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And if men come unto me I will show unto them their weakness. I give unto men weakness that
they may be humble; and my grace is sufficient for all men that humble themselves before me;
for if they humble themselves before me, and have faith in me, then will I make weak things
become strong unto them. - Ether 12:27
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ABSTRACT

Author: Dunn, Samuel, J. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: August 2018
Title: Pathology of Neurodiversity?: Cognitive Accessibility and the Rhetorical Construction of
ADHD in Higher Education
Committee Chair: Patricia Sullivan
It is estimated that 2-8% of college students (approximately 1 in 20) report clinically
significant diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Typically, those with
verifiable diagnoses of ADHD are eligible to receive certain accommodations through the
university which, in theory, put them on even footing with their peers; however there has been
very little research done to actively address the needs of these students in the context of the
composition classroom itself. To address this gap, in this dissertation I discuss the rhetorical
positioning and identity construction of ADHD in the contemporary American university and
ways in which composition courses in particular can more effectively institute practices aimed at
enabling cognitively diverse students to succeed.
The first goal of this dissertation is to better understand origins of the current
medical/pathological rhetorical treatment of ADHD and the ways in which this approach affects
college students with ADHD. Specifically, I look at the history of ADHD discourse to
demonstrate how ADHD has come to be discussed through the lens of medical and pathological
language and how such language has been adopted by contemporary colleges and universities
through accommodations offerings and diagnostic protocols. The second goal of this dissertation
is to advocate for ways that agents within composition programs can improve pedagogy and
course design in such a way as to better meet the needs of these neurodiverse students. In
particular, I discuss a cognitively accessible approach to teaching composition that focuses on
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metacognitive awareness as well as a “prototyping pedagogy.” Owing to the difficulty of
addressing individuals’ cognitive needs – even when there exists a specific diagnosis each case is
deeply idiosyncratic – the goal for both of these pedagogical approaches is to enable students to
better recognize their own cognitive strengths and weaknesses and to actively seek out
technologies, physical spaces, and writing processes that best enable them to compose
successfully.
From this dissertation I have identified three general takeaways: 1) institutional language
surrounding neurodiversity needs to improve, 2) more effort can/should be placed on the
academic success of neurodiverse students in colleges and universities, and 3) pedagogical
approaches tailored to the needs of ADHD students are also beneficial for most if not all other
students, regardless of cognitive ability. It is this last takeaway that is perhaps most important to
emphasize. I argue that as we make conscious efforts to improve the cognitive accessibility of
composition programs, we are simultaneously improving the overall quality of composition
pedagogy for all students, regardless of cognitive ability or diagnostic status.

1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Overview
In this dissertation I analyze and critique the rhetorical construction of Attention Deficit

Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) as a medical disorder requiring treatment and/or
accommodations to address deficits. In particular, I demonstrate how this medicalization and
pathologization of ADHD has been adopted by colleges and universities through
accommodations offerings and diagnosis protocols, thus inscribing an expressly negative identity
for students with ADHD. Furthermore, I propose ways that writing programs at all levels of
agency can proactively implement cognition-based accessibility practices that benefit all students
regardless of diagnostic status.
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders, 5th Edition:
DSM-5, ADHD is defined as, “A persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivityimpulsivity that interferes with functioning or development” (59). While this brief definition is
fairly standard across all contexts, there is considerable discussion and controversy surrounding
whether ADHD exists, what ADHD actually is, and how it should be approached and
accommodated in institutions of higher education. Various chapters of this dissertation are
devoted to exploring these issues, but here in the introduction, I want to begin by briefly
describing my own personal experience with ADHD, as defined by the DSM-5. I recognize that
an over-reliance on anecdotal and narrative evidence can be a major limitation to disability and
pedagogical scholarship. As such, I recount my own experience here not as evidence, per se, but
rather 1) to make explicit my own positioning (including bias), and 2) to humanize my research
in ways that demonstrate how, for me and for others like me, the answers to my research
questions and the recommendations I propose are not merely academic, but personal.
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1.2

Personal Connection to the Project
I was in elementary school when I was first told that I probably had ADHD. My teachers

would often include notes on my report cards telling my parents that I needed to not talk to my
friends in class, and I spent nearly the entire 4th grade “perched” on my chair (that was my
teacher’s word for it) like a bird rather than sitting normally. I was never officially diagnosed or
medicated, however, because my distractibility and hyperactivity never became overly
detrimental to my academic progress and success. As I progressed through K-12 and moved on
to college and graduate school, I continued to put off seeking an official diagnosis because I felt
that much of what made me a successful student and writer, and later teacher and scholar,
seemed tied to certain traits that are often associated with ADHD. While my ADHD was
increasingly making some aspects of life difficult and I would have benefited greatly from
certain accommodations, I was afraid of losing those strengths or somehow weakening them if I
sought diagnosis and accommodation.
As the fall semester of my second semester of my PhD program was coming to an end, I
was in the middle of writing my term papers when I was involved in a rollover accident. The
accident happened on a Monday and I had to finish and submit my papers by the Friday of that
week. I had presented the main material of those papers the previous week, so the material was
gathered and writing the papers was more or less a matter of transcribing the presentations I had
given. But after the accident, I was in a difficult place mentally. I wasn’t dealing with any
outwardly visible problems as a result of the accident, but I couldn’t bring myself to focus. In the
accident I had suffered whiplash and was told by the EMT at the scene that I likely had a minor
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concussion. This brain trauma, mild though it was, seemed to react very negatively with my
ADHD, and I couldn’t bring myself to focus on writing the papers1.
Fittingly, one of the papers I was writing involved theorizing the implementation of
certain physical and cultural accommodations that workplaces could make in aiding the cognitive
health of their neurologically divergent employees. That week the central questions driving that
paper ceased to be purely academic, and instead became questions to which I desperately needed
answers considering the cognitive disarray I was facing:
•

What kinds of struggles do neurologically divergent students face when they are asked to
perform cognitively difficult writing tasks in composition courses?

•

How can we address and accommodate such students in the face of those difficulties?

I was able to finish the papers (though it required asking for and being granted extra time), but I
have continued seeking answers to the questions at the heart of that project regarding the
struggles of and the accommodations available to the neurologically diverse.
As I have learned more about ADHD, I have gained some insight that has provided me
with a more nuanced understanding of what ADHD is and how it affects me. First, as I had found
through my experience, many ADHD “symptoms” are only negative in certain contexts and can
contribute to success in other contexts. Additionally, however, I have also come to realize that
there have been and continue to be ways in which my ability to function cognitively is inhibited
by ADHD in many areas of my life. In recognizing that I might benefit from guidance by mental
health professionals, nearly a year after my accident I began the process of official diagnosis.

1

The relationship between traumatic brain injury and ADHD has been tentatively demonstrated in several recent
studies. While those studying this issue refrain from making claims regarding causal linkage, a statistically
significant correlation has been demonstrated. See: Hughes, et al; Ilie, et al; Zwi and Clamp.
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I say that “I began the process” because diagnosis is not completed with a single visit to
the doctor or a simple test. I underwent a battery of tests administered by a psychologist working
in Purdue University’s Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS) over the space of nearly a
month. After completing all the tests, I received a 10-page report that discussed at some length
the tests performed and summarized the findings of each one. Finally, to conclude the report
stated: “When considering all of these areas, a diagnosis of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder, Combined Presentation, Mild is most appropriate.”
As a result of this diagnosis, the report informed me that I was a “good candidate for
stimulant medication management of ADHD,” and that I might apply to the Disability Resource
Center (DRC) for further academic accommodations. In discussing these accommodations with
the psychologist who diagnosed me as well various other mental health and academic support
professionals, I found that the offered accommodations would not be useful for me. These
accommodations focused largely on outwardly expressed behaviors with which I either didn’t
struggle or that did not pertain to the work I do as a scholar and teacher of composition and
rhetoric. For example, while I am highly distractible, I don’t struggle inordinately to pay
attention in class, so a peer note-taker was unnecessary. In terms of classroom accommodations,
the offer of additional time on tests or distraction-reduced testing environments weren’t
applicable due to the lack of tests in my graduate coursework2.
The same disconnect I experienced with the proffered accommodations are common to
the experience of ADHD students in my courses who come to my class bearing accommodation
letters from the Disability Resource Center (DRC). Almost to a person these students have said
some variation of, “I have ADHD and a note from the DRC, but I don’t think my

2

Unfortunately, this diagnosis and the accompanying accommodations offering came post-preliminary exams.
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accommodations really apply to your class.” We discuss their accommodations, and with the
exception of my occasionally recommending that they look into various assistive technologies,
we agree that the accommodations they’ve received won’t provide much assistance.
Unfortunately for me and for my students, the cognitively difficult work of composition
courses is affected by ADHD but in ways that the proffered accommodations don’t ameliorate.
While there has been considerable research identifying, discussing, and responding to physical
and behavioral accommodations – leading to the current accommodations approach – cognitive
disabilities have been under-discussed, specifically with regard to the unique difficulties
composition courses present to these students. This perceived gap between institutionally
provided accommodations and the needs of myself and my students has largely motivated this
project.
While the offered accommodations were unhelpful for me, this process of getting
diagnosed and discussing various intervention possibilities did connect me with a weekly
campus-sponsored ADHD group therapy where two mental health professionals lead discussions
about harnessing the idiosyncrasies of the ADHD brain for our own educational and professional
good, while diminishing the attendant difficulties. It is this attention to focusing on strengths first
and only then looking at ways of accommodating weaknesses, together with the
personal/classroom observations and the preliminary background research that has laid the
foundation for this dissertation.

1.3

Research Questions
As I have come to better understand the ADHD community through psychological

counseling and scholarly research, my questions have sharpened and my focus has shifted from
the early questions I was asking. Specifically, while I’m still interested in understanding the
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struggles that neurologically diverse students face in composition courses, I’ve found that in
order to understand that struggle, it is important to first better understand the cognitive processes
that underlie composition3. Also, in order to understand how to best accommodate these
students’ needs, we need to first better understand the current accommodations framework and
the theoretical and historical paradigms from which it is operating. With these concerns in mind,
the core research questions for this dissertation are as follows:
•

What is the origin of the current deficit-focused behavioral accommodations?

•

How is the focus on behavioral accommodations institutionally (re)inscribed by the
discourse surrounding ADHD in higher education?

•

1.4

How can we better meet the needs of neurodiverse students in composition courses?

Prevalence of ADHD
George DuPaul, et al conducted a review of six studies that sought to identify the

prevalence of ADHD in college students. These studies suggest that 2 - 8% of college students
report clinically significant diagnoses of ADHD (“College Students” 236)4. If we take the middle
value in the range (5%), that number translates to one in 20 college students, or, on average, at
least one student in every composition course.5 That students with ADHD are likely to be present

3

I will discuss some literature that addresses this question in Chapter 2, but for now that is a project that is outside
the purview of my dissertation.
4
DuPaul, et al make it clear that “these numbers do not reflect the actual percentage of college students with
documented ADHD” (236, emphasis original). Studies of the prevalence of ADHD are predominantly carried out
among child populations. The statistic cited here is derived from six different studies each with varying
methodological concerns, largely due to their near-exclusive reliance on self-report data. The most current (2016)
CDC data demonstrate that “approximately 9.4% of children 2-17 years of age (6.1 million) had ever been
diagnosed with ADHD” (“Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): Data and Statistics”). This number
would seem to align with the DuPaul claim, when coupled with the CDC reports of the increasing trajectory of
ADHD diagnoses over the past 20+ years ((“Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): ADHD Throughout
the Years”). While this CDC data is more current, and perhaps more methodologically sound, I cite the 2009 DuPaul
report due to its explicit focus on the college student population.
5
This is based off of the (optimistic) recommendation of the Conference on College Composition and
Communication’s (CCCC) statement from October 1989 (which was subsequently revised November 2013 and
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in every class we teach ought to be reason enough for us to look for improved methods of
addressing their unique needs and concerns, but the concern is bigger than that.
While just 2-8% of college students may seem a relatively small percentage, when we
consider that there are 20.4 million students enrolled in colleges and universities across the
United States (“Fast Facts”), it means that between 408,000 and 1,632,000 college students have
ADHD. And this number is likely an underestimation. In addition to the assessment difficulties
that will be discussed in the following chapter, identifying with precision the number of
individuals with ADHD will always fall short. This is due, in part, to the largely negative social
bias associated with ADHD that disincentivizes self-identification (Mueller, et al) as well as the
fact that even if ADHD existed in an unbiased society, many individuals simply are not aware
that they have ADHD (Asherson, et al).
These numbers themselves paint a striking picture of the need for discussion about best
practices when addressing ADHD in the composition classroom, but the argument might be
made that such a discussion is moot because accommodations are already made available to any
students who qualify for them. While this is true and legally guaranteed under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and even more prominently the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, these
accommodations fall well short of meeting the needs of students with ADHD. While I later
discuss in detail the short-comings of university-granted accommodations, I will briefly mention
here a study published in 2009 regarding accommodations for college students with ADHD. This
study found that among students with ADHD who were offered accommodations, only “40%
reported that the university had offered sufficient accommodations.” The study also reported
that, “of those receiving adequate accommodations, though, only 45% indicated that they use the

again March 2015) “Principles for the Postsecondary Teaching of Writing” in which it is advised, “No more than 20
students should be permitted in any writing class. Ideally, classes should be limited to 15.”
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available accommodations” (Chew, et al, 274). If 60% of students feel that accommodations are
insufficient to meet their needs and more than half of those who find them sufficient don’t even
use them, there is much room for discussing alternatives and additions to this current approach.

1.5

Chapter Summaries
Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides definitional groundwork for ADHD by discussing

current best practices in clinical psychology as well as various legally binding government acts
upon which many accommodation services are based. I then discuss accommodation services
and some of the ways that the current approach does not fully meet the needs of students who are
neurologically diverse. To more fully understand this notion of neurodiversity, I discuss
competing theoretical frameworks of cognition such as executive functioning, information
processing, and multiple intelligence theory that have bearing on how we have come to
understand the cognitive impact of ADHD. Additionally, I explore how attempting to define
cognition overlaps with the neurodiversity movement which aims to redefine neurological
differences as a normal aspect of human variation and not as disorders that need medical
treatment.
In Chapter 3 I discuss how medical rhetoric, specifically that employed by mental health
professionals, came to be the predominant discourse surrounding ADHD. To do this I discuss
early descriptions of ADHD that demonstrate a shift away from an exclusive focus on the moral
and religious implications of behavior and towards ways that medicine and medical discourse
might be employed to (re)form behavior. I then discuss early 20th century depictions of ADHD,
which depictions are often looked to as the starting point of the scientific history of ADHD.
Finally, I examine in more depth two diagnostic manuals from the 1970s and 1980s that
demonstrate the consummation of this move toward rhetorically constructing ADHD as a
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medical disorder that fosters deficits in those who suffer from it, deficits that require special
treatment and accommodations.
In Chapter 4 I focus on a specialist discourse, namely the Barkley Deficits in Executive
Functioning Scale: Long Form (BDEFS:LF), which is used as a preliminary diagnostic tool for
ADHD. This diagnostic test, while not fully comprehensive, is commonly used by university
accommodations offices as a part of the diagnosis process, often in the early stages as a
screening tool. Students seeking diagnosis and university accommodations must go through
testing such as this in order to qualify, and as such, tests such as the BDEFS:LF represent the
terministic screens that, at least partially, construct the reality of ADHD on campus. To analyze
this test, I bring Kenneth Burke’s (nonsymbolic) motion/(symbolic) action pair into conversation
with Martin Buber’s I and THOU to demonstrate that these tests ascribe unambiguously negative
symbolic action – which in turn lead to negative attitudes and actions (Burke, RHM 42, 50) – to
the nonsymbolic motion of ADHD. In this chapter, I highlight an area where mental health
professionals and rhetoricians throughout the university (WPAs, members of faculty senates,
policy makers, etc.) might focus linguistic reform efforts to start shifting institutional attitudes
regarding ADHD from a pathology paradigm to one embracing the spectrum (both strengths and
weaknesses) of neurological diversity.
In Chapters 5 and 6 I address two specific ways on which composition instructors and
WPAs might begin focusing their efforts to create classrooms and pedagogies that are more
effective at meeting the needs of cognitively diverse students.
In Chapter 5 I argue that one way of doing this is by enacting an accessible pedagogy
focused on metacognition that reflects some of the ideals behind cognitive-behavioral therapy, a
common occupational therapy for individuals with ADHD. This renewed emphasis on
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metacognition can help students better understand their own cognitive processes and thus
consciously choose to engage in composition processes uniquely suited to their own strengths
and weaknesses. In particular I discuss how implementing mindfulness meditation into
composition courses can provide students with metacognitive experiences that can help them
develop metacognitive knowledge.
In Chapter 6 I discuss what I call a “prototyping pedagogy” that encourages students to
be aware of the influence of external factors on their cognitive processes and to actively choose
those external influences that will enable them to function most effectively. To illustrate this
pedagogy, I discuss two of these external influences in some depth: composition technologies
and composition environments. These are two areas of concern that don’t often receive the
attention they merit considering the cognitive impact they have on individuals’ ability to
compose successfully. This pedagogy adopts a focus on design thinking and draws on usability
research methods to teach students to engage in iterative design of their own writing processes
(including external factors like environment and technology) that are uniquely attuned to their
individual cognitive needs. The end goal of this prototyping pedagogy is to encourage students to
view their writing processes as prototypes that they are honing. By actively studying the usability
of composition technologies and of the environments in which they compose, students can gain
insight into the ways in which these do or do not enable them to draw on their own cognitive
strengths and mitigate their cognitive weaknesses. Ultimately, the goal is to enable to students to
make conscious decisions regarding these aspects of the composition process that often go uninterrogated in composition courses.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Defining ADHD
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a term that was first introduced in

1994 with the publication of the 4th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM 4). Prior to this it was known by dozens of different names depending on a
given time period’s symptoms du jour. Prominent precursors to “ADHD” were Attention-deficit
disorder (ADD), hyperactivity, minimal brain dysfunction (MBD) and others. In Chapter 1 I
mentioned a brief definition of ADHD from the DSM 5. I want to add to that definition, again
from the DSM 5, to get a fuller understanding of what is being addressed when we talk about
ADHD:
A neurodevelopmental disorder defined by impairing levels of inattention,
disorganization, and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity. Inattention and disorganization
entail inability to stay on task, seeming not to listen, and losing materials, at levels
that are inconsistent with age or developmental level. Hyperactivity-impulsivity
entails overactivity, fidgeting, inability to stay seated, intruding into other people's
activities, and inability to wait – symptoms that are excessive for age or
developmental level. In childhood, ADHD frequently overlaps with disorders that
are often considered to be “externalizing disorders,” such as oppositional defiant
disorder and conduct disorder. ADHD often persists into adulthood, with resultant
impairments of social, academic and occupational functioning. (32)
From this list of symptoms and diagnostic markers, mental health professionals determine
whether an individual qualifies for ADHD diagnosis. If they determine a positive diagnosis, they
then specify, per the DSM-5, which of the three ADHD subtypes the diagnosed individual
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exhibits: predominantly inattentive presentation, predominantly hyperactive/impulsive
presentation, or combined presentation (60). In addition to this more specific diagnosis, the
diagnosis is then determined to be mild, moderate, or severe.
Accurately diagnosing any form of neurological diversity is difficult because each case is
deeply idiosyncratic (Singh; Steinhoff; Uekermann, et al). Even with a more specific diagnosis
of ADHD, the way that this disorder presents in each individual is widely varied. In order to
diagnose ADHD, psychologists employ a series of assessments with information derived from
several different sources in order to triangulate an accurate diagnosis, as illustrated in Table 2.1
(adapted from Pliszka, et al). The majority of these tests are multi-variable and are measured
along a spectrum rather than a strict issue/non-issue assessment. As such, even if there is a
positive diagnosis using one of these diagnostic instruments, there is no equivalency across
positive diagnoses.
To address some of these methodological difficulties, the DSM-5 asserts that,
“Manifestations of the disorder must be present in more than one setting (e.g., home and school,
work). Confirmation of substantial symptoms across settings typically cannot be done accurately
without consulting informants who have seen the individual in those settings” (61). To collect
this information, surveys and requests for information are sent to the individual’s friends, family
members, co-workers, roommates, etc. Additionally, the individual fills out surveys and is often
interviewed extensively. Exact protocols for diagnostic testing are not widely published, and
likely vary by institution, but Table 1 demonstrates some of the diagnostic protocols and
instruments used when establishing an official diagnosis of ADHD.
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Table 1. Some common tests for diagnosing and assessing ADHD
Name

Description

Academic Performance Rating
Scale(APRS

A 19-item scale for determining a child’s academic productivity and
accuracy in grades 1-6 that has 6 scale points; construct, concurrent, and
discriminant validity data as well as norms (n = 247) (Barkley)

ADHD Rating Scale-IV

The ADHD Rating Scale-IV is an 18-item scale using DSM-IV criteria
(DuPaul, et al; ADHD...)

Brown ADD Rating Scales for
Children, Adolescents, and Adults

Software that is scalable according to age that measures deficits in
executive functioning

Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL)

Parent-completed CBCL and Teacher-completed Teacher Report Form
(TRF)

Conners Parent Rating ScaleRevised (CPRS-R)
Conners Teacher Rating ScaleRevised (CTRS-R)
Conners Wells Adolescent SelfReport Scale (CASS-L)

Evaluate problem behaviors as reported by the teachers, parents or
alternative caregivers, and adolescents

-Home Situations QuestionnaireRevised (HSQ-R),
-School Situations QuestionnaireRevised (SSQ-R)

A 14-item scale designed to assess specific problems with attention and
concentration across a variety of home and public situations; it uses a 0-9
scale and has test-retest, internal consistency, construct validity,
discriminant validity, concurrent validity, and norms (n = 581) (Barkley)

Inattention/Overactivity With
Aggression (IOWA) Conners
Teacher Rating Scale

A 10-item scale developed to separate the inattention and overactivity
ratings from oppositional defiance (Loney and Milich)

Swanson, Nolan, and Pelham
(SNAP-IV) and SKAMP

The SNAP-IV (Swanson) is a 26-item scale that contains DSM-IV criteria
for ADHD and screens for other DSM diagnoses; the SKAMP (Wigal et al)
is a 10-item scale that measures impairment of functioning at home and at
school.

Vanderbilt ADHD Diagnostic
Parent and Teacher Scales

Teachers rate 35 symptoms and 8 performance items measuring ADHD
symptoms and common comorbid conditions (Wolraich et al.
“Teachers…”). The parent version contains all 18 ADHD symptoms, with
items assessing comorbid conditions and performance (Wolraich et al,
“Psychometric…”)

Given the “developmental” definitional ties to diagnosis of this disorder, seen in the
above quote from the DSM-5, there are many differing approaches to understanding and
diagnosing ADHD. Some choose to focus on the neurological basis of the disorder and focus on
treatment appropriate to that viewpoint (Curatolo, D’Agati, and Movero; Faraone and
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Biederman; Diamond; Tripp and Wickens), others choose to focus on the behavioral expressions
of ADHD (Barkley “Behavioral Inhibition”; Winstanley, Eagle, and Robbins; Skirrow, et al),
while still other focus on family or other social factors that might be associated with the
development of ADHD (Dealt; Biederman, et al; Bernier, et al; Webster-Stratton, Reid, and
Hammond). These viewpoints are not necessarily contradictory, and many, if not most, who
study and treat ADHD recognize the reality of ADHD is probably some mix of all these factors. I
highlight these different approaches to diagnosing and treating ADHD because it highlights how
much (and how little) we know about ADHD. However, despite these differences and difficulties
in identifying ADHD, institutions of higher education are legally required to accommodate
individuals with ADHD ever since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in
1990 and subsequent court cases dealing with accommodations and ADHD.

2.2

ADHD and the ADA
Accommodations for individuals with ADHD are legally founded on two pieces of

government legislation, Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and the 1990 ADA. To
understand what these two acts mean for accommodations generally and for ADHD in particular,
it is important to clarify that the legislative foundation for accommodations in college is different
than that for primary and secondary school. In K-12 education, accommodations are driven by
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The IDEA is the impetus for special
education programs that help facilitate the success of students who have some disability that
makes learning difficult. As Michael Gordon and Shelby Keiser explain regarding the IDEA,
“funding is mandated that identifies children with significant problems and provides them with
appropriate services that facilitate learning” (4). In contrast, the ADA and Section 504 are not
entitlement acts, they are anti-discrimination acts. The difference is that the IDEA is concerned
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with success, whereas the ADA and Section 504 are concerned with access. Gordon and Shelby
explain, “the antidiscrimination model is outcome-neutral. The ADA does not dictate that a
student must pass every course or examination…. The ADA guarantees that individuals who are
otherwise qualified for jobs or educational programs will not be denied access simply because
they have a disability” (5). This is an important and at times confusing distinction because it
highlights that “ADA-compliance administrators must focus more on whether students have
equal opportunity than on optimizing academic success” (Gordon and Keiser 5). It is important
to point out that “educational success” is not the goal of the ADA. While those who implement
the ADA and provide accommodations for students are naturally going to be concerned with the
educational success of students, the ADA itself and the accommodations it legally prescribes are
not founded on that specific value. The ADA and the accommodations that it prescribes and
allows are often the only interventions that students with ADHD ever experience. Given its nearexclusivity in intervening on behalf of students with ADHD, the ADA bears exploring in greater
depth.
The Americans with Disabilities Act outlines for workplaces and institutions of higher
education requirements that it needs to meet in order to not be found discriminatory against
disabled persons. Section 102(a) of the ADA reads, “No covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” Previous to this section, “disability” is defined
as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities”
(Sec. 3.1.A). Section 102(a) further explains that one way such institutions might demonstrate
discrimination is by, “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
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hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity” (Sec. 102.b.5a). In this section
we find three key terms in understanding how the ADA defines disability and how that definition
pertains to ADHD: major life activities, reasonable accommodations, otherwise qualified
individual.
2.2.1 Major Life Activities
The original iteration of the ADA did not elaborate on what constitutes a “major life
activity,” but in 2008 Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in which it was
determined that “major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working”
(13). Additionally, the ADAAA added “major bodily functions” to its definition of “disability”
and for which accommodations need to be provided. According to the ADAAA, the term “major
bodily functions,” “includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited
to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological,
brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions” (14). While students with
ADHD might exhibit some difficulty with many of these major life activities and bodily
functions, university accommodations officials often focus on interventions for students with
ADHD related to: learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, and communicating, among the
major life activities, and neurological and brain functions from the major bodily functions.
This list of major life activities and major bodily functions provide a good starting point
in considering of how the ADA applies to ADHD; unfortunately, there is little consensus
regarding how to shape this information into an accommodations framework. Similarly, there is
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little consensus regarding the extent to which employers and public institutions must go in order
for accommodations to be considered “reasonable.”
2.2.2 Reasonable Accommodations
The term “reasonable accommodations” is perhaps most directly defined in a 2002 brief
by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission entitled “Enforcement Guidance:
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act”
that outlines the guidelines for the enforcement of the ADA. The brief reads:
A modification or adjustment is ‘reasonable’ if it ‘seems reasonable on its face,
i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases;’ this means it is ‘reasonable’ if it appears to
be ‘feasible’ or ‘plausible.’ An accommodation also must be effective in meeting
the needs of the individual. In the context of job performance, this means that a
reasonable accommodation enables the individual to perform the essential
functions of the position.6
This tautological definition makes it appear as if government officials are leaving this term
purposefully opaque. This may be the case in order to not unnecessarily limit the scope of
accommodation; however, the unintended effect of such opacity is that it leaves little guidance
for direct application in settings such as colleges and universities.
The exact applicability of “reasonable accommodations” vis-à-vis the ADA for
individuals with ADHD has been the subject of many cases that have been tried before federal
courts including:

6

The quotes in this passage come from the 2002 Supreme Court case US Airways vs Barnett.
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•

Brown v. Cox Medical Centers (8th Cir. 2002), in which the court defined “ability to
perform cognitive functions” a major life activity;

•

Gagliardo v. Connaught Laboratories, Inc. (3d Cir. 2002), in which the court found
“concentrating and remembering (more generally, cognitive function)” to be major life
activities

•

Knapp v. City of Columbus (2006) in which three firefighters with ADHD sued for
accommodations from the city. The court found that the ADA didn’t cover their struggles
with ADHD, because their ability to perform their work was not affected.

As these cases demonstrate, when it comes to discussion of the legal ramifications of the ADA
for organizations (both professional and educational) whether or not an accommodation is
“reasonable” depends upon 1) whether the impairment falls within the scope of “major life
activity,” as discussed previously and 2) whether that impairment directly affects an individual’s
ability to perform their required function. It is this second concern with regard to an individual’s
ability that is at the heart of whether someone is deemed to be an “otherwise qualified
individual.”
2.2.3 Otherwise Qualified Individuals
The term “otherwise qualified individual” is most easily understood in the context of
physical disabilities. An individual in a wheelchair might be a qualified chemistry student except
for her ability to perform the work of a chemistry lab due to the height of the lab counters. In
such a case, per the ADA, a chemistry lab is required to provide work space that this student
would be able to access. The question of “otherwise qualified individual” is a little bit more
difficult to define when it comes to some of the “major bodily functions” aspect of the ADA, in
particular neurological and brain functions. In schools, the work that is performed often depends
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upon a certain level of cognitive ability. Assessment measures such as GPA and standardized
testing scores are used as requirements for acceptance to institutions of higher education
expressly for the reason of assessing an individual’s ability to perform cognitively rigorous work.
How can we say that a student with a disability that affects his ability to perform cognitive work
is otherwise qualified to do the work of higher education, when that work is (often) cognitive in
nature?
While addressing this question of “otherwise qualified” is generally difficult with regard
to cognitive and neurological functions, it is fairly straightforward in the context of higher
education. The fact that a student has been accepted and matriculated into a course of study is
evidence that, from the perspective of the university, the student has the necessary cognitive
qualifications to succeed. As such, when difficulties related to ADHD present themselves and
inhibit the ability of students to learn, they qualify for accommodation. This definitional
discussion of key terms in the ADA is important because it is the groundwork upon which
accommodations are based.

2.3

Current Accommodations Approach
To begin a discussion of ADHD accommodations in higher education, let’s briefly return

to two statistics previously mentioned in Chapter 1 that demonstrate the prevalence and
experience of students with ADHD in higher education. First, in 2009 it was estimated that,
“approximately 2% to 8% of college students self-report clinically significant symptoms
associated with ADHD” (DuPaul, et al, “College Students…” 236).7 To reiterate, this translates
to roughly one in 20 college students, or at least one student in every composition course. And

7

Review footnote 4 on page 6 for methodological note about this statistic.
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this number only includes students who have been formally diagnosed, ignoring those who never
sought out diagnosis, who only just missed the cutoff that separates “clinically diagnosable”
from “normal,” or who may exhibit ADHD-like symptoms as a result of other social,
developmental, or other mental disorders8. While it is clearly impossible to report how many
individuals with ADHD go undiagnosed, Stephen Able, et al published a study in 2007 that set
out to compare the kinds of impairments individuals with undiagnosed ADHD experienced in
with those experienced by individuals with diagnosed ADHD. In doing so they used a lowintensity screening protocol (the six-question ASRS v1.1) to screen by phone 20,011 individuals
with no prior diagnosis of ADHD. They found that of those 20,011 screened, 1236 (6.2%)
screened positive for ADHD. While a formal diagnosis would require a considerably more
thorough evaluation, if this finding that around 6% of college students have ADHD and are
undiagnosed proves even mildly accurate, the actual number of individuals with ADHD could
double beyond the 2 – 8% of diagnosed students reported by DuPaul, et al.
Second, according to a 2009 study, among the students who had been formerly diagnosed
with ADHD, “40% reported that the university had offered sufficient accommodations to them.”
Additionally, it was found that, “of those receiving adequate accommodations, though, only 45%
indicated that they use the available accommodations” (Chew, et al, 274). In explaining why
accommodations went unused – whether those accommodations were perceived to be sufficient
or not – Chew, et al report:
Reasons for not using available accommodations among both those who indicated
being provided adequate accommodations and those who did not included, “I

8

In the two and a half years since I was officially diagnosed with ADHD, I make a point of self-identifying to my
classes in order to destigmatize mental health issues. Anecdotally I can report that in every class in which I have
done this I have had at least two to three students per class, beyond those students with official diagnoses and letters
of accommodation, privately tell me that they too have ADHD.
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want to do things like everyone else, even though it takes me longer,” “Kind of
got over it,” “Many are unnecessary,” “Don’t want to,” “No need,” “Lazy,” “I
don’t think I was properly diagnosed,” “None offered,” “Unaware of them,” and
“Don’t know anything.” (274)
While there are conflicting explanations here, and any attempt to generalize the motivations or
justifications behind these self-report findings would be irresponsible, it bears emphasizing that
60% of students formally diagnosed with ADHD found the accommodations they were offered
to be inadequate. And more than half of those who considered accommodations adequate did not
actually use those accommodations. Clearly student perception of the adequacy of
accommodations is not the best measure of whether accommodations are effectively addressing
these students’ needs. As the students themselves recognized there are other issues that may have
inhibited their actually making use of the accommodations (social pressure, motivation, etc.) that
have nothing to do with the intrinsic adequacy of the accommodations themselves. However,
given the discussion of QoL above, as well as the ongoing work of disability resource center
officials, administrators, and teachers alike of finding better ways of helping students succeed,
we might do well to explore what other reasons might exist for these accommodations being
perceived as inadequate.
The current manner in which institutions of higher education attempt to address the
academic and subsequent QoL struggles of students with ADHD is by providing course
accommodations as dictated by a centralized accommodations office. These offices are typically
staffed by trained professionals and academics in psychology, education, and disability studies;
yet even with the expertise of these individuals and their exclusive focus on providing recourse
for students who reach out in need, this system can at times fall short of achieving its goal. In
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discussing this “issue of formal accommodations,” Margaret Price explains, “We are accustomed
to thinking of classroom accommodations in terms of measurable steps that help ‘level the
playing field’...but what accommodations can be offered for the student who is earnestly
participating, but in ways that do not fall into the (usually rationalist) pattern of classroom
discussions and activities?” (59). Price’s question regarding the problem of accommodating
students who are earnestly participating reflects directly the experience of students with ADHD,
as described above. These students are earnestly attempting to succeed, but are unable to do so,
even with accommodations to help them. Understanding some of the ways in which this
accommodations approach is at times insufficient is important if we are to improve the
educational experiences of students with ADHD.
In identifying and discussing some of these concerns regarding the current
accommodations approach, I want to emphasize here that my aim is not to unduly criticize the
work of those individuals who enact, distribute, advocate for, educate about, and otherwise
promote the usefulness of accommodations on college campuses. Rather, I aim to illustrate some
of the mitigating factors surrounding the accommodations institution that are either outside these
individuals sphere of agency, or which they readily acknowledge and work to address, but that
remain areas of concern.
2.3.1 Concern 1: Accommodation Controversy
The first difficulty that the current accommodations system faces is the controversial
nature of accommodations for students with learning disabilities. Unlike physical disabilities that
are readily visible and whose needs are readily apparent, learning disabilities and
neurodevelopmental disorders such as ADHD present concerns and needs that are not easily
discerned. This lack of visibility results in some skepticism of the necessity and fairness of
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accommodations for such students (Stage and Milne; Stage and Manning). While ADHD is not
considered a learning disability per se, ADHD and learning disabilities have been found to be
comorbid at the rate of 45.1% (DuPaul, Gormley, and Laracy). In addition to these similarities
and comorbidities of ADHD and LD, accommodating ADHD attracts a similar tenor of
controversy in popular and academic literature, as well in the anecdotal experience of many
individuals who have been diagnosed with ADHD. This controversy can take many forms. Some
question the existence of ADHD in both popular (e.g. Berezin, Pies, Wedge) and academic
(Quinn and Lynch; Sjöberg and Dahlbeck; Tait) publications. Even when it is acknowledged that
there does exist such a phenomenon as ADHD, there are also definitional arguments, as explored
previously. Beyond these foundational arguments, there is much controversy that focuses
specifically on policies addressing if/to what extent ADHD, and LD more generally, should be
accommodated. It is in this last area of controversy that the controversy can become, at times,
vitriolic.
Jon Westling, the provost of Boston University who would go on to become the
university’s president was suspicious of the application of accommodations for learning
disabilities because he thought they undermined academic rigor. He went so far as to write and
publish about the “myth” of learning disabilities. Promulgators of this myth, he claimed, “[use]
the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ... – perhaps
contrary to legislative intention, but nonetheless – to force colleges and universities to lower
academic standards” (Westling “Getting”). In his office as provost, he “began to deny
accommodations to students at BU. He enforced policies requiring students to have disabilities
recertified every three years, denied requests for services, and refused to allow course
substitutions for foreign language requirements” (White 706). Later in 1997, after Westling had
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become president of the university, 10 students brought suit against Westling and Boston
University for discrimination. While the judge declared 13 “fundamental conclusions” in the
case, two are pertinent to our discussion:
Conclusion 9: “Federal law does not require a university to modify degree
requirements that it determines are a fundamental part of its academic program by
providing learning disabled students with course substitutions.”
Conclusion 10: “BU's refusal to modify its degree requirements in order to
provide course substitutions, particularly in the area of foreign languages, was
motivated in substantial part by uninformed stereotypes by the President and his
staff that many students with learning disabilities (like the infamous, non-existent
‘Somnolent Samantha’) are lazy fakers, and that many evaluators are ‘snake oil
salesmen’ who overdiagnose the disability.” (Guckenberger v. Boston University)
In response to this court case and the findings of the judge, Westling wrote an opinion piece that
was published in the Wall Street Journal entitled, “One University Defeats Disability
Extremists.” In this piece Westling asserts a qualified victory over the “overblown and
unscientific claims by some learning disability advocates.” This declaration of victory comes
based on Conclusion 9 that finds that federal law cannot force universities to adjust degree
requirements that are “fundamental” to its academic program. He declared that with the findings
of the case:
Academic standards have been vindicated…. Universities can reject diagnoses
that make no sense. Universities, not learning disability specialists, can determine
appropriate academic accommodations. To uphold the integrity of academic
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degrees, universities need a fuller restoration of their proper academic authority,
but the decision moves us in the right direction.
Westling, despite being directly called to the carpet for basing his judgments and actions on
“uninformed stereotypes” maintained his crusade against “learning-disabilities extremists” in the
name of academic integrity.
In a second case, the controversy surrounding accommodations is not quite as stark as the
Boston University case, though it is perhaps more representative of the often quietly held opinion
that some accommodations give those receiving them an unfair advantage. In 2017 Michael
Schlesinger, a professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign for 41 years, was placed on administrative leave after refusing to grant specific
accommodations to a learning-disabled student (Flaherty). In contrast to the BU case,
Schlesinger was not setting himself up in opposition to a perceived overreach in learning
disability accommodations. Rather, he felt that the specific accommodation in question –
providing electronic copies of his lecture slides prior to class – disincentivized students from
coming to class at all. Schlesinger offered to pay for a note-taker to assist the learning-disabled
student in question but refused to provide copies of his slides (Flaherty).
In an email exchange with the Disability Resources and Educational Services (DRES)
specialist who was coordinating the accommodation, Schlesinger, who had BCC’d the 100+
other students in the class, said that he would not, “advantage a single DRES student over the
100-plus non-DRES students in my course by providing that student with my lectures
electronically” (ShoKami, “ATMS 140 Drama”)9. Schlesinger then dismissively ended his email
to the DRES specialist, writing, “I think the university needs to rethink having people such as

9

The emails cited here were posted on Reddit by one of the students in the class. Schlesinger confirmed their
authenticity to Inside Higher Ed (Flaherty).
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you. Nonetheless, I look forward to spending the remainder of my life in Kona, Hawaii.” In an
email sent to Inside Higher Ed, Schlesinger wrote concerning the situation, “I have not resigned
and do not tend [sic] to resign. Rather, I intend to fight for a more balanced approach to assisting
disabled students, an approach that does not disadvantage non-disabled students” (Flaherty).
Robert Rauber, chair of the department of atmospheric sciences, emailed Schlesinger and the
DRES specialist responding to the situation. In this email, which was also sent to all class
members, Rauber expressed sympathy for not wanting to disadvantage other students, but that,
“My concern in this matter, however, is a legal one. The student was given a letter of
accommodation by the university that provides specific software to be used with electronic notes,
with the expectation that electronic notes will be provided by the professor” (ShoKami, “ATMS
140 Drama: the aftermath”).
In both of these cases, individuals in positions of power to affect the granting/enacting of
accommodations were more convinced by their own opinions and suspicions than by the
assertions of experts in the field of disability studies and accommodation. The solution that
smoothed the situation in both cases was to adhere to legal requirements. Legal justification,
while effective in quieting concerns and controversy, is not an ideal nor a terribly humane basis
for accommodation. It merely forces the hand of the unwilling while doing nothing to address
their negative and damaging attitudes and actions.
These two cases are perhaps extremes and even outliers in representing the controversy
that surrounds offering accommodation. In both cases what I hope to illuminate is the underlying
suspicion of accommodations that eventually led to extreme actions. The response of the
department chair in the second case is particularly illuminating when viewed in this light. The
department chair outwardly supported the accommodation recommendation of the DRES, but in

27
doing so also validated the professor’s concern about disadvantaging the other students. I do not
want to paint with a broad brush here and say that all professors are skeptical of ADHD and/or
learning disabilities. In fact, my own experience has been quite the opposite. My positive
interactions with professors with regard to my own ADHD have far out-weighed the negative
ones. However, I have had several experiences wherein I’ve had professors openly, and in front
of the class, question the existence of ADHD generally as well as my own diagnosis of the same.
Additionally, others with ADHD (both other students as well as mental health professionals) are
often shocked and even concerned when they learn that my practice has been to openly admit to
having ADHD to teachers, prospective employers, and other individuals in positions of power or
influence. They, like me, have had majority positive experiences with such individuals, but the
possibility of this invisible skepticism drives their shock and concern.
This controversy and skepticism likely exists due to the fact that ADHD is a relatively
new concern on college campuses. While there are many studies that have investigated attitudes
of K-12 teachers and students towards individuals with ADHD (Bender, Vail and Scott; Cook;
Ghanizadeh, Bahredar, Moeini) there have been very few investigating such attitudes in colleges
and universities. This is likely due to the fact that it is only in the past 20 years or so that ADHD
has been recognized as being something that might affect adults (Millstein, et al; Spencer, et al)
and it is only in the past 10 years that this has been a widely accepted idea (Barkley, Murphy,
and Fischer; Okie). Though the relative recency of this issue being acknowledged might
contribute to the controversy ADHD accommodation can raise, and most disability resource
offices on college campuses actively work to educate and undercut these kinds of negative
attitudes. However, this controversy remains an issue that affects the overall effectiveness,
perceived and actual, of accommodations for students.
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2.3.2 Concern 2: Student Responsibility in Seeking Out Accommodations
The controversy surrounding if and to what extent accommodations should be granted to
individuals with ADHD leads to a second concern with the effectiveness of the current
accommodations system: undue burden on the students seeking accommodation. The Attention
Deficit Disorder Association (ADDA), a large and well-established education and government
advocacy non-profit organization, has published a list of recommended accommodations for
ADHD entitled, “Recommended Accommodations for College Students with ADHD.” The
ADDA introduces their specific recommendations by first discussing the differences between
high school and college accommodations and the difficulties that can ensue for students making
this transition. This introduction focuses on the relative lack of structure behind the college
accommodations offering and ends by stating, “It is exceedingly important that college students
learn to advocate for themselves and seek out support to ensure success in the classroom and
beyond.” Of note here is the underlying assumption that the student is responsible for actively
seeking out accommodations, and that the system for offering accommodations is entirely
reactive to student requests. The American Psychological Association (APA) further
demonstrates this reactive approach to accommodation explaining, “Most often, the student is
advised to initiate the accommodation process with the disability resource center or office on
campus” (“Reasonable”). This process, while asking a lot of students, is a legal necessity due to
students’ rights to privacy, alluded to under the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution. As such, accommodations can only legally be offered to students who take the
initiative to self-identify. However, this approach, while a legal necessity, is of particular
concern for students who are already at a cognitive disadvantage.
In order to receive accommodations, students with diagnosable and accommodationworthy cognitive difficulties are required to engage in self-advocacy that requires them to engage
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in the very cognitive work with which they struggle. In the case of students with ADHD this can
mean organization and cognitive planning, two cognitive processes with which individuals with
ADHD almost universally struggle. This added cognitive work is required of them in addition to
the academically rigorous cognitive work already required of them and all students. The fact that
students with ADHD struggle to keep up with the baseline rigorous cognitive work required of
all students is often what merits and motivates accommodations in the first place. In such a
circumstance, this reactive, student-driven approach to accommodation is especially concerning.
By placing the responsibility of initiating the accommodation-granting process on the shoulders
of the student in need, the institution ensures that many students in need will not seek out nor
receive accommodations.
In this instance, universities are in a difficult position. They legally cannot take a more
active role in identifying who does and does not merit accommodation. The current system,
relying entirely on accommodations so-conceived, is ill-equipped to address this concern.
2.3.3 Concern 3: Focus on Behavior
Thus far, in discussing concerns with the current accommodations approach I have been
addressing issues ancillary to the accommodations themselves. In shifting now to problems
directly related to accommodation offerings, it is important to note that any list of
accommodations offerings will not be universally applicable. Every school determines on a caseby-case basis the accommodations they can make available. These decisions are made after
balancing concerns of feasibility, student needs, legal responsibility, and, academic standards.
Additionally, disability resource centers often do not publicize the accommodations that are
potentially available. Because of the idiosyncratic presentation of social, behavioral, cognitive,
and developmental disorders, not all possible accommodations are made available to every
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student who is clinically diagnosable (Lindstrom 230). I mention these difficulties in producing a
list of accommodations in order to make clear that, while the accommodations offerings I discuss
here are broadly generalizable across institutions of higher education, my arguments and
conclusions may be more or less valid from campus to campus, depending on local exigencies,
policies, and practices.
With that caveat in place, I base my discussion of ADHD accommodations on the
ADDA’s “Recommended Accommodations for College Students with ADHD.” The ADDA
recommends that colleges and universities make accommodations available to individuals with
ADHD in three areas: tests, lectures, and courses, as illustrated in Table 2:
Table 2. ADDA-recommended accommodations for college students with ADHD
Tests

Lectures

Courses

Extended time on tests and
assignments

Permission to record lectures

Written instructions from
professors

Testing in a separate and
quiet place

Audio-taped textbook

Priority registration with a
professional in the disability
services office

Testing over several sessions

Assistance with writing class
notes (i.e., note-taking
service)

The possibility of class
substitution within the
curriculum

Reading assistance service
(i.e., reading group)

Reduced course load

In this list of recommended accommodations, it is clear that the focus of the accommodations is
to identify distracting and disrupting behaviors in classrooms and other campus-centric spaces
and implementing interventions that mitigate the problems associated with those behaviors.
While the behaviors themselves are not identify, we might extrapolate that some of the
problematic behaviors that have been identified are completing tasks, paying attention, reading
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text, taking notes, listening, and multitasking (completing diverse work from a “full” course
load). However, in identifying problematic and visible expressions of ADHD, these
accommodations do not necessarily address the underlying cognitive causes for those behaviors.
To illustrate, if students exhibit a struggle to finish tests in an allotted time frame, they
might be granted extra time to complete tests. The problematic behavior – difficulty paying
attention and general distractibility – has been identified and addressed. With this
accommodation, students will hopefully have enough time to both experience their distractions
and also finish the test. This is a useful accommodation because it can enable students to actually
complete the test where they might not have been otherwise able. However, it doesn’t address
the distractibility itself. Distractibility is not inherently bad. For example, a link has been
demonstrated between distractibility (occasionally reframed more positively as “mindwandering”) and creativity (Baird, et al; Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna). However,
distractibility can be unmoored, stream-of-conscious thought free from any conscious cognitive
direction that serves merely put off actually completing the task at hand.
Providing students extra time on tests can potentially help students to more productively
engage in some of the more idiosyncratic strengths of ADHD, especially, in this case, if the test
requires a more creative kind of thinking such as inventing arguments, drawing connections
between concepts, etc. It is less likely to be helpful if the accommodation merely focuses on the
outward behavior itself without direction that helps students understand the underlying cognitive
roots of those behaviors as well as how the accommodation can help them to more
conscientiously working with and through them. It is unrealistic to expect accommodations
administrators to, by themselves, do this work of helping students more specifically apply
accommodations in specific course settings. Doing so is often outside their realm of expertise as
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it would require more familiarity with the content and cognitive work required of specific
disciplines. However, it is similarly difficult for professors or instructors to do this work unless
they have experience dealing with such difficulties themselves. As such, these professors and
instructors, even if willing, may be unable to help students productively enact accommodations
in ways that go beyond the strict behavioral approach currently used.
Accommodation fall short of being as effective as they might be when they are left to
stand for themselves without a framework for teaching students how to proactively and
consciously cope with the struggles and draw on the strengths that result from their ADHD and
the behaviors the result. In the worst cases, learning to productively take advantage of these
accommodations to their fullest capacity can be left to the students to figure out for themselves.
The metacognitive work of learning to understand, cope with, and recognize the strength of
distracting and disruptive cognitive processes merely adds to the cognitive burden already placed
on these students, in much the same as asking students to proactively seek out accommodation.
2.3.4 Concern 4: Exclusive Focus on Campus/Classroom Contexts
Returning to the list of ADDA-recommended accommodations, another concern stems
from the fact that these accommodations only explicitly address student behaviors in the context
of the classroom. By focusing only in this space, accommodations can enable students to survive
the cognitive rigors of the classroom, but they do not expressly provide students with a
framework for extending their usefulness outside of the classroom. For example, if students
struggle to be attentive in class, it might be recommended that they be given the opportunity to
record class lectures or receive class notes in other ways. In such a case, the assumption seems to
be that these students will go back and listen to the lectures at another time or in another
environment when/where they are more focused and/or less distracted. This accommodation
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might work well for students whose disability centers on sensory processing concerns or when
the space/situation itself is the source of the problematic behavior or cognitive process.
Unfortunately, with ADHD and some other cognitive disabilities this approach does not address
the difficulty at hand, it merely changes the geography of its expression. This approach again
fails to address the actual difficulty these students will face if/when they get around to listening
to the recorded lecture. This is an especially important issue to address in composition courses
where the most taxing cognitive work of our courses takes place outside the walls of the
classroom. Classroom-based interventions based on specific behaviors are not necessarily helpful
or applicable as students confront the difficulties born of their ADHD in their attempts to
compose in contexts outside of the classroom such as dorm rooms, coffee shops, libraries, etc.
Once again, the concern here is not necessarily with the accommodation itself, but rather
with the way in which it is implemented in specific courses. As with the previous concern, if
students are to take full advantage of this kind of accommodation, they will likely require
instruction and direction in how to extend the usefulness of the accommodation outside of the
classroom. And, as was discussed previously, such discussion about implementation probably
exceeds the expertise of both the accommodations administrators and the professors themselves,
though in different ways.
Clearly it is only within the classroom or in other campus spaces that the institution can
grant and implement accommodations. To attempt to accommodate on a more personal level
would be to risk intruding on student privacy and personal space. As such, by highlighting this as
a concern with the current accommodation approach I am not intending to cast undue blame the
institution or those who accommodate. Rather, I hope to highlight that accommodation cannot be
our only recourse in helping students to succeed in their academic endeavors. Unfortunately, as
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has been stated, the purpose of the ADA is to even the playing field not enable success. Even
though the individuals implementing the accommodations do consciously concern themselves
with student success, the accommodations institution is not.
Part of the reason that the ADA and accommodations do not, and perhaps cannot, have
success as the goal, is that “success” can be a difficult concept to define and pursue. Success
often has as much to do with objective measures of achievement as it does more qualitative
measures of well-being. If we are concerned with students succeeding in college, a framework
for addressing the needs of these students needs to go well beyond base-level accommodations
that focus on academic access and achievement. And it requires, to some degree, a greater
understanding of the lived experience of individuals with ADHD as it extends beyond base-level
life activities and functions.

2.4

ADHD and Quality of Life
While more recent iterations and revisions of the ADA have attempted to broaden its

scope to more invisible concerns such as the introduction of neurological and brain functions in
the 2008 ADAAA, there is little attempt to address more definitionally difficult issues such as
emotional well-being and quality of life. Understanding how diverse neurological expressions
such as ADHD affect these more difficult-to-define aspects of human life is vital in looking into
ways of addressing ADHD in higher education that are more beneficial for students.
Numerous studies demonstrate that the quality of life (QoL) of adults with ADHD is
markedly worse than that of their neurotypical counterparts in many areas. In 2011, Rashi
Agarwal, et al reviewed 36 such articles published in various peer-reviewed medical and
psychology journals between 1969 and 2011. In their review article, Agarwal, et al found that
“quality of life” was defined in two ways, health-related QoL and overall QoL. Health-related
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QoL was defined as comprising, “disease and treatment related aspects of the individual, such as
pain, limitations in motor ability, energy level, or mood,” while overall QoL, “additionally
encompasses nonmedical aspects of a person’s life, such as satisfaction with social, educational,
and occupational functioning” (11). Agarwal, et al found that, “There appears to be a consensus
that patients with adult ADHD have lower QoL than nonADHD patients” (14), specifically
mentioning that lower QoL can be evidenced by such markers as anxiety and depression levels,
daytime sleepiness, emotional control, and life satisfaction. The authors specifically noted
surprise at how few studies had been conducted measuring QoL. They note that the 36 studies
they reviewed utilize a number of different scales that propose “to accurately measure a construct
that, by definition, is abstract and complex” (12). This qualification is important to note because
scholars who study QoL have considerable difficulty establishing a comprehensive definition, let
alone developing a valid and reliable method for measuring it. These difficulties, when added to
the similarly difficult-to-define-and-measure nature of ADHD, greatly complicates any
comparison of the effect ADHD has on QoL. However, methodological concerns
notwithstanding, the unanimity with which these 36 studies proclaim a markedly lower QoL for
adults with ADHD warrants concern.
College students with ADHD have similarly been shown to have a lower QoL,
specifically in such areas as: depression, anxiety, tendency to anger, tendency to suppress
emotion, less support from friend groups, and comparatively lower academic achievement
(Advokat, Lane, and Luo; Blase, et al; Murphy, Barkley, and Bush; Pinho, et al). These studies
that highlight the struggles of students with ADHD and that report a resulting lower QoL are
relatively unsurprising. Students with ADHD are commonly perceived to struggle more and to be
less successful in academic endeavors because ADHD is only identified via diagnosis, and
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diagnosis is often only sought when individuals are struggling. But to blankly assert that college
students diagnosed with ADHD struggle more than their non-diagnosed peers is to oversimplify
the situation. Looking more closely at the findings of these kinds of studies gives a fuller view of
the QoL of students with ADHD.
Given that there is a demonstrated relationship between academic achievement and QoL
among college students generally (Antaramian; Shareef, et al), I want to briefly discuss the
findings of Advokat, Lane, and Luo’s 2011 study of 235 students at Louisiana State University
(92 with an ADHD diagnosis and 143 without ADHD). In this study the researchers identified
ways in which students with ADHD and students without ADHD were similar and ways in
which they were different, specifically with focusing on study habits and academic achievement.
They found that the two groups were similar with regard to number of AP credits earned, selfreported SAT scores, number of scholarships awarded, number of credits enrolled in per
semester, and number of hours spent studying each week. Regarding differences, they found that
students with ADHD had statistically lower GPAs, were more likely to withdraw from class, and
were more likely to “say that they were worse than other students at planning for and completing
class assignments, at frequently taking class notes[,] at studying ahead of time for exams, and at
avoiding distractions” (660). The findings of this study are particularly noteworthy because,
while ultimately they conclude that students with ADHD do perform more poorly in class – and
to report their findings thus would be wholly merited – the study focused on identifying
similarities and dissimilarities, not comparative achievement, per se. In particular, in looking at
the similarities we can glean a fuller picture of the experience of students with ADHD.
The similarities reported in the study paint a picture of two groups of students who are
not visibly dissimilar from one another in terms of their dedication to and engagement in
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scholarly activities. They are students unafraid of academic rigor (AP credits), they have a
history of academic success (scholarships, SAT scores), they take full course loads (credit
hours), and they spend equivalent amounts of time studying. From this we might conclude that
the differences in classroom achievement (GPA, class withdrawal rates) between students with
and without ADHD is not necessarily a matter of dedication, diligence, capability or desire. The
findings regarding lower GPA and increased course withdrawal rates among students with
ADHD do empirically demonstrate that there are struggles that need to be addressed in order for
these students to succeed. However, given that these students are historically on par with their
peers, both in terms of success and engagement, it would seem that addressing these issues is not
merely a matter of addressing the behaviors that directly result in their struggles. Indeed,
particularly compelling in these findings was that the students with ADHD explicitly
acknowledged being aware of the habits and processes that lead to academic success: planning to
complete assignments, taking notes, studying ahead of time for tests and avoiding distractions.
Yet there existed a gap between knowledge of what it takes to succeed, and their ability to act
upon their knowledge.
One other finding of note in Advokat, Lane, and Luo’s study was that the group of
students with ADHD were more likely to “say they were worse than other students.” These
students have constructed an image of themselves that reflects the deficit-laden, pathological
rhetorical framing critiqued in Chapter 4. This is interesting given that their desires to succeed
and engage in their work were not markedly different than their peers. It would seem that
students come to college equally qualified to succeed, but once they arrive on campus they find
that the institution is designed in such a way as to facilitate the success of the non-ADHD student
population while it inhibits, to some degree, the success the ADHD student population. Good-
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faith efforts are made by campus officials in many departments and administrative offices to
address these struggles and to help students to succeed, but despite these efforts, many students
still feel that the accommodations offered by the university are insufficient

2.5

Defining Cognitive Processes
At the heart of these studies into QoL, as well as the court cases mentioned earlier

regarding who is and is not justified in receiving accommodation, is the question of how
cognitive ability plays into an individual’s ability to complete job tasks and have a healthy
emotional life. As mentioned previously, the ADA remains (perhaps purposefully) opaque. This
lack of rigor is likely due to the fact that the DSM-5, as discussed above, defines ADHD in
diagnostic terms, focusing on symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity rather than
underlying cognitive processes. The focus is expressly on outwardly visible behavior, while
ignoring the invisible, cognitive dimensions of the issue. Thus, it is useful, in building a more
complete understanding of ADHD, to consider how it has been understood from a cognitive
perspective.
It’s easy to say that we need to more fully understand and define the cognitive side of
ADHD in order to best shape our accommodations practices, but doing that is a complicated
ordeal. Current cognitive psychology and neuropsychology texts have identified six domains of
cognitive performance, and nearly all empirical studies in the fields of neuropsychology,
cognitive psychology and education psychology focus on some subset of these domains: 1)
information processing, 2) speeded performance, 3) attention, 4) knowledge and expertise, 5)
executive functioning (EF), and 6) memory.
In reviewing studies that deal more specifically with ADHD, they most often focus
primarily on EF (e.g. Barkley and Murphy; Brown; Hughes, et al; Pennington and Ozonoff;
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Willcutt, et al), though some also address information processing (e.g. Luman, et al; Sergeant,
Oosterlaan, and van der Meere al; Toplak, Dockstader, and Tannock, “Temporal…”). EF
processes are further separated (though they often overlap, in the following specific cognitive
processes: fluency, planning, working memory, inhibition, and set-shifting. In order to
understand why these EF processes are of particular concern when considering individuals with
ADHD, I define each of them as they are used cognitive psychology:
•

Fluency: “[The] ease of mental operations concerned with stimulus meaning and its
relation to semantic knowledge structures.” (Winkielman et al 366)

•

Planning: “‘Cognitive,’ planning may be defined as the ability to organize
cognitive behaviour in time and space and is necessary in situations where a goal
must be achieved through a series of intermediate steps each of which does not
necessarily lead directly towards that goal.” (Owen 431)

•

Working Memory: “The term working memory refers to a brain system that
provides temporary storage and manipulation of the information necessary for such
complex cognitive tasks as language comprehension, learning, and reasoning.”
(Baddeley 556).

•

Inhibition: “Inhibition describes an active process that tempers unwanted stimuli
(external or internal) that compete for processing resources in the context of a
limited capacity system.” (Gohier, et al 101)

•

Set-shifting: “Shifting back and forth between multiple tasks, operations, or mental
sets, also referred to as ‘attention switching’ or ‘task switching.’” (Miyake, et al 55)

Studies that focus on these EF functions exclusively characterize individuals with ADHD as
having fundamental deficits in their cognitive functioning abilities. This deficit-centered
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characterization is a natural result given that the specific cognitive processes associated with
executive function are processes with which individuals with ADHD happen to struggle.
To illustrate this deficit-centered characterization, in 1997 Russell Barkley published an
article in which he proposed a “unifying theory of ADHD.” In laying out this model, Barkley
explains, “Poor behavioral inhibition is specified as the central deficiency in ADHD. The model
then sets forth a linkage between response inhibition and four executive functions that depend on
such inhibition for their own effective performance” (“Behavioral Inhibition…” 66). This article
has been cited over 7,000 times and Barkley’s ADHD assessment tool that stems from this
theory of ADHD, the Barkley Deficits in Executive Functioning Scale, has become widely used
by mental health professionals across the country. As executive functioning has become the
focus of ADHD studies, the definition of ADHD has been linked expressly with the second word
of the acronym: deficit.
However, while there are real, demonstrable struggles with which individuals with
ADHD must learn to contend, these individuals also exhibit cognitive strengths that are ignored
when executive functioning is the exclusive frame for understanding this “disorder.”
Unfortunately, there are relatively few studies that have been published that focus on identifying
the cognitive strengths as opposed to the cognitive weaknesses of individuals with ADHD. This
is likely due to the robustness of the existing framework for research identifying and treating the
weaknesses of ADHD. For over a century, researchers have studied ADHD in its various deficitcentered forms and have honed methods and treatment protocols, whereas only relatively
recently has the question been raised regarding what strengths may come as a result of ADHD as
well. These studies investigating the cognitive and intellectual strengths of individuals with
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ADHD, while relatively few, are important for putting together a fuller picture of the expression
of ADHD.
Virginia Douglas, the 2004 CPA Gold Medal Award winner for Distinguished Lifetime
Contributions to Canadian Psychology has explicitly called for improved work in this area,
claiming that any profile of ADHD, “should also include measures and manipulations that
demonstrate the cognitive strengths of ADHD children, which are frequently ‘masked’ by
impaired self-regulation” (23). As work has been done in this area, the results have been, at
times, conflicting. In perusing psychological studies looking for research that demonstrates the
cognitive strengths of ADHD, it is often the case that there are studies that demonstrate findings
of strengths that are directly at odds with findings of other studies demonstrating struggles. For
example, Ulla Ek, et al, in studying a group of children with ADHD and another with milder,
unspecified attention and/or learning problems, found that “The cognitive assets of both groups
involved in the study were found in areas demanding logical thinking, reasoning and common
sense” (759). Alternatively, Victoria Schirduan, Karen Case and Judith Faryniarz found that
students with ADHD tended to struggle most with work that demanded of them logicalmathematical intelligence. How do we then reconcile these moments of conflict?
Douglas, after making her call for increased research into the strengths of ADHD, makes
an important distinction that needs to be made as we differentiate between the struggles and
strengths of individuals with ADHD. She wrote, “Recognizing the difference between not
knowing and not doing can also alert us to the potential strengths of ADHD children, which, I
believe, are more likely to become evident when demand for self-regulated attention and
inhibition are reduced” (25, emphasis added). The distinction between struggles and strengths,
then, is not a matter of ignorance, but the ability of individuals to do what they know. This
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distinction is often the sticking point in these studies that identify the same cognitive processes
as both areas of struggle and strength. The cognitive process itself is not necessarily the issue,
but rather the ability of the individual with ADHD to actively recognize what cognitive process
they are engaging, and then consciously exercise control over their ability to engage that process.
Take, for example, set shifting. Set-shifting, as defined above, is the ability to shift focus
between mental tasks, operations, or processes. For example, when a student writes a literature
review, they are required to focus on a variety of tasks that require a variety of mental processes.
Students must locate sources, read them for comprehension, draw connections between sources,
and incorporate sources – often via summary, paraphrase, or direct quotation – into a cohesive
narrative of some sort. The variety of mental tasks required to complete such a project requires
students to be well-practiced at set-shifting. One of the hallmarks of ADHD is the ability to
switch cognitive focus easily and frequently, but that set-shifting often occurs unconsciously.
The mind shifts easily, but if individuals are unable to decide how and when to make those
shifts, this can be a major impairment in their ability to complete any task.
The issue, then, is not in the behavioral expression of the cognitive task – the ability to
switch focus, in this case – but rather the individual’s ability to be mindful of what they are
focusing on and to exert at least some control over when that focus shifts. This, then, is the
approach that we might to take when helping students recognize their cognitive strengths as well
as their struggles. We need to help them become consciously aware of their cognitive processes
and help them actively assert control over them. This can help them identify their own cognitive
strengths and struggles. Such knowledge can then enable them to actively draw on their strengths
and develop means of mitigating their struggles.
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Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences

2.6

Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences is one frame of understanding ADHD that
explicitly incorporates this notion of differentiating between the relative strengths and
weaknesses of individuals with ADHD. Whereas psychologists tend to favor the cognitive
process (EF, information processing) approach to understanding ADHD, education researchers
are more likely to look at ADHD through the lens of multiple intelligences. This theory of
multiple intelligences posits that “intelligence” is a phenomenon that incorporates a much
broader collection of abilities than those taught in schools. In Gardner’s theory, there are eight
distinct, though at times overlapping intelligences:
•

Musical-rhythmic

•

Visual-spatial

•

Verbal-linguistic

•

Logical-mathematical

•

Bodily-kinesthetic

•

Interpersonal

•

Intrapersonal

•

Naturalistic

Everyone, regardless of diagnostic status or neurological functioning, has intelligences with
which they are primarily capable and with which they struggle. As was briefly mentioned
previously, Schirduan, Case and Faryniarz explicitly set out to answer the question: “How are
ADHD Students Smart?” using the framework of Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences.
They found that most of the schools in their study focused curricula on verbal-linguistic and
logical–mathematical types of intelligence. In contrast they found that more than half of their
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ADHD subjects possessed natural intelligence (awareness and sensitivity to nature and the
world) and spatial intelligence (strong visual processing skills and awareness of space, size,
distance, measurement, etc.) as their predominant type. Thus, according to this study, ADHD
students were structurally disadvantaged by dominant curricular approaches. This study is 15
years old and, having been focused on K-12 education, may not be entirely applicable to
composition courses in higher education; however, the central claim of the study is entirely
applicable because we can and must do a better job of attending to the needs of the
neurologically diverse students in our classrooms. Additionally, it argues that a curriculum needs
to be evaluated for its capacity to “reach” neurologically diverse student populations, which is
also one of the central arguments of this dissertation.
Thus far in trying to map out how cognitive models of ADHD provide a stronger
understanding of the cognitive work – both struggles and strengths – of individuals with ADHD,
I have been using language that inaccurately generalizes the experiences of individuals with
ADHD. The truth is, any generalizations will, of necessity, ignore some aspect of someone’s
lived experience. The strength of the executive functioning, information processing, and multiple
intelligence theory models is that they provide a broad framework that can be applied on an
individual level to better understand deeply idiosyncratic cognitive patterns. The goal in better
understanding the geography of cognition here is to begin discussing what it might look like to
shift ADHD accommodations away from a behavioral/pathological model focused on treating
the deficits of ADHD students and focusing instead on ways in which all students exhibit both
cognitive strengths and weaknesses. As we do this, we will be increasingly able to meet the
needs of all students, both those with officially acknowledged forms of cognitive diversity and
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those who, while falling within the range of neuro-typical, still embody a broad range of
cognitive strengths, weaknesses, and primary intelligences.

2.7

Neurodiversity
This change away from the behavioral, pathological model of ADHD and towards a more

nuanced understanding of cognitive ability, both strengths and weaknesses, reflects the goals of
the neurodiversity movement. The term “neurodiversity” originally came about in the 1990s
through online groups comprised of people with Autism and Asperger’s Syndrome. It was a way
of explaining the brain function of these individuals without using terms like “disorder” or
“disability,” terms that are at best dismissive. “Neurodiversity” has since found broader
applications, describing individuals with “neurological or neurodevelopmental disorders, such as
attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder [ADHD], bipolar disorder, developmental dyspraxia,
dyslexia, epilepsy, and Tourette’s syndrome” (Jaarsma and Welin 21). With words like
“disorder” and “syndrome” in this list we continue to see the presence of a linguistic division
into “normal” and “other.”
To embrace neurodiversity is not to assert that there aren’t real medical conditions
associated with some of these diverse neurological presentations. Rather the neurodiversity
paradigm pushes for acceptance and accommodation of neurological variance. It is, as the 2011
National Symposium on Neurodiversity explained, “a concept where neurological differences are
to be recognized and respected as any other human variation” (“What Is”). Thus, one of the main
objectives of the neurodiversity social movement is to shift the broad cultural perspective of
these neurological differences away from exclusively viewing them as disorders that need to be
treated, cured, or reined in, and instead to find ways of normalizing them in their idiosyncratic
beauty.
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Any discussion of neurodiversity is difficult, again, because each neurologically atypical
individual is going to be atypical in a unique way. While we group and classify neurological
differences, there is rarely any broad consensus regarding outward manifestations, symptoms, or
effective treatments/coping mechanisms. Additionally, this discussion is made difficult by
relative ignorance concerning how the brain functions, and how those functions actually affect
day-to-day work.
We have brain imaging technologies such as PET scans and fMRIs that help us to get a
sense of what sections of the brain are working during certain kinds of activities, and from such
images neuroscientists have begun the work of mapping out the brain.10 This in turn allows us to
better understand geographically how neurodiverse individuals differ from neuro-typical. While
this is a helpful exercise in understanding the brain and the nature of neurodiversity generally,
Eric Racine, et al call for caution when using these technologies as evidence or when making any
concrete claims, as is common practice among many popular media outlets11. They explain that
many individuals have the erroneous tendency to think that brain imaging technology “enables
us to capture a ‘visual proof’ of brain activity, despite the enormous complexities of data
acquisition and image processing” (160).
It is immediately apparent, even from this brief description of neurodiversity, that it is a
term that carries significant political baggage. Many of those associated with this social
movement feel that “the rights of the neurodiverse are at risk, as their emotional and other

10

Whole peer-reviewed journals are devoted to this work, including NeuroImage, Human Brain Mapping, The
Open Neuroimaging Journal, Journal of Neuroimaging, Frontiers in Neurology: Applied Neuroimaging, and
Psychiatric Research: Neuroimaging.
11
Racine, et al give two examples, first from the Washington Post: “Patients have long reported that acupuncture
helps relieve their pain, but scientists don’t know why. Could it be an illusion? Now brain imaging technology has
indicated that the perception of pain relief is accurate,” and the second from the popular (non-peer reviewed) Pain
and Central Nervous System Weekly the headline, “A relatively new form of brain imaging provides visual proof
that acupuncture alleviates pain.”
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differences might be interpreted as social incompetence and, hence, as decisional and legal
incompetence” (Mackenzie and Watts 28). The political nature of this approach to understanding
ADHD illustrates the real human stakes in play when we talk about how to incorporate a
neurodiversity paradigm in composition courses.

2.8

ADHD and Composition
There is much evidence demonstrating that neurologically diverse individuals often

struggle with their writing abilities (DuPaul and Langberg; Gregg, et al; Molitor, Langberg, and
Evans; Semrud-Clikeman and Harder). Unfortunately, these studies are usually conducted by
psychologists or neurobiologists who “lack expertise and experience in evaluating writing
samples” (Gregg, et al. 315). In order for these individuals to study the writing ability of
students, they often look to writing contexts such as standardized tests and other timed,
impromptu writing situations that provide preexisting and reliable methods for assessment
(Cahalan-Laitusis, Buly and Valencia; Russell and Plati). The concern in doing so is that these
kinds of writing assessments are widely viewed by composition researchers as lacking validity
because they don’t actually measure what they claim to measure, namely writing ability (Gordan;
Huot; Perelman). In other words, the many factors that play into a student’s writing ability are far
too many and far too complicated for researchers to hope to be able to adequately understand and
assess them by the use of a timed, high-stakes test.
In addition to the drawbacks that are presented with regards to the complexity of writing,
there has also been a relative dearth of research focused specifically on the writing abilities of
individuals with ADHD. As Margaret Semrud-Clikeman and Lana Harder wrote in 2011,
“Research has not established how the functional impact of ADHD specifically affects academic
skills such as writing. Because writing becomes increasingly important from high school to
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college, it is important to investigate the extent to which ADHD symptoms affect college
students’ abilities in this essential academic domain” (216). Semrud-Clikeman and Harder bring
up a vital point, emphasizing the importance of writing in higher education as an essential task
for all that we do in the higher education classroom. There is an entire subsection of the field
composition studies (WAC/WID) dedicated to studying how and why writing occurs in other
areas of campus outside of the composition classroom. We have also seen that students with
ADHD are at a distinct disadvantage in the writing classroom, though that disadvantage is often
due as much to specific environmental concerns as it is to some form of innate capability. In
order to allow these students full access to their abilities, we need to find ways to help them learn
compose in ways conducive to their own cognitive strengths and neurological identities.

2.9

Conclusion
While one of the main purposes of this dissertation is to specifically address ways that we

can achieve this goal of cognitive accessibility model of education designed for students who
have ADHD that can be implemented in composition courses, it’s important to lay some
definitional background. In this chapter I have discussed some of this background regarding how
we currently understand, define, and accommodate ADHD in higher education. In the following
two chapters I explore how this current framework of understanding ADHD, in particular the
emphasis it places on ADHD as a medical concern that needs treatment, came to be the dominant
discourse, how it came to be adopted into higher education, and why it may not be a sufficient
foundation for the cognitive accessibility practices I am proposing.
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A DISCURSIVE HISTORY OF THE
MEDICALIZATION OF ADHD

“What is significant … is the expansion of the sphere where medicine now functions as an agent
of social control. In the wake of a general humanitarian trend, the success and prestige of
modern medicine, the increasing acceptance of deterministic social and medical concepts, the
technological growth of the twentieth century and the diminution of religion as a viable
institution of control, more and more deviant behavior has come into the province of medicine.”
- Peter Conrad, Identifying Hyperactive Children, 4-5
3.1

Introduction
Histories of the diagnosis and treatment of ADHD are replete with descriptions and

explanations of various divergent behaviors that are deemed inappropriate and at times insane.
As such, there are historical descriptions and depictions of what is now called ADHD that might
be found in myriad disciplines and discourse communities, from moral (both religious and
secular), political, educational, medical and nearly any other text where writers are concerned
with identifying, exploring, and prescribing acceptable human behavior. Despite the many
competing discourses that have been employed historically to explore ADHD, medical discourse
has largely won the day, and it is through that lens that ADHD is now officially defined and
discussed. However, while medical rhetoric is the current arbiter of official knowledge with
regard to ADHD, those other discourses have only been subordinated, not eliminated. Little
wonder, then, that any discussion of ADHD at any level of discourse breeds considerable
confusion and controversy.
In this chapter I discuss how medical rhetoric, specifically that employed by mental
health professionals, came to be the predominant discourse surrounding ADHD. To do this I
briefly discuss early descriptions of ADHD (though it was called many other things) that
demonstrate a shift away from an exclusive focus on the moral and religious implications of
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behavior and towards ways that medicine and medical discourse might be employed to (re)form
behavior. I then discuss early 20th century depictions of ADHD that are often looked to as the
starting point of the scientific history of ADHD. To more concretely define and highlight the
current rhetorical construction of ADHD, I then examine in more depth two diagnostic manuals
from the 1970s and 1980s that demonstrate the consummation of this move toward rhetorically
constructing ADHD as a medical disorder that fosters deficits in those who suffer from it,
deficits that require special treatment and accommodations. This discussion of historical
descriptions and portrayals of ADHD is not intended as a comprehensive discursive history of
the disorder, but rather a brief exploration of a few key forerunners that led us to the current
rhetorically intransigent pathological conception of ADHD.
In examining the history of ADHD, my goal is not to review or analyze the specific
language that is used in diagnosis and treatment, though such work would be illuminating. In
Chapter 4 I do look specifically at the language and terminology of contemporary diagnostic
protocols through the lens of rhetorical analysis, but doing this work from a historical standpoint
has not yet been done. That said, my intent here is to demonstrate that when we relatively
complex biomedical representations of ADHD are the dominant discourse, it communicates to
non-expert audiences ADHD is overtly complex and difficult. This is not an argument that is
incorrect or inherently negative as there is considerable complexity in understanding what is
actually going on when we say that someone has ADHD. However, I demonstrate that this
exclusive focus on medical discourse and its attendant complexity fosters within a lay audience
an attitude that some expertise is required in order to engage the subject with any level of
credibility. And in creating this filtered access to even discussing ADHD, the
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medical/pathological discourse receives little if any pushback. This, I argue, has enacted a
rhetorical barrier of entry that has calcified the deficit-laden, pathological view of ADHD.
Brief note regarding terminology: As can be seen throughout this introduction, any
historical discussion of ADHD is difficult given the lack of terminological consistency. What we
now call “ADHD” has been called by dozens of other terms. In this chapter when I refer to
discussions and descriptions of “ADHD” pre-1994 (when “ADHD” became the accepted
overarching term), I am not referring to the current conception of ADHD, but rather its historical
precursors, even when those precursors may have been concerned with behaviors and
phenomena that do not necessarily fit into the contemporary definition.

3.2

18th Century Descriptions of ADHD
The earliest acknowledged medical description of ADHD comes from a German doctor,

Melchior Adam Weikard, who anonymously published a medical textbook in 1775 entitled Der
Philosophische Arzt. The book was published anonymously because, as Russell Barkley and
Helmut Peters explain, “the reaction of organized religion to the publication of his textbook was
widespread condemnation owing to his attacks in the textbook on various religious practices
being used at the time to cure medical illnesses” (625-26). This tension was not just between
religion and Weikard, but is emblematic of the tension between the medical and religious
communities. This becomes readily apparent in Weikard’s discussion of the illness he terms
“Lack of Attention, Attentio Volubilis.”
Weikard first provided a general overview of the illness, writing, “Those, who have a
lack of attention, are generally characterised as unwary, careless, flighty and bacchanal” (627).
After laying out this general description, he went on to describe a biological rationale for its
expression in humans: that the ability of individuals to concentrate depends on the “stability and
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strength of the fibres” (627). Following this discussion of fibres (whose definition Weikard have
assumed his readers would understand since he did not provide one) and their relationship to
attention, Weikard presented a hypothetical case to illustrate what “Lack of Attention” looks
like:
A young chaplain for example is supposed to meditate about the saviour’s
sufferings. Every humming fly, every shadow, every sound, the memory of old
stories will draw him off his task to other imaginations. Even his imagination, if
and when it is copious, entertains him with a thousand minor subjects. He laughs
so cordially when he is contemplating a nun who saw a soldier getting caught on
the fence of the garden and his trousers getting snagged while he is to meditate on
when Christ was taken prisoner. – That is what I call lack of attention. (627)
From this point Weikard went on to explain in more detail some of the intricacies of what one
might be aware of when diagnosing this illness. But from this introductory description we can
see that the primary symptom that Weikard acknowledged was inattention and distractibility,
behavioral symptoms that have become common to any diagnosis of ADHD. But interestingly,
and, I imagine, not coincidentally, he bookended his biological discussion of fibres with
language and an example that mirrored to some extent what one at that time might have expected
to hear over a pulpit.
In that initial general statement regarding “Lack of Attention, Attentio Volubilis”
Weikard uses strong, value-laden language more common of discourses on moral character than
medical diagnosis. The first three descriptors “unwary,” “careless,” and “flighty” indicate a lack
of social awareness that might have indicated poor character. While this might be considered a
moral failing, poor character would not necessarily have carried any concrete religious ties.
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However the fourth descriptor, “bacchanal” is of particular note for the religious connotations
associated with the word. The term was and is often used to denote drunken revelry and other
unruly and riotous behavior, with occasional sexual signification. It might be that Weikard
associated alcohol-induced revelry with inattention because of alcohol’s acknowledged effect of
lowering inhibitions, a hallmark of inattentiveness. However, the moralistic overtones of the
word are important, considering the religious climate in which Weikard was writing his book.
If this opening statement were the only instance of Weikard alluding to religious
treatments of deviant behavior, it might plausibly be argued that he was merely acceding to the
traditional moral and religious definitions of this malady, and in so doing was merely borrowing
the credibility of the established discourse. However, after this general definition and his brief
explanation of the biological “fibres” at the root of the issue, he illustrated his discussion with a
hypothetical case of a day-dreaming chaplain – whose daydreams were rather bawdy for the time
– and in doing so expressly portrays religion in a contemptuous, hypocritical light. Chaplains are
supposed to be attentive students dedicated whole-heartedly to the contemplation of Christ. To
be a daydreamer would be tantamount to the 18th century religious equivalent of dereliction of
duty. And even if chaplains do happen to daydream, they certainly should not find humorous the
contemplation of a scandalized nun viewing a soldier’s trousers snag on a fence. This hypocrisy
is perhaps relatively mild, but by juxtaposing it directly with a medical discussion of a deviant
behavior that has heretofore been the purview of religious intervention, Weikard is indirectly
arguing that the state of organized religion is such that it is unable to achieve that which it sets
out to do, whether in matters spiritual or temporal.
On beyond the fact of his ridiculing religion, Weikard presents his more scientific
description, with its sophisticated and intellectually rigorous (for the time) exploration of the
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varying strengths of the fibres, as an alternative to the unempirical religious discourse. Such an
alternative would have been especially welcome in the Enlightenment Age in which he was
writing, thus making inroads in the rhetorical shift toward a medicalization of inattention.
In 1798, some 20 years after Weikard’s textbook was published, Scottish physician Sir
Alexander Crichton published his three volume work An Inquiry Into the Nature and Origin of
Mental Derangement: Comprehending a Concise System of the Physiology and Pathology of the
Human Mind. And a History of the Passions and Their Effects. In the second chapter of Book 2,
entitled “On Attention and its Diseases,” Crichton first acknowledged that there is a range of
healthy attention spans, and that inattention is not necessarily pathological. However, in
Crichton’s view, there did exist “morbid alterations to which attention is subject,” and in
describing such, he explained that these morbid alterations “may all be reduced under the two
following heads: First. The incapacity of attending with a necessary degree of constancy to any
one object. Second. A total suspension of its effects on the brain.” Crichton went on to describe
those who suffer this disorder, asserting that “every impression seems to agitate the person, and
gives him or her an unnatural degree of mental restlessness.” When feeling this mental
restlessness, Crichton explained, those with the disorder “say they have the fidgets” (qtd in
Lange, et al 242). From this description we initially find that Crichton was concerned with
“incapacity of attending,” “mental restlessness,” and “the fidgets.” This seems to suggest a set of
symptoms that might easily match current descriptions of ADHD: Combined Presentation, i.e.
both inattentive and hyperactive. However, as Crichton further explained how to identify those
who suffer from the disorder, like Weikard we find that he included moralistic language that
illustrates the ongoing shift away from religious discourse and toward medical discourse.
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While Crichton’s descriptions were not as directly critical of organized religion’s
attempts at behavior control, in describing the behavioral aspects of this “disease of attention,”
Crichton employed quite pointed moralistic language to illustrate the ultimate impact of such
distraction on those who suffer from it. He explained that the extraneous stimuli that cause
inattention and mental restlessness “are sufficient to distract patients of this description to such a
degree, as almost approaches to the nature of delirium. It gives them vertigo, and headache, and
often excites such a degree of anger as borders on insanity” (qtd in Lange, et al 242). This
assertion of mental illness to the degree of delirium and insanity is important to note, because in
the latter half of the 19th century madness was often viewed through the lens of immorality and
criminality. Michel Foucault explains in Madness and Civilization that during the 18th century
age of reason, “One-tenth of all the arrests made in Paris for the Hopital General concern ‘the
insane,’ ‘demented’ men, individuals of ‘wandering mind,’ and ‘persons who have become
completely mad.’ Between these and the others, no sign of a differentiation. Judging from the
registries, the same sensibility appears to collect them, the same gestures to set them apart” (65).
Of note here is the implication that traditional means of social control, namely the church, were
either no longer effective or no longer trusted. In that vacuum of trust rose the disciplinary
institutions critiqued at length by Foucault, as well as medical diagnoses and treatments.
Regarding the medicalization of moral insanity, Heidi Rimke and Alan Hunt explain:
During the 19th century cases of madness were documented in which individuals
did not display any overt mental defect. Instead they exhibited some morally
offensive behaviour manifested in bizarre or outrageous conduct. This discovery
gave rise to a new species of mental disease, one in which the diagnostic focus

56
was upon the pathology of the individual’s moral faculty. Thus emerged ‘moral
insanity’, the insanity of immorality. (70, emphasis added)
Here Rimke and Hunt explicitly argue that the adoption of medical language to explain and
diagnose insanity was en vogue at the time Crichton was writing his Inquiry Into the Nature and
Origin of Mental Derangement. That he would assert a link between “Attention and Its Diseases”
and insanity and delirium expressly shifts the discourse from moral, and the realm of religion, to
medical.
These two texts by Weikard and Crichton are the earliest identified examples of ADHD
being discussed in medical literature, and they represent a turning point that began the discursive
representation of ADHD as a medical disorder. This shift from moral and religious discourse to
one that was more technical and scientific was a step toward improving the treatment of
individuals with ADHD and is largely, and rightfully, viewed positively. However, while largely
a marker of positive progress, this shift was not without its negative effects. By shifting from a
moral framework to a scientific and medical one, they began a rhetorical tradition that privileges
expertise over accessibility. This is apparent when considering the number of historians of
ADHD who view early 20th century discussions of the work of George Still to be the starting
point for a history of ADHD because of his use of more rigorous scientific methods.

3.3

The 20th Century and the Scientific Starting Point of the History of ADHD
Many scholars concerned with outlining the history of ADHD take as their starting point

the Goulstonian Lectures of Sir George Frederic Still in 1902. As Adam Rafalovich has pointed
out, “Both skeptics of ADHD (Armstrong; Breggin; Shrag and Divoky) and advocates of
ADHD’s validity (Barkley; Goldstein and Goldstein) trace the lineage of the disorder to these
lectures” (98). That these historians take Still as their starting point is somewhat surprising. The
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work of Weikard is a relatively recent discovery and so it is perhaps permissible to have gone
unnoticed, but given the well-known status of Crichton’s work as well as other 19th century texts
such as Heinrich Hoffman’s “Fidgety Phil” (Stewart), one might assume those would be selected
as the point of departure. However, Arthur Anastopoulos, Russell Barkley, and Terri Shelton
explain that Still’s cases represent the “[first] attempt made to describe a collection of … cases,
deduce their common characteristics, and place such problems within a theoretical framework”
(1). The medicalization of ADHD has become so prominent that today, even though historians
recognize that earlier descriptions of ADHD exist, they look to Still and his scientific attempt to
understand ADHD as the “starting point of the history of ADHD” (Lange 244). This selection of
a historical starting point pointedly reflects the fact that in the current discourse surrounding
ADHD, only texts which display a specific kind of academic rigor and expertise are designated
accurate enough to base a discussion of modern ADHD.
Interestingly, Still’s depiction of “a psychiatric syndrome comparable with what today is
diagnosed as ADHD” (Barkley and Peters 623) is actually quite similar to the descriptions of
Weikard and Crichton. Anastopolous, et al summarized Still’s explanation of ADHD, writing,
“As conceptualized by Still, problems of this sort reflected serious deficiencies in the ‘volitional
inhibition’ of behaviour, presumably arising from ‘defects in moral control’ (2). One hundred
plus years after the work of Weikard and Crichton, Still continued to explicitly invoke morality
as a symptom of the problematic behaviors at the heart of ADHD. But because his description
was based on a more deliberate, scientific methodology, it is generally considered more credible.
As the 20th century progressed, there arose several new and at times competing
explanations of problematic behaviors related to inattention and hyperactivity. In J. Gordon
Millichap’s 1975 book The Hyperactive Child with Minimal Brain Dysfunction: Questions and
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Answers, Millichap identifies the various and competing terms that were employed throughout
the 20th century. He wrote:
Alternative terms for [minimal brain dysfunction] MBD and children with MBD
have included the following:
1. The hyperactive child syndrome.
2. The hyperkinetic syndrome.
3. Minimal cerebral dysfunction.
4. Minimal brain damage.
5. Minimal brain injury.
6. The brain-damaged child.
7. The brain-injured child.
8. The perceptually handicapped child.
9. The perceptually disabled child.
10. The dysfunctioning child.
11. The dyslexic child.
12. The clumsy child.
13. Chronic brain syndrome.
14. The Strauss syndrome.
15. The Prechtl choreiform syndrome.
16. Specific learning disorders.
17. Learning disorders.
18. Maturational lag syndrome.
19. Central nervous system dysfunctions. (2)
Of these 19 different terms, only four of them – dyslexic child, clumsy child, specific
learning disorders, and learning disorders – might fall outside the purview of medicine, though
even the ones dealing with learning disorders might still be regarded medical in nature
considering, in many cases, school psychologists and counselors often have at least some
medical training. Most directly we see that six times the word “syndrome” appears, three times
there is the explicit mention of injury, six times there are direct references to the brain, and there
is extensive use of scientific language, some of which (e.g. Prechtl choreiform) is entirely
incomprehensible by any but the most expert.
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By the 1970s we see that the rhetorical shift toward discussing ADHD in medical terms
has reached saturation. Just because medical language is used does not automatically make it
incomprehensible to a lay audience and thus act as a rhetorical gatekeeper. However, as we see
in the above list and as I demonstrate in the following section, medical professionals did actively
perform this exclusionary work.

3.4

The Importance of ADHD Discourse in the 1970s and 1980s
The two decades of the 1970s and 1980s are of particular importance to this project

because they are bookended by two important events: 1) the publication of the DSM II in 1968,
and 2) the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which became law in 1990.
Before the DSM II, “minimal brain dysfunction,” “hyperactivity,” and the other
terminological precursors to “ADHD” listed above were discussed and treated by medical
professionals, as has been seen. But their inclusion in the DSM II is significant because it marked
the first time that ADHD was officially acknowledged by the American Psychological
Association. This acknowledgment granted greater legitimacy to medical discussions, diagnoses,
and treatments of ADHD. In what might be considered a culmination of the trajectory outlined in
the previous discussion, from this point forward ADHD became inextricably linked to medical
professionals and medical discourses. This, in turn, has shaped the current pathological
framework that is largely the basis for understanding and treating ADHD, and it is upon this
pathological framework that institutions of higher education base their accommodations
decisions.
The 1990 passage of the ADA is notable as an ending point for this discussion because,
though many colleges and universities provided accommodations for various disabilities before
the passage of the ADA, beginning in July 1990, offering accommodations to individuals with
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qualifying disabilities became a legal necessity for all institutions. In the intervening 30 years,
adjustments have been made institution-by-institution to determine how/which accommodations
are offered, but accommodations offerings are largely driven by legal necessity as prescribed in
the ADA and its subsequent adjustments. While the ADA does not specify specific diagnoses
that are and are not covered by its legal requirements, it defines “disability” through the lens of
impairments on “major life activities” and later “major bodily functions.” This language mirrors
the language of symptoms and condition-driven deficits that became the standard rhetorical
approach to ADHD in the 70s and 80s.

3.5

Examination of 1970s-80s Texts Describing ADHD
In the rest of this chapter, I discuss two book-length texts published during this 22 year

window that attempt to declare authoritatively what was known about ADHD and what should
be done about it. In selecting which books to discuss, I conversed with various clinical
psychologists, disability resource officers, and a disciplinary librarian to see if I might identify
the most influential and formative texts that have shaped current understandings of ADHD.
While they all had insightful recommendations – nearly all of them recommended I look at the
work of Russell Barkley – the recommendation of the librarian was ultimately the most helpful.
This librarian explained to me that, given space constraints on the library shelves, my question
had already been considered, and that the selection of books already on the shelves was the
answer. I thus checked out every book the library had that was published in the time period in
question (15 books, including one by Russell Barkley). In briefly skimming these books, I
decided to narrow my focus to those books whose purpose was explicitly to 1) identify and 2)
address ADHD (treatment/intervention/parenting/educating/coping strategies). This resulted in a
set of nine books.
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In selecting which books to examine in greater depth, I decided to select two books, one
intended to be read by a lay audience and one intended for an expert audience. Of the nine books
to choose from, five had been written with expert readers in mind, and four had either non-expert
or hybrid audiences in mind. For the non-expert book I chose the earliest published book of the
nine which expressly noted in its introduction that it was intended to be read by both medical
professionals as well as parents and educators. For the expert book I chose an edited collection
from the year 1980 because that was the year the DSM III was published, and I wanted to discuss
the rhetorical situation these medical professionals were addressing at that moment. The DSM III
is important for several reasons, but for my purposes it was important because 1) it introduced
the term “Attention-deficit Disorder” (ADD), and 2) the DSM III was the first officially
designated discussion of this medical concern that went into any depth in discussing the “major
life activities” affected by ADHD.
The DSM (either II or III), probably had more direct influence on the ADA and on
college officials making decisions regarding accommodations offerings, but I have chosen to
discuss these texts written by medical professionals for various audiences because, as mentioned
earlier, my intent here is not to discuss specific diagnosis and treatment language, but rather to
discuss the ways in which an exclusive focus on medical discourse excludes non-experts from
meaningful rhetorical engagement. These texts, even though they are intended for both expert
and non-expert audiences, demonstrate this exclusionary rhetorical climate. The focus of my
analysis of these texts, then, is on examining how the authors perceived and addressed the
rhetorical situation of their texts. Namely I focus on their intended audiences, their stated
purposes, and the ways they address their audiences to achieve their purposes.
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3.5.1 The Hyperactive Child with Minimal Brain Dysfunction: Questions and Answers, written
by J. Gordon Millichap, 1975
In the preface to this book, J. Gordon Millichap expressly defined his intended audience
as well as his purpose in writing this book. He explained, “This book is written for the
pediatrician and general practitioner as well as for the concerned parent, the interested teacher
and student and the informed layman...It is hoped that the answers will lead to a better
understanding of the hyperactive child and improvement in medical, educational, and
psychologic management of MBD” (viii). That Millichap specifically intended on writing this
book for an audience comprised of medical, educational, and parental audiences might initially
suggest a certain rhetorical inclusiveness. Addressing the concerns that attend ADHD is
important to many different audiences, and so it makes sense to provide broad explanations to
common questions to create a more informed populace. However, in stating his purpose
Millichap made an interesting rhetorical move. Whereas he was writing in order to inform a
broad audience, he asserted that the intended application of the information is only within reach
of the experts in the audience, those who can manage MBD in medical, educational, or
psychological contexts. Millichap was expressly addressing a lay audience and telling them that
they need specific expertise or positions of influence in order to improve upon the way that these
problematic behaviors are managed. In effect, he was saying to just trust the experts.
This assertion of non-experts’ limited ability to actually influence the way MBD was
managed might be dismissed as imprecise language in the preface of the book; after all, why
address parents if not with some hope that they might parent their children better as a result of
increased information and understanding? But the same message of limited agency is
communicated throughout the book. To wit, Chapters 1-5 explain definitions and causes for
MBD at some length. The first chapter starts off with relatively common discussions of
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symptoms such as impulsivity, inattention, and hyperactivity, and it covers questions regarding
demographic statistics and possible environmental factors. However, just 15 pages into the book,
the tenor of the discussion abruptly changes as Millichap starts delving into protracted
discussions of highly technical medical concerns and abstruse and loosely related speech and
language disorders. For example, Millichap describes “the neuromuscular disorders of speech
production that result in dysarthria” and the various “causes and types of dysarthria in MBD”
such as pseudobulbar palsy, extrapyramidal--athetoid and choreiform--disorders, cerebellar
speech, spastic dysarthria and lower motor neuron disorders, to name a few (23). While some
information regarding underlying causes and related concerns is warranted for all audiences, to
engage in this detailed and jargon-heavy discussion clearly indicates that Millichap is more
concerned with the informational needs of the expert rather than the parent.
This shift in focusing more on the expert rather than non-expert audience is further
demonstrated with the use of figures that are likely only significant for individuals with medical
training such as those in Figure 1 and Figure 2:

Figure 1. A figure copied from page 25 of The Hyperactive Child with Minimal Brain
Dysfunction: Questions and Answers

64

Figure 2. A figure copied from page 59 of The Hyperactive Child with Minimal Brain Dysfunction:
Questions and Answers
This selection of material, both written and pictorial, may not be a deliberate attempt to
ignore the needs and information literacies of a lay audience. It may be that Millichap was so
accustomed to addressing an expert audience that he was unable to code-switch. It may be that
he knew that in order for his book to have credibility he needed to utilize more technical content
and language. Whatever the reason for selecting the material that he did in defining MBD, the
result was an alienated and excluded lay audience.
Millichap’s focus on engaging experts continues with the descriptions in Chapters 6-10 of
diagnosis protocols and treatment options. Millichap dedicates two chapters to “Pediatric
Neurology Examination and Electroencephalogram” and “Neuropsychologic Tests; Special
Senses--Hearing and Vision Tests.” While parents or teachers might have preliminarily
suspected that a child has MBD due to inattentive or hyperactive behavior, Millichap claims that
confirmation of those suspicions can only come via highly specialized testing protocols whose
very names are inaccessible without medical training. Later, when discussing treatments,
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Millichap does acknowledge that there are actions that parents can take to help their children, but
those actions exclusively involve seeking out expert help. As Millichap explains, “Parents
informed of the diagnosis of MBD are usually stricken with guilt and prone to anxiety”;
however, he continues, “an explanation of the nature of MBD in neuroanatomic and physiologic
terms should help to shift the major responsibility for the problem from the parents to the child’s
brain and a possible organic dysfunction” (87). At first blush this is a positive move that
demonstrates an attempt at sympathy for the parents whose children struggle. But that sympathy
falls short as he suggests that the parents find comfort in the fact that there was and is literally
nothing they can do about it themselves. It’s the child’s brain’s fault, so why worry?
Millichap’s attempt at sympathy, while a clear argument regarding which groups can and
cannot do anything to manage the problematic behaviors and struggles that attend MBD, also
makes clear that this work of rhetorical exclusion is not driven by malice, jealousy, or any other
ill-intent. Rather, it is an authentic attempt to provide help via expertise, even if by doing so it
effectively silences any input from those lacking expertise. This is a key notion to bring away
from a closer look at Millichap’s work. Millichap and others like him who similarly engage in
exclusionary rhetorical strategies likely have authentically good intentions. They have a
particular set of knowledge and skills that they want to use in benefiting whomever they can. But
the very nature of the medical discourse compels Millichap to enact these exclusionary rhetorical
practices.
3.5.2 Hyperactive Children: The Social Ecology of Identification and Treatment, edited by
Carol Whalen and Barbara Henker, 1980
Because Carol Whalen and Barbara Henker’s edited collection is directed toward an
expert audience, the presence and prevalence of technical language, charts, and diagrams is to be
expected and, unlike with Millichap’s book, is not necessarily indicative of rhetorical exclusion
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of non-experts in ADHD discourse. However, in looking closely at the stated goals of the book,
we find that Whalen and Henker were expressly concerned with asserting their medical authority
over the discourse surrounding ADHD due to the considerable controversy ADHD invites. To
better understand Whalen and Henker’s stance in this book, I want to first briefly describe some
sources of this controversy.
At the beginning of this chapter I described the rise in prominence of medical and
scientific rhetorics to describe and explain ADHD, and sociologists of the 1970s readily
acknowledged that such was the case. In 1970 Eliot Friedson wrote a widely acclaimed book,
Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge in which he
acknowledged the prevalence of medical explanations and treatment of deviant behavior, “The
medical profession has first claim to jurisdiction over the label of illness and anything to which it
may be attached, irrespective of its capacity to deal with it effectively” (251). Though clearly
suspicious of whether this approach was a healthy one, it was clear that medicine had priority
claim whenever there existed a concern that regards the body. Peter Conrad in 1976 similarly
observed that in the specific context of hyperactivity, “The medical profession… has a virtual
monopoly on anything that can be conceptualized as illness. Because of the way the medical
profession is organized and the mandate it has from society, decisions related to medical labeling
(diagnosis) and treatment are nearly completely controlled by medical professionals (as experts)”
(72). However, despite the prominence of medical discourse as the medium through which
ADHD was discussed, alternative explanations and descriptions based on alternate discourses
and paradigms also arose.
In particular, in the 1960s and 70s Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s notion of the
social construction of reality gained quite a bit of traction, and there were many who critiqued
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the medicalization of mental illness and deviant behavior in those terms, explaining that
behaviors such as hyperactivity were only being labeled “deviant” due to a relatively recent
social value placed on quiet, studious children. To this point, historian Matthew Smith argued
that during the Cold War there was a call for, “a return to more strict, subject-centered,
authoritarian and structured classrooms,” and that such a return, “was not only pedagogically
more effective, but also vital to national security” (60). When educating children becomes a
matter of national security, it’s only natural to turn to the most robust heuristics for ensuring that
all children, regardless of natural abilities to focus and sit still, keep pace with our geo-political
foes. However, a great deal of skepticism was born in recognizing that external factors (politics,
economics, etc.) not some intrinsic “proper order of things” were the driving the medicalization
of ADHD.
It was this particular exigence – controversy surrounding the aptitude of medical
discourse for describing admittedly difficult-to-define phenomena – which Whalen and Henker
were explicitly addressing. In the preface to their book they describe at some length the
rhetorical situation in which they perceived themselves to be operating, and their description
makes it clear that efforts to reassert the preeminence of medical discourse are foremost in their
mind:
This book is being published at a time when the public and professionals alike are
deluged with well-intentioned but poorly substantiated treatises on hyperactivity
and its supposed causes and cures… [This] includes articles impugning the
motives of child specialists and predicting increased use and calamitous
consequences of psychostimulant therapies. Often, these dramatic accusations and
warnings find a receptive audience – perhaps because they offer easy
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explanations, perhaps because they are cloaked in the attractive language of
individual freedom, and certainly because there is so very little empirical
information on which to evaluate these plausible claims. Whatever the reasons,
the topics of hyperactivity and child psychopharmacology have become targets
both for socio-political commentators in the professional journals and for the
popular press. (xx)
After describing their position in the controversy, they specifically and very directly delineated
their purpose, writing:
We feel strongly that these popular attacks are not only endangering children's
rights to optimal treatments, but also are impeding research on child behavior
problems and intervention strategies. In this climate of controversy, there is a
clear need for a responsible and authoritative survey of what we know about
contextual variables in the identification and treatment processes – the
bidirectional transactions between children and their environments. This present
volume is an attempt to fill this need. (xxi)
In this assertion of writing to meet a dire need we begin to see a subtle shift in the way they are
approaching the scope and exclusivity of their work. For decades medical professionals had been
given near free reign to medicalize and treat any and all issues related to the body. This was due
to the many advances that had been made to better understand the human body and the etiologies
and treatments of diseases and illnesses that had plagued humanity for centuries. But we see in
Whalen and Henker’s argument a willingness to acknowledge and validate the arguments of their
detractors with regard to the social pressures that affected their work.
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Another unfortunate effect of this campaign against the labeling and treatment of
“deviance” is that the kernels of truth in these tirades, for example, the influence
of social and attributional contexts on labeling and treatment processes, the
important roles played by those who apply the labels, and the actual (rather than
imagined) dangers of drug therapies, are often obscured by the polemics. (xxi)
This is an important concession, even given their expressed goal of asserting “a responsible and
authoritative survey of what we know about contextual variables in the identification and
treatment processes.” Their willingness to account for the many factors driving labeling and
treatment processes conceivably opened the door for a more nuanced approach to understanding,
diagnosing, and treating ADHD.
In looking at the articles throughout the collection, we can see a greater emphasis on
understanding more of the external factors involved in an ADHD diagnosis than we saw in the
earlier Millichap book. There is a chapter dedicated to better understanding “relationships
between symptomatology and home environment” (105), a chapter in which an “interactive
model” for identifying hyperactivity is outlined that includes taking into consideration home and
school environments along with the child’s makeup (145), and even a section dedicated to
discussing, “neglected subgroups” in which Whalen and Henker acknowledge that, “Needed also
are studies of the different coping mechanisms and lifestyle changes that unfold in families with
hyperactive children, and the complex interrelationships among divorced family variables,
environmental factors, and child outcomes” (350). This seems another shift in the discourse,
away from one that is exclusively medicine-centered and instead takes into account the lived
experiences of those who deal with ADHD, either personally or as a family member. However,
even though this expanded framework for better understanding the nuances of ADHD helps to be
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more inclusive and perhaps even provides some access to the discourse, the medical community
is still the overarching authority that dictates what is discussed, identified and treated. This is
perhaps most evident in a flowchart that represents the “interactive model” for identifying and
labeling hyperactive children, shown in Figure 3:

Figure 3. Flowchart for identifying and labeling hyperactivity from page 154 of Hyperactive
Children: The Social Ecology of Identification and Treatment
In looking at this flow chart, we can see that in every case the step just before the actual
diagnosis of hyperactivity is a requirement to see a physician. Even though family and school
environments are taken into account when making a determination of whether or not to label a
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child “hyperactive,” the physician is the ultimate gatekeeper. While opening up the discourse to
create better access is a step in the right direction, ultimately the medical professional has the
final say and remains the ultimate authority on the subject.

3.6

Medicalization of ADHD and Higher Education
In conclusion, I want to return briefly to Peter Conrad’s critique of the medicalization of

hyperactivity. He writes, “Some problems that have come into the medical domain are not ipso
facto medical problems. This is particularly true about deviant behavior…. By defining a
problem as medical it is taken out of the public realm where there can be discussion by ordinary
people and put on a plane where only medical people can discuss it” (72). Conrad goes on to
quote Janice Reynolds who explained, “The increasing acceptance, especially among the more
educated segments of our populace, of technical solutions – solutions administered by
disinterested politically and morally neutral experts – results in the withdrawal of more and more
areas of human experience from the realm of public discussion” (220-221). This ultimately is the
crux of my argument with regard to medicine and ADHD. Despite the progress that was made in
the years directly prior to the passing of the ADA in 1990, the medical discourse that dominated
the discussion of ADHD served as a rhetorical barrier of entry that only admitted medical
professionals as experts qualified to make official judgments. It is upon this framework for
understanding disability that the ADA is constructed. As was discussed in the previous chapter,
the ADA requires some “record of impairment” prior to an individual qualifying for
accommodations. In institutions of higher education, where such accommodations are necessary
for many students, this means diagnosis by a medical professional.
Even when the medical professionals act in the more inclusive manner outlined by
Whalen and Henker, they can’t get around the prescribed assumptions of the medical paradigm
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that conceive any act of diagnosis and treatment as a means of identifying something broken or
unwell, and improving it. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, this approach
imposes a distinctly negative identity upon students who go through the process of getting
diagnosed with ADHD.
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A MOTION/ACTION ANALYSIS OF ADHD
DIAGNOSTIC PROTOCOLS

“I had in mind the particular aptitude that the human biologic organism has for the learning of
conventional symbol-systems (such as tribal languages), our corresponding dependence upon
this aptitude, and the important role it plays in the shaping of our existence.”
- Kenneth Burke; Dramatism and Development; 15
“Not all simplicity is wise.”
- Walter Kauffman; “I and You: A Prologue;” I and Thou; 9
4.1

Discursive Representations of ADHD
Disability studies have long taken up issues connected with the inveterate linguistic

discrimination that exists regarding disabilities (often termed “ableism”), usually focusing on
how public views on disability are constructed in the linguistic traditions of various discourses
(e.g. Bailey, Kafai, Shalk). In this chapter, rather than focus on the public discourse, I focus on a
segment of the discourse surrounding ADHD within colleges and universities where potentially
discriminatory institutional attitudes and actions are formed and thus might potentially be
reformed. Namely, I address instruments used by university psychologists and other health
professionals to diagnose ADHD, which diagnosis is often required in order for any student with
ADHD to receive accommodations. I will discuss how Kenneth Burke’s notion of nonsymbolic
motion and symbolic action, when paired with Martin Buber’s conceptions of I and THOU,
demonstrates how psychological testing for ADHD ascribes unambiguously negative symbolic
action to the cognitive nonsymbolic motion of ADHD. This negative symbolic action can in turn
lead to similarly negative attitudes and outwardly expressed behavioral actions (Burke, Rhetoric
of Motives 42, 50).
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As discussed in the previous chapter, ADHD has been described and defined almost
entirely by medical professionals as they have attempted to understand it as a disorder, diagnose
and treat it. This rhetorical construction of ADHD – that it is a medical disorder that causes
deficits requiring treatment – has become the standard by which ADHD is defined and classified
by the biomedical community (Bailey) and by which it is largely understood by the general
population12. It is also upon this discourse upon which university accommodations language is
modeled.
Within colleges and universities, the discourse surrounding ADHD is driven almost
exclusively by trained and credentialed psychologists and psychiatrists, either in a counseling or
an accommodations advisement capacity. In order for students to receive academic counseling
and/or accommodations, they are required to be evaluated for ADHD or demonstrate proof of
prior evaluation and diagnosis by a medical health professional. (Often colleges and universities
will require students to be reevaluated even if they provide the required proof.) As such, the
evaluative instruments used by mental health professionals to diagnose ADHD are of particular
interest here as they represent almost exclusively the language and discourse that mediates the
relationship between the institution and the non-expert.
There are many instruments that can be used to diagnose ADHD (See Table 2.1 on page
14). That said, one of the most widely used is the Barkley Deficits in Executive Functioning
Scale-Long Form (BDEFS-LF). There are two major reasons why this diagnostic instrument is
so widely used: 1) it is a self-report instrument that is quick and easy to evaluate, and 2) the
copyright of this particular instrument allows photocopies to be made of the report, significantly
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While no studies have looked into attitudes among a “general population,” studies have been conducted among
several groups – K-12 teachers (Bender, Vail and Scott; Cook; Ghanizadeh, Bahredar, Moeini), college students
(Chew, et al) and school-aged children (Law, et al), to name a few – demonstrating a prevalence of negative
attitudes toward ADHD that suggest the influence of the deficit-driven, pathology paradigm.
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reducing the cost incurred by many other tests which require mental health professionals to buy
new copies of an instrument for every student seeking diagnosis (at anywhere between $50 and
$150 per copy). Many mental health professionals who diagnose ADHD do not rely entirely
upon self-report testing when making diagnoses, favoring instead to administer a more
comprehensive protocol that collects as much diagnostic information as possible. This includes
collecting statements from friends and family, collecting formal documentation of childhood
behaviors, and extensive one-on-one interviews. However, even in the case of this more
comprehensive testing, self-report protocols such as the BDEFS-LF often are used as a
preliminary screening assessment to determine whether or not to engage in the more thorough
and rigorous evaluation.
For many individuals, even many who never go on to receive more thorough evaluation
and/or treatment, this self-report is the first official document they encounter that offers any
definitional grounding for ADHD. In other words, it is through this instrument that institutions
who diagnose and accommodate demonstrate both their definitions of ADHD and the value they
ascribe to individuals with ADHD.

4.2

Overview of the BDEFS-LF: Self Report
Before describing and discussing the BDEFS-LF Self Report, a brief methodological note

is warranted. In consultation with the testing coordinator in the “Disability Resource Center”
(DRC) at Purdue University, I have been advised to be circumspect in my discussion of any
psychological testing protocols. Access to these tests is very closely guarded by mental health
professionals because they don’t want individuals to be able to “study for the test.” Most of these
testing protocols require proof of medical licensure to even look at them, let alone analyze and
discuss them. As I mentioned, the BDEFS-LF: Self Report is more accessible and has a more
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lenient copyright; however, though I was able to gain access the instrument, I have been strongly
discouraged from making any reproduction of the report, either in part or whole. While this may
seem an unnecessarily covert restriction given the broad accessibility on the Web of materials
describing ADHD symptoms and diagnostic protocols, out of professional courtesy I accede to
the request of the DRC. But in order to have a productive analysis of how this and other
diagnostic tests rhetorically construct the reality of ADHD and the identities of students with
ADHD, some broad description is warranted. This description is based on by my experience
having had the test administered to me as well as my own examination of the testing protocol
itself.
The BDEFS-LF interprets ADHD expressly through the lens of “executive functioning”
which it defines as “self-regulation across time for the attainment of one’s goals (self-interests),
often in the context of others” (Barkley, Barkley Deficits… 13). While there are many competing
theories of human cognition and neurological function as it relates to outwardly expressed
behavior, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is striking that executive functioning is chosen as the
object of assessment here, because in doing so the test focuses solely on the behaviors with
which individuals with ADHD struggle.
The BDEFS-LF: Self Report consists of 89 questions. Each question recounts a specific
behavior, and individuals taking the test are instructed to rate how often they have exhibited that
behavior over the preceding six months on a scale of one to four. On this scale, 1 = Never or
rarely, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = Often, and 4 = Very often. The 89 questions are divided into five
categories of executive functioning: “Self-Management to Time,” “Self-Organization/Problem
Solving,” Self-Restraint,” “Self-Motivation,” “Self-Regulations of Emotion.” Total scores in
each of these five categories are calculated individually and then as a whole. Additionally, 11
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specifically identified questions are totaled and used to calculate a seventh score aimed more
specifically at diagnosing adult ADHD13. These seven scores are then compared to tables
according to age and gender which provide percentile rankings14. According to Barkley, “The
higher the percentile, the more deviant the score is relative to the normative sample (general
population)” (Barkley Deficits…, 112). These raw scores and their attendant percentile rankings
are then used to determine if the individual can be diagnosed and to what degree.15.
In every one of the 89 questions that make up the BDEFS-LF, the focus is on the negative
outward expression of ADHD. This negativity is framed in two ways, either negatively
describing individuals engaging in normal tasks or behaviors (e.g. Have trouble motivating
myself, lack self-discipline, etc.) or describing behaviors which are generally understood to be
negative themselves (e.g. procrastinate, make impulsive comments, etc.). By focusing
exclusively on the negative aspects of executive functioning, the BDEFS-LF explicitly argues
that to have the cognitive function that has come to be defined as ADHD is to be found lacking,
to not measure up, and to not meet the standard of base-level human behavior. This is not
altogether surprising considering the name that has been given this form of cognitive functioning
– Attention-deficit/hyperactivity Disorder – is 50% negative (deficit and disorder). This deficit
model, in turn, leads to the pathological paradigm through which ADHD is almost exclusively
framed. With such a model, there is something wrong that needs addressing before a student can

13

There is not discussion of why these 11 questions were selected or why they are of particular relevance for adult
ADHD.
14
The 89 question diagnostic instruments are published as appendices in the book Barkley Deficits in Executive
Functioning Scale (BDEFS). The book’s purpose is to establish the rigor and validity of the instrument and to
discuss and justify the development of the diagnostic criteria. Additionally, the percentile distribution tables are also
found therein.
15
“Generally, scores from the 76th to the 84th percentile should be considered of marginal clinical significance.
Those from the 84th to the 92nd percentile should be considered borderline or somewhat deficient. Those between the
93rd and 95th percentiles should be considered mildly deficient. Those between the 96th and 98th percentile should be
considered moderately deficient. And those at the 99th percentile should be viewed as markedly deficient or severe”
(Barkley, Barkley Deficits…, 112).
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conceivably succeed. Or, as a respected professor in the field off-handedly remarked to me at a
conference when I recounted having been diagnosed with ADHD halfway through my PhD
program, “Oh. Are you getting fixed?”
The implications of framing an entire subset of cognitive function in negative terms, I
contend, is plainly unfortunate, and it is made all the more unfortunate given the discussion of
how diagnostic tools generally, and this one in particular, represent the driving forces behind
most discourse surrounding ADHD in institutions of higher education. But in order to
demonstrate the extent to which this rhetorical framing damages the ADHD population, in the
rest of this chapter I draw on Kenneth Burke’s theory of nonsymbolic motion and symbolic
action16 and Martin Buber’s theory of I-IT vs I-THOU relationships to demonstrate how this
explicitly negative discourse fosters within the institution an attitude of neglect and the dismissal
of any potential strengths these students might embody as a result of their ADHD.

4.3

Brief Background of Motion/Action
Burke discusses his understanding of motion and action in several places throughout his

published writing, perhaps most directly in his 1978 article in Critical Inquiry, “(Nonsymbolic)
Motion/(Symbolic) Action.” I take as my entry point, however, three mentions of the motion
action pair in Burke’s unpublished correspondence with Wayne Booth17. In this correspondence
Burke often emphasized the importance of motion and action as a starting point for criticism. In
a September 16, 1978 letter he wrote, “I’m so sold on my motion action routine.... I have to

16

Burke often discusses this theory using the more succinct terms “motion” and “action.” While it is important to
note the difference between the nonsymbolic and the symbolic, I largely follow Burke’s terminological lead here.
17
The hard copies of this correspondence can be found in the Special Collections Library at Pennsylvania State
University. My access to this correspondence came through Gregory Clark of Brigham Young University who
visited Penn State and made digital scans of the letters.
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approach all those things from my starting-point, for nothing else seems quite real,” and in a
letter dated September 18, 1978 he further emphasized, “I want to see everything discussed in
connection with that tie-up [‘my motion action routine’].” This kind of general language about
how “everything” needs to be talked about through the lens of motion and action might be
viewed as hyperbolic, especially considering how, in the course of his correspondence with
Booth, Burke was continually trying to make a case for his own primacy as a critic and theorist
and reproaching Booth for failing to sufficiently recognize him as such. However, in a letter
dated January 2, 1979, Burke made a comment that is notable for its specificity as to how his
motion action pair might be used critically: “I insist upon the motion action pair as the
groundwork of a secular nomenclature for the discussion of human relations.” Burke’s mention
of human relations here is important, first of all because Burke is widely recognized as being
dedicated to finding ways that rhetorical theory and criticism might ameliorate the human
condition, even going so far as to give his book A Grammar of Motives the epigraph “ad bellum
purificandum” or, “towards the purifying of war,” war being the basest and most despicable of
all forms of human relations18. But for the purposes of my argument, I take his mention of the
motion action pair being the groundwork for discussing human relations as an invitation to
explore how the motion action pair can help us better understand the human relations of
individuals with ADHD and the institution representatives diagnosing them, as mediated through
diagnostic protocols. This relationship is particularly important in this case because of the

18

Not only does this Latin phrase (which Burke himself appears to have coined) appear on the flyleaf of A
Grammar of Motives, but it is featured prominently in his own personal library in his home in New Jersey. There it
can be found above the window frame in his library written in his own handwriting, as well as on a welcome sign to
his library written by his wife Linda (Zappen, Halloran, and Wible). Finding a “purification” of war by means of
logic and/or dialectic was of great importance to him.
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identity-building potential of an institutional designation. Such identity-building work can affect
students’ abilities to succeed in college, as we will see.
If motion and action are to be “the groundwork of a secular nomenclature for the
discussion of human relations,” as Burke contends in his letters, one might assume that Burke
clearly delineates what he means by the distinction and relationship that he sees as existing
between these terms. Sadly, as has been noted by Daniel O’Keefe and Matthew Weiss, he does
not, leaving scholars to parse out for themselves what he does say about it and make use of this
pair as best they can. The motion and action paradigm is used most often as a way of discussing
the ontological function of language (Crusius; Henderson) or as a framework for developing a
rhetoric of embodiment (Crable; Foss and White; Hawhee). However, despite the fact that in
Burke’s correspondence with Booth he insists upon it being used to understand and discuss
relationships between humans, it is rarely if ever employed in such a manner. What might it
mean, then, to discuss human relations through the lens of motion and action? Or, put more
specifically for the purposes of this dissertation, how might Burke’s theory of motion and action
help us to better understand the human relations between students with ADHD and powerwielding authorities such as administrators, disability resource center employees, or even
instructors?

4.4

Definitions of Motion and Action
Before discussing how motion and action might find application in understanding the

position of individuals with ADHD in institutions of higher learning, definitional groundwork for
using Burke’s motion action in this way needs to be established. I interpret Burke as saying that
“nonsymbolic motion” (hereafter referred to as “motion”) consists of the world in its holistic
entirety without any being capable of symbolic representation being present to witness or define
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it. “Symbolic action” (hereafter referred to as “action”) occurs as symbol system-wielding beings
step into the world of motion, divide it up, and attempt to make sense of it. In other words, as
symbol-using animals attach symbolic meaning to specific, observable parts of the whole, by
means of language and other symbol systems, they operate in the realm of action. In Burke’s
own words, “There can be motion without action (as the sea can go on thrashing about whether
or not there are animals that have a word for it)” (“(Nonsymbolic) Motion” 814). Motion exists
independent of action. However, when we symbol-using creatures observe the movement of a
body of water we might say, “It thrashes.” To say that something thrashes is to conjure fierce
images of an angry, wild and perhaps unreasonable quasi-being. This kind of action, being
applied to the motion of the sea, has led to centuries of writers and fishermen to perceiving the
sea as an entity bent on swallowing any and all who might venture out upon its depths. Thus,
while the motion of the sea exists devoid of body, parts, or passions, our language-driven minds
demand explanation and motive, so we assign it symbols that represent ideas and emotions
extending beyond its intrinsic identity.
Much of Burke’s later work is devoted to exploring this relationship between motion and
action. For example, the pentad that he develops at length in A Grammar of Motives to flesh out
his theory of dramatism is, in essence, a heuristic for assigning symbolic action to human motion
as comprehensive as possible. It does so by attempting to take into account as many distinct parts
or variables of that action as possible. Burke frames this project by asking the question, “What is
involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?” (xv). In essence,
humans observe that other humans are engaged in some behavior. The human being who is
observed might, in a symbol-using vacuum, be considered a fully connected extension of the
holistic motion of the universe. It is the observing human that separates the observed human
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from its surroundings and attempts to make sense of what, how, and why that human is engaged
in the observed behaviors. Dramatism, then, “is concerned with the basic forms of thought
which, in accordance with the nature of the world as all men necessarily experience it, are
exemplified in the attributing of motives” (xv). Action, then, attributes more than a symbol; its
aim, perhaps most especially (though not exclusively) as it deals with human motion, is to
attribute motive.
This delineation of motion and action might seem, on the face of it, to be another
instantiation of the old Cartesian dualism of mind-body, alternately discussed as matter/spirit,
natural/social, and others. However, Burke’s motion action pair is a separate class of taxonomy.
Burke is attempting to work his way outside of the symbolic realm altogether. Bryan Crable
explains, “The action/motion pair is not analogous to other vocabularies because such
oppositions themselves fall solely within the realm of symbolic action...matter, for example,
cannot be equivalent to motion, for the matter/spirit distinction is itself a product of action;
‘matter’ points us toward action, not motion” (126, emphasis original). Were the motion action
pair reducible to merely a new frame for the mind/body dualism, the work of using it to interpret
and understand human relations would be relatively simple. But both mind and body are
specifically delineated parts of the larger system of motion. The task at hand, then, is quite
difficult as we are attempting to discuss motions that are expressly nonsymbolic while doing so
from the inescapable situatedness of the realm of symbolic action.
To demonstrate this situatedness let’s discuss the key symbolic action for this
dissertation: attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder. By accepting and using this term, we are
immediately dividing out a piece of action from the larger whole of motion. Even broader terms
such as “cognitive function” or “neural network,” while sidestepping the problematic negativity
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of the words “deficit” and “disorder,” still separate brain function from other bodily functions. In
turn, as we focus on “bodily functions,” they are separated from other natural motions that
produce the sustenance for those bodily functions. Such natural motions might include weather
conditions that facilitate the production of food or the distance of the earth from the sun which
ensures sufficient, but not too much, light and heat. Even the broadening our focus to include
these functions of the natural world that produce the sustenance which enables the bodily
functions – among which functions are the various brain functions, which brain functions are
then subdivided into ordered and disordered – we are in turn neglecting the larger universe-level
functions that hold the natural world in its current orbit around a sun. And so on, turtles all the
way down. This is not to say that the project is altogether too difficult and we should just throw
in the towel. Rather I hope to highlight the difficulty we face when starting a conversation from
the starting point of motion and action.
Ultimately, because we operate and exist within the symbolic realm (as humans
generally, but as scholars concerned with “English” more specifically), there is no way for us to
conceive of, let alone understand precisely, motion in its holistic entirety. The only way to
proceed is to acknowledge that, yes, this discussion of motion and action as it relates to ADHD
will, of necessity, ignore certain aspects of the whole of motion. As I discuss “cognitive motion”
and the ways that psychological testing protocols inscribe certain symbolic actions, which bring
with them the possibility of undesirable attitudes and actions, I will, of necessity, be starting
from the observation deck of action, and by so doing I am at once selecting and deflecting
aspects of reality (Burke, LSA 45). With this caveat in place, we can approach the task of better
understanding what it might mean to apply this motion action frame to discussing and better
understanding human relations as it refers to ADHD.
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To attempt to understand human relations we might conceivably use Burke’s pentad,
because, as previously discussed, it seems to be interrelated to Burke’s motion action pair.
However, rather than analyzing the various aspects of a dramatistic scenario already set within
the framework of action, I’m more interested in taking a step back and looking at the move from
motion to action, from nonsymbolic to symbolic. Rather than focus on defining and explaining
an act, scene, agent, agency or purpose, I want to look at the process of distinguishing an “act”
from the whole of Action, a “scene” from the grand Scene, and so on. That said, Burke’s notion
of “motive” and its relationship to action, which is at the heart of his dramatism, will be
important for the discussion.
In moving from discussing the motion action pair generally to talking about human
relations, the notion might arise that we really have no control over how we act and react. We
might say that “human relations” are just biologically determined outcomes. Again, working
from a standpoint that is always already situated within the symbolic, it’s impossible to
definitively affirm or reject this proposition. However, Burke addresses this concern in Language
as Symbolic Action, explaining, “I need but point out that, whether or not we are just things in
motion, we think of one another...as persons…. All I would claim is that, illusion or not, the
human race cannot possibly get along with itself on the basis of any other intuition” (53,
emphasis in the original). Whether or not we are in fact beholden to our biological motion and
are not agents unto ourselves, the mere fact that we refer to and understand the beings all around
us as persons with whom we are able to identify (at least to some extent) provides the
groundwork for attempting to understand what that process is that moves us to considering those
beings persons. And this approach, seeing others as persons and not simply objects in motion is
vital if we are to be truly compassionate and humane.
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4.5

Motion, Action, and I-IT
To begin addressing the implications on human relations of moving from motion to

action, I want to bring Martin Buber’s notion of I-IT and I-THOU relationships to this discussion
of motion and action. I do so because Buber’s project is explicitly geared towards enacting more
humane human relations. As we seek to understand (and perhaps improve) the ethical nature of
the move from motion to action, from being-indistinguishable-from-the-background to person,
we are employing what Martin Buber might call an I-IT (as opposed to I-THOU) framework. In
an I-IT framework, human agents (I’s) interact with and experience motion. In doing so, they
focus on a portion of that motion, and it is transformed within the human agents into a series of
symbolic actions (ITs). Burke himself participates in this I-IT discussion of motion and action in
the previous quote regarding the sea. There exists the-sea-and-its-thrashing, and along comes a
human I who gives IT a name. There is existential distance between the human and the sea. As
Buber writes in defining IT, “I perceive something. I feel something. I sense something. I think
something...All this and its like is the basis of the realm of It,” (54, emphasis added). Even when
we talk about motions that are biological and thus endemic to the very being of the I, the act of
naming, symbolizing, and categorizing separates that motion from the namer, symbolizer, or
categorizer. Bryan Crable has written, “Any demarcation of the nonsymbolic indicates that we
are already working from within the realm of symbolic action--that there is a human actor,
engaged in adequate or inadequate symbol-use” (128). Crable here further reinforces our
previously discussed inescapable situatedness within the symbolic realm, but what is of
particular note here pertaining to our discussion of Buber is Crable’s assertion that there is a
human actor engaging in symbol-use at varying levels of adequacy. That we seem to intuitively
understand that symbol use can be adequate or inadequate highlights the separation between the
human actors and the objects of their symbol-using. In using the term “adequate,” Crable seems
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to be suggesting that there is a correct, platonic understanding of the IT, and that the imprecise
nature of our symbol systems does not allow us to ascribe Symbols (with a capital “S”) that
wholly encompass that IT, leaving mere “adequacy” our best hope. The goal of much of human
communication, then, from this interpretation would be to use the most adequate symbols,
always recognizing, however, that the very nature of language disallows a direct one-to-one
relationship with the holistic reality of motion.
It might be tempting to say that as long as the human agent I’s go about creating action
out of the nonhuman realm of motion, the I-IT approach, no matter its adequacy, is relatively
harmless and appropriate. For example, let’s say there exists some natural, motional entity that
we call a “tree.” A human agent I might call IT a “good” tree or a “bad” tree, the “best” tree or
the “worst” tree, but the motion of its treeness will continue unperturbed no matter the adequacy
of our symbolic action. However, the assertion that the tree is unperturbed only remains accurate
as long as we are referring explicitly to the direct effects of the act of naming/describing on the
tree. The vibrating of our vocal chords or the act of putting pen to paper does not have any direct
effect upon the tree. That said, in making specific symbolic action out of the motion of the tree, it
is possible to indirectly, and severely, perturb the tree. If the tree depends upon the human agent
for water, or fertilizer, or provide other life-sustaining elements, and that human agent has
assigned the symbolic action of “bad” or “worst,” while the symbol itself may not affect the tree,
it does affect the human agent. The symbolic action of “bad tree” has a rhetorical effect on the
attitude of the human towards that tree, which attitude, Burke would claim, is an incipient act19
(RM 50). The human behaviors associated with this attitude might lead to neglect of the tree.
Ultimately, in this scenario, the symbolic action can have a potentially devastating effect on the

19

In this case, “act” refers to outwardly expressed behavior, rather than symbolic assignation of meaning.
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tree. Through this example we see that the delimiting act of creating symbolic action from
nonsymbolic motion has a reciprocal rhetorical effect on the symbol user. This seems to be true,
at varying levels, of all symbol use.
Here we begin to see that when human agent I’s begins to engage other humans the same
way they would any other nonsymbolic motion – the same way they would a tree – adequacy
becomes a more pressing concern and the project becomes more serious.
Firstly, by moving to a discussion of humans actioning the motion of other humans we
can no longer ignore the effect of an I’s act of naming/describing on another human IT. In this
instance, the vibrating of the I’s vocal chords or the act of an I putting pen to paper to create
action from human motion can have a direct effect upon the human IT. While school children
assert that words are less powerful than sticks and stones (at least with regard to the effect upon
one’s bones and the breaking thereof), the close attention that rhetorical studies pays to better
understanding how words impact audiences is a testament to the effect of symbols on the
symbolized. Additionally, scholars in many disciplines have noted that the symbols we use, and
that are used on us, have an indelible impact on the way we view ourselves and others, and color
all inter-human interactions.
But here we are also interested in the indirect influence of the symbol used upon the
symbol user. In the instance of a human I assigning another human IT the symbolic action of
“bad human,” the effects of this symbolic action can create attitudes within the I that might
conceivably lead to the I treating the “bad human” IT in ways that indelibly perturb the IT’s
personhood. This situation is intensified when the symbolic action moves beyond inadequacy
and instead becomes actively negative and damaging. As Haig Bosmajian has written:
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Hitler's ‘Final Solution’ appeared reasonable once the Jews were successfully
labeled by the Nazis as sub-humans, as ‘parasites,’ ‘vermin,’ and ‘bacilli.’ The
segregation and suppression of blacks in the United States were justified once
they were considered ‘chattels’ and ‘inferiors.’ The subjugation of the ‘American
Indians’ was defensible since they were defined as ‘barbarians’ and ‘savages.’
(295-296)
While the cases Bosmajian describes are extreme, they illustrate the power that symbolic action
has upon the attitudes of the symbol user, allowing and justifying dehumanizing behavior that
would otherwise be horrifying and unthinkable. Of particular note in Bosmajian’s discussion is
the fact that in all three examples the human motion is made action by institutions rather than
individuals. While the reciprocal effects of the chosen symbolic action upon the I are inescapable
regardless of whether the I is an individual or an institution, the corresponding negative effects
upon the IT are magnified when the I is an institution.
Thus far I have discussed the actioning of human motion in the same way I discussed the
inanimate tree, as a unidirectional relationship wherein the I considers, evaluates, and symbolizes
the IT. However, in real human relationships this process is not unidirectional. This process is
made significantly more complicated by the fact that the roles of symbolic action assigner and
nonsymbolic motion assignee are blurred. And because they are blurred, they are under constant
revision. Humans take into account any and all motion-action history associated with the other
humans in question when revising and adjusting the associated symbolic actions. For example, as
one human I asserts that another human IT is a bad human, the “bad human” IT now incorporates
the experience of being called a bad human into the motion of the first human. This in turn
changes the symbolic action reciprocated to the original symbol-user, perhaps assigning the
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symbolic action “mean human.” And so the relationship continues to evolve, the motion of each
human in constant flux with each new instance of symbolic action and the symbolic interaction
in similar flux owing to the shifting motion.
Given this situation where the various participants in the human relationship
simultaneously exist and function as both I and IT, symbolic actioner and motion, let us return
and consider how this version of project changes when one of the participants is an institution.
Institutions exist to provide some service to individuals. That service may be material goods (e.g.
infrastructure provided by the government), an intangible existential service (e.g. a sense of
belonging provided by the local Moose Lodge), or something in-between (e.g. an education
provided by a university that allows individuals to provide for their own material needs while
also providing a sense of belonging). When individuals and humans are engaged in a relationship
of the sort we have been describing, the power dynamic is unbalanced in favor of the institution
because the individual expects or depends on the service provided. As discussed previously,
when institutions as I’s assign inadequate or even negative symbolic action to individual ITs, the
institution’s willingness to provide its services might diminish. In so diminishing, the individual,
upon observing and experiencing the dehumanizing motion of the institution’s negligence or
indifference, might assign to the institution the symbolic action “untrustworthy” or even
“bigoted.” The effect of this action upon the individual at best increases the distance between
individual and institution and might serve to further harm the individual’s ability to receive or
otherwise experience the services of the institution.
If we are to treat the assignation of symbolic action to the motion of other humans as the
basic unit of understanding a human relationship, whether that relationship exists between two or
more humans or between a human and an institution, it is clear that the I-IT framework is
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altogether too dehumanizing, especially when the overarching goal is to relate productively and
healthily with one another.

4.6

Motion, Action, and I-YOU
In contrast to adopting the I-IT framework for human relations, Buber would have us

strive for I-YOU20. He explains, “Even as a melody is not composed of tones, nor a verse of
words, nor a statue of lines--one must pull and tear to turn a unity into a multiplicity--so it is with
the human being to whom I say YOU. I can abstract from him the color of his hair or the color of
his speech or the color of his graciousness; I have to do this again and again; but immediately he
is no longer YOU.” To approach a human from the standpoint of I-IT is to overgeneralize. It is to
stereotype and objectify. Unity, not multiplicity is the goal of I-YOU. “Man’s world is
manifold,” explains Walter Kauffman, “and his attitudes are manifold. What is manifold is often
frightening because it is not neat and simple. Men prefer to forget how many possibilities are
open to them,” (9). I-YOU encourages a human agent I to not settle for the neat, simple and
overgeneralizing IT, but to embrace the frightening vastness of human possibility.
This I-YOU approach may be the ideal, but it is perhaps not an altogether achievable
goal. I-YOU seems to be aimed at understanding and accepting the nonsymbolic motion of
human nature in its own nonsymbolic state. But, as discussed, we cannot escape our situatedness

20

Buber’s work in the original German is entitled Ich und Du, which is often translated as I-THOU. The two most
widely used translations of Buber’s work are the Smith (1958) and the Kauffman (1970) translations. I am using the
Kauffman translation here. Buber himself worked with Smith on the 1958 translation, while Buber’s son
commissioned the Kauffman translation three years after his father’s death. Smith translates “Du” as “Thou,”
whereas Kauffman translates it “You.” Kauffman justifies his use of “you” asserting that there is no adequate
English translation of Du: “German lovers say Du to one another, and so do friends. Du is spontaneous and
unpretentious, remote from formality, pomp, and dignity” (14, emphasis in the original). Kauffman insinuates that
the formality, pomp, and dignity associated with “thou” (largely due to its association with religious texts and
language) render it an unhelpful translation when compared to the original German denotation. As such, Kauffman
follows the pattern of the NIV Bible, updating “thou” to a more contemporary “you,” recognizing that while “you”
doesn’t necessarily capture the essence of “Du,” it does avoid the formal and religious baggage of “thou.”

91
within the symbolic. Due to the nature of symbolic action as a divider and categorizer of the
nonsymbolic motion of the world, we likely will never be able to avoid the I-IT starting point. To
this point, Burke asserts:
The progress of human enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people
not as vicious, but as mistaken. When you add that people are necessarily
mistaken, that all people are exposed to situations in which they must act as fools,
that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness, you complete the
comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that underlies great tragedy.
(ATH 51-52)
While Buber’s concern about working from an I-IT standpoint is well-taken, Burke’s balanced
approach here effectively counters it. If we can recognize at the outset that we will, of necessity
fail in our efforts to fully embrace another human as YOU, then we can strive for humility and
give our fellow ITs the benefit of the doubt, recognizing that we too, in their eyes, are fools.
While we perhaps can’t fully embody Buber’s I-YOU ideal, Burke submits, in addition to
humility, identification as an alternative. Burke explains: “In being identified with B, A is
'substantially one' with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time, he remains unique, an
individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and
consubstantial with another” (RM 21). With identification so understood, we might look at our
motion-action experiences with other humans not so much as either I-IT or I-YOU, but rather as
a sliding scale. As we improve our ability to transcend differences and better identify with and
allow for complexity in our fellow humans, we are better approaching the YOU end of the scale.
So, in discussing human relations through the lens of motion/action, per Burke’s insistence, the
question we must ask is, “Does my choice of symbolic action treat another human more as an IT
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or a YOU?” Are humans objects, or are humans individuals with whom I can identify? While it
is not likely that anyone would conscientiously defend choosing to view humans as objects, the
language that we use in relating to other humans can adopt that attitude even if we do not. And in
looking at the institutional discourse of colleges and universities with regard to ADHD, that we
see that this is likely what is happening. While the individuals who work within institutions to
diagnose and accommodate individuals with ADHD use symbolic action that treats others YOUs
rather than ITs in their own personal conversation and communication, the institutionally
mandated and accepted documents they use, such as the BDEFS, lean unfortunately toward
treated them as ITs.
The institution of the university is often viewed as the arbiter of who is and is not “smart”
and/or “capable” in many areas. Given the previous discussion of the effects of symbolic action
on the symbol user, the argument might theoretically be made that when students are assigned
negative, deficit-laden symbolic action by the institution, the reciprocal effect of that symbolic
action on the institution itself is to treat these students as lesser than those students who don’t
require accommodation. While there is certainly danger that this might occur, the fact that
caring, well-intentioned individuals carry out the work of accommodation and educational
instruction (hopefully) ensures that this does not occur. However, the act of being institutionally
defined by this negative, pathological selection of reality via diagnostic protocols and other
institutional documentation does encourage an identification of inferiority upon students that can
be potentially damaging to their success. It is for fear of this stigma that many students actively
avoid seeking out help and accommodation when they might need it (Collins and Mowbray;
Stanley and Manthorpe).
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This medical, pathological discourse, in addition to introducing road blocks to receiving
the help that individuals with ADHD might require to succeed, has also shaped the current
approach to accommodations, as discussed in Chapter 3. In doing so, individuals who do receive
diagnosis and accommodation are compelled to focus expressly on shoring up the negative
aspects of their neurological diversity. Admittedly, and speaking from experience, there are
cognitive and behavioral impairments that in many cases need to be addressed in order for
students with ADHD to be able to succeed in the university. However, it is equally important that
these students be given the opportunity to recognize and lean upon the unique strengths and
abilities that result from this same “disorder.” These strengths represent an alternative selection
of reality can go unheralded when the negatives and weaknesses are the only focus.
Moving forward, then, what is needed is a shift away from institutional symbolic action
centered exclusively on pathology and towards symbolic action centered on a neurodiversity
paradigm. Such a paradigm aims for the understanding of neurodiversity as a form of human
diversity subject to the same societal dynamics as other forms of diversity. This is not to ascribe
any malice aforethought to administrators, psychologists, accommodations specialists, etc. who
participate in the current system of diagnosis and accommodation. They work to improve the
system. But the neurodiversity movement has helped broaden the scope of our work when
striving to meet the needs of neurologically and cognitively diverse populations. This broader
work that identifies strengths and weaknesses needs to be more fully reflected in the discourse
and language of the institutional documents used to discuss, diagnose, and accommodate these
individuals. This shift in symbolic action from pathology to neurodiversity gets us closer to an IYOU basis for understanding the nonsymbolic motion of ADHD, which ultimately is a much
more humane framework for this specific subset of human relations.
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There are many ways that this shift in institutional focus from a pathology paradigm to a
neurodiversity paradigm can be implemented and thus help create climates that support a more
cognitively accessible composition course. In the final chapters of this dissertation I discuss ways
the various agents surrounding the composition classroom (WPAs and instructors in particular)
can begin making this shift.
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FOSTERING COGNITIVE ACCESSIBILITY
THROUGH METACOGNITION

5.1

Introduction
In this chapter and the next I discuss ways that composition instructors and WPAs might

more effectively meet the needs of cognitively diverse students. In much of the work that has
been done addressing classroom and pedagogical application, there is a tendency to make
suggestions that focus primarily on addressing deficits. As DuPaul and Stoner write in their
widely cited book ADHD in the Schools: Assessment and Intervention Strategies, “We
recommend that involved professionals take a systemic and ongoing approach to designing,
implementing, and evaluating classroom-based accommodations that combines both preventive
and remedial approaches to dealing with presenting problems, and that involves multiple
intervention agents or approaches” (143). While this is a helpful approach in many cases, an
inclusive, accessible classroom needs to go beyond this deficit-centered approach. The difficulty
in moving beyond a deficit approach is that strengths are not as readily apparent as are
weaknesses, as demonstrated disruptive behaviors and poor educational outcomes. Additionally,
while in a one-on-one setting – as with an occupational therapist or a psychologist – identifying
strengths might be a relatively straightforward endeavor, a classroom setting makes such one-onone attention more difficult.
In these two chapters I propose two approaches to making composition courses more
cognitively accessible to a class I expect to be neurodiverse: 1) placing a renewed emphasis on
metacognitive practices, and 2) incorporating a “prototyping pedagogy” that encourages students
to be aware of the influence of external factors on their cognitive processes and to actively
choose those external influences that will enable them to function most effectively. At the heart
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of both of these approaches is the guiding notion that college and university students can and
should take an active role in identifying their own cognitive strengths and weaknesses rather than
waiting and relying on institutional actors (teachers, mentors, and other professionals). It is
particularly important that students learn to proactively identify and understand their own unique
cognitive strengths and weaknesses in composition courses because the majority of the cognitive
work required by these courses occurs outside of the classroom where the reach of institutional
accommodations is limited.
In this chapter I discuss ways that composition instructors can foster cognitive
accessibility in their classrooms. In particular I discuss why “accessibility” is a more effective
focus than accommodation, and that one important way of creating a cognitively accessible
classroom is by focusing pedagogical efforts on providing students with metacognitive
experiences that produce metacognitive knowledge. Specifically I propose that implementing
mindfulness meditation is one, relatively easy way of encouraging metacognitive experiences in
the composition classroom. By approaching composition pedagogy in this way, instructors and
WPAS can help students develop a more sophisticated understanding of their own cognitive
processes that will in turn enable them to enact writing behaviors geared specifically toward
capitalizing on their own unique cognitive strengths and mitigating their weaknesses.

5.2

Accessibility, not Accommodation
In looking for ways to enable students to access their own unique cognitive abilities, as

well as help them work around and through the controversy and skepticism surrounding
accommodations as discussed in Chapter 2, disability resource centers and campus
accommodations administrators do much work in educating campus communities about the
realities of learning disabilities and in attempting to destigmatize accommodations. These
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outreach and education efforts contribute greatly towards improving students’ opportunities to
gain access to the accommodations that they may need, and these efforts also help navigate the
problem of exclusive student agency. However, as in the case of the University of Illinois
situation mentioned in Chapter 2, the underlying skepticism that drove the controversy often
lingers, if only invisibly. Additionally, destigmatizing and making it more culturally acceptable
for students to utilize accommodations still plays into the deficit-centered rhetorical construction
of ADHD explored in Chapters 3 and 4. To address both of these problems, then, what is needed
is a focus on intrinsic accessibility practices rather than extrinsic accommodations. Accessibility
practices need to be proactively built into the classroom spaces, pedagogies, and course designs
where they will actually be utilized. In doing this, instructors and WPAs can share the weight of
agency without infringing on students’ rights to privacy.
This focus on accessibility rather than accommodation is similar to the work being done
by education researchers in the area of universal design of learning (UDL). UDL is focused on
creating an education framework that doesn’t focus explicitly on the needs (or deficits) of
specific learners or individuals with various learning disabilities. Instead it attempts to
implement curricular and pedagogical principles that enhance the educational opportunities of all
individuals and that provide access to learning and knowledge no matter the students’
(dis)abilities. I say that accessibility is similar to UDL largely because I disagree with UDL on
the basis of terminology. I sense danger in asserting that any approach to education is truly
“universal.” UDL scholars would readily agree that any overt prescription of learning design
would necessarily neglect the needs of some. As Margaret Price has written, “The ‘universal’
part of the moniker expresses an aim rather than an accomplished fact” (87). However, to assert
universality, even if only as an aim rather than a fact, is to invite essentializing, and in the hands
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of politicians and bureaucrats that language can easily become co-opted as the new “No Child
Left Behind.” When we focus on a “universal” the aim is a panacea that will work in every case
for every individual. The goal is to reach an endpoint or a resting place where we can assert,
“Mission Accomplished!” Discussing the issue in terms of “accessibility,” on the other hand,
communicates that we are engaging in an iterative process that is constantly questioning whether
something (a pedagogy, an assignment, a classroom, etc.) is able to be accessed by all students.
And when the answer comes back in the negative, a shift or adjustment is not only warranted, but
actively invited. As Price asserts, “As teachers committed to creating more accessible kairotic
spaces for those with mental disabilities, we are not ‘solving problems’; we are finding ways to
move” (101). In my mind, then, we would do well to move away from “universal” language.
A common theme when discussing concerns with the current accommodations system as
it pertains to cognitively diverse individuals (as was done in Chapter 2), is that it does not take
into account the cognitive underpinnings of the disorder and focuses instead on problematic
behaviors. A composition course dedicated to incorporating ideals of accessibility for cognitively
diverse students needs to do a better job of enabling students to see the connection between their
cognitive processes and their outwardly expressed behaviors which, depending on how they are
framed, can be weaknesses and/or strengths.

5.3

Metacognition, not Behavior
When discussing behaviors and better understanding how/why/when they occur, and how

composition instructors (and writing program administrators, more indirectly) can help students
enact more productive behaviors, I am treading on fraught ground due to, as Chris Gallagher
terms it, “a disciplinary allergy to the b-word—behavior” (239, emphasis original). Behaviorism
has largely been relegated to the scrap heap of rhetoric and composition’s disciplinary heritage –
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alongside current-traditional rhetoric – for being overly prescriptive and mechanical, and for not
allowing for reflective response to fluid and evolving rhetorical exigencies. Addressing this
rejection of behaviorism in composition studies, Gallagher attempts a reclamation of
behaviorism that is important in understanding how to more effectively address the needs of
cognitively diverse students. Gallagher draws on Robert Zoellner to do so, asserting, “The key to
understanding Zoellner’s thinking is to recognize that behaviorism was for him an attempt to
understand and shape learning, not an effort to control behavior. Teachers can and should
reinforce behaviors that lead to learning, thereby helping students expand their behavioral
repertoire (and become more fully human)” (251). It is this view of behaviorism that is needed if
composition instructors are to help neurodiverse students to succeed. Their role is not to
prescribe specific behaviors, but rather to help students become more consciously aware of their
own behaviors as well as the circumstances, contexts, and other external forces that impel
behavior. Additionally, instructors can actively introduce various behaviors, writing practices,
and writerly habits to their classes, not as prescription, but as various options to try on to see if
they fit.
While this approach to introducing a broad range of possibly helpful practices and
behaviors to novice writers is not revolutionary – even the least experienced writing instructors
do this instinctively – when, as a discipline, compositionists consciously avoid critical
discussions and explorations of behaviors and behaviorism we are left intellectually emptyhanded, relying on lore and anecdote. To this end I echo Gallagher’s claim that “what we need
are not high-minded refusals to engage behaviorists, but better ways of thinking and talking
about writing and learning behaviors” (257, emphasis original). As such, I am not advocating a
wholesale rejection of the current behavior-based accommodations offerings. Indeed, as has been

100
discussed, in many cases clinically diagnosed students require such accommodations in order to
succeed. Instead, I am claiming that writing programs and composition instructors need to do
more at the level of course design and pedagogy to proactively help students utilize
accommodations as heuristics for better understanding their own idiosyncratic cognitive
processes. Students need to be given opportunities to more consciously reflect on successful
writing behaviors. This can be done as composition instructors more clearly teach and
demonstrate these behaviors to students, and more explicitly require students to reflect on which
practices and behaviors facilitate their own unique pathways to success.
Such a practice is reminiscent of Plato’s discussion in Phaedrus of “artful speaking.” He
claims, “You must understand the nature of the soul … [in order to] determine which kind of
speech is appropriate to each kind of soul…. Then, and only then, will you be able to use speech
artfully” (278b-c). Similarly, instructors need to recognize that students are each unique
regarding which behaviors, technologies, processes, environments, etc. are particularly
appropriate to their own unique “souls” and writing processes. In order to most effectively
enable students to understand their own writing souls, the focus then ought to be in crafting a
composition classroom in which students are able to become metacognitively aware of their own
unique, and perhaps ever-shifting, approach to writing success. Only then, will students be able
to compose artfully. Or if not artfully, at least effectively.
Creating an accessible classroom that addresses productive behaviors with this
metacognitive approach might be productively compared to cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT),
a common form of psychological therapy for individuals with ADHD and other
neurodevelopmental disorders. CBT is a method that arose due to the perceived limitations of
approaches to treatment that relied wholly upon pharmacological interventions or explicit
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behavior training. With both of these approaches, the “effects appear to be short-term and limited
to the period of treatment, [and] not all [patients] respond positively to treatment” (Toplak, et al
803). Alternatively, cognitive-behavioral approaches to treating ADHD focus on inculcating a
metacognitive awareness of the cognitive skills and performances that are associated with
specific behaviors. These treatments often focus on problem-solving strategies, training in selfinstructions, self-reinforcement and self-redirection to cope with errors. Toplak, et al explain
that, “The rationale and underlying theory for these types of treatments is the belief that
behavioral self-control can be increased by enhancing specific cognitive or metacognitive skills,
which are believed to underlie and promote impulse control, goal-directed behavior, or both”
(804). CBT, or any therapy, operates within the same medical paradigm as do accommodations
in that it is focused on identifying some problem or concern and attempting to address it.
However, CBT lends itself nicely to the neurodiversity approach of enhancing awareness of both
strengths and weaknesses and then leaning on strengths and addressing weaknesses. Its approach
to becoming more consciously aware of cognitive effects on behavior is most often used as a
means of mitigating problematic behaviors. But it can similarly be used as a means of helping
individuals with ADHD become metacognitively aware of both strengths and weaknesses. If
such metacognitive skills can in fact increase behavioral self-control, and help students better
understand more fully their cognitive strengths and weaknesses, this is a key in the project of
improving the cognitive accessibility of composition courses.

5.4

Metacognition and Composition
Metacognition is a phenomenon that has recently enjoyed much attention in composition

studies, but more thoroughly understanding its roots in cognitive psychology can further
illuminate how we might more fully utilize it as a tool for creating an accessible composition

102
classroom. One of the foundational works that helped spur the study of metacognition is John
Flavell’s 1979 article in American Psychologist, “Metacognition and Cognitive Monitoring: A
New Area of Cognitive – Developmental Inquiry.” In this article Flavell outlines a model of
cognitive monitoring that can help us better understand what is meant when we talk about
metacognition. This model consists of “four classes of phenomena” (906), of which we are
primarily concerned with the first two: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive
experiences.21 Flavell defines metacognitive knowledge as consisting “primarily of knowledge or
beliefs about what factors or variables act and interact in what ways to affect the course and
outcome of cognitive enterprises” (907). This knowledge in turn affects what a person “knows”
about herself as a cognitive processor, and which she then can abstract as being either unique to
her cognitive self or broadly true of all cognitive processors. Metacognitive experiences are
moments that cue metacognitive knowledge. They are situations that provide “opportunities for
thoughts and feelings about your own thinking to arise” (908). The ability to be aware of your
own cognitive processes and to develop an understanding of what it takes to improve cognitive
abilities might serve as a definitional starting point for all educational endeavors. In fact, in
concluding his article Flavell makes a claim regarding the educational potential of inculcating a
habit of metacognition that makes clear its importance in composition classrooms:
Perhaps it is stretching the meanings of metacognition and cognitive monitoring
too far to include the critical appraisal of message source, quality of appeal, and
probable consequences needed to cope with these inputs sensibly, but I do not
think so. It is at least conceivable that the ideas currently brewing in this area
could someday be parlayed into a method of teaching children (and adults) to
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The other two classes of phenomena -- goals/tasks and actions/strategies -- are discussed as being dependent on
and ancillary to metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experience.
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make wise and thoughtful life decisions as well as to comprehend and learn better
in formal educational settings. (910)
It is not overstating the fact that increasing one’s ability with metacognition is a vital life skill.
But even more strikingly (for the purposes of this dissertation, anyway) than Flavell’s claims
regarding the general importance of metacognition in life, are his claims about the specific skills
metacognition can improve, skills that are often at the heart of composition courses: evaluating
sources and recognizing and evaluating rhetorical appeals, not to mention increasing the ability
to comprehend and learn in formal educational settings. If early metacognition researchers were
drawing these connections between metacognition and composition, it is no wonder, then, that
metacognition is receiving much attention in composition research.
The Council of Writing Program Administrators, in cooperation with the National
Council of Teachers of English and the National Writing Project identified metacognition as one
of the “eight habits of mind essential for success in college writing” in their “Framework for
Success in Postsecondary Writing” (1). For the purposes of composition courses, the document
defines metacognition as, “The ability to reflect on one’s own thinking as well as on the
individual and cultural processes and systems used to structure knowledge” (1). Metacognition,
they explain, is fostered in writers as they are given opportunities to, “examine processes they
use to think and write in a variety of disciplines and contexts; reflect on the texts that they have
produced in a variety of contexts; connect choices they have made in texts to audiences and
purposes for which texts are intended; and use what they learn from reflections on one writing
project to improve writing on subsequent projects” (5).
Metacognition is currently applied to composition courses mostly as a way of helping
students consciously recognize the skills, habits, and processes they are learning in their
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composition courses so that they will be able to make use of them in later discipline-specific and
professional writing contexts. For example, let’s say a student learns to write a research paper in
her first year composition (FYC) class. When she is asked in her senior seminar in biophysics to
write a research article complete with literature review, if she is going to utilize what she learned
in FYC, she might metacognitively step back and say, “In my FYC class I learned to find
credible sources and to do library research, I learned to incorporate those sources naturally into
my own prose, and I learned how to create works cited pages.” She might then take the next step
of application and ask, “How do those skills translate to this research report? How should I go
about doing research for a literature review? How can I tell which databases to use and which
sources will be helpful to me? How do I actually incorporate those sources into my own writing?
etc.” The specific genre markers between an FYC and a biophysics research paper may be
completely different, but when students are metacognitively aware of what kinds of writing
skills, habits, and processes they have acquired, they are more likely to be able to generalize
(Beach) those skills, habits, and processes and repurpose them (Roozen) for use elsewhere,
though that repurposing will likely involve some reengineering (Brent) and remixing (Yancey,
Robertson and Taczak) before they work quite right.
This conception of metacognition is at the heart of the “transfer” boom over the past
decade, and much work has been done discussing ways to cue this kind of metacognition in FYC
programs. The touchstone for transfer researchers is often David Perkins and Gavriel Salomon’s
work from the late 1980s and early 1990s in which they distinguish between high-road and lowroad transfer by highlighting the differences in metacognition. High-road transfer, “depends on
deliberate, mindful abstraction of skill or knowledge from one context for application to
another...[this requires] reflective thought in abstracting from one context and seeking [and
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identifying] connections with others” (25). The example above is an illustration of this high-road
transfer. The student recognizes what she has learned previously and consciously attempts to
make connections between that previous experience and the new one in front of her. Low-road
transfer, in contrast, refers to “the automatic triggering of well-practiced routines in
circumstances where there is considerable perceptual similarity to the original learning context.”
If the student in the previous example were to engage in low-road transfer, she might not
consciously think of previous experiences, and instead rely on reflexive researching and writing
processes that might have been instilled or influenced by her FYC course, but in doing so she
does not reflect on whether those processes are the most valuable or effective for the new
project. The value of a metacognitive approach to composition has led some composition
scholars to create and publish course curricula, textbooks, and other pedagogical tools
specifically geared toward facilitating writing transfer22.
This “transfer”-focused approach to composition, while beneficial in many ways, might
be critiqued as being just another metaphorical frame for the discussing the general goals of any
education system. And, as King Beach has argued, it is perhaps not an altogether helpful
metaphor at that (101). What makes it so compelling is its explicit treatment of the notion of
metacognition. However, as transfer scholars incorporate notions of metacognition into their
work, they often discuss it as subordinate to the higher goal of transfer. In contrast, I would argue
that as compositionists we might be better served focusing primarily on metacognition. To most
effectively discuss “transfer” would require us to have a more thorough knowledge than we can
possibly have of the future rhetorical situations and composition exigencies that students will
face. But as composition instructors focus on metacognition, and provide students with various
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See, for example, Wardle and Downs’ Writing about Writing and Yancey, Robertson, and Taczak’s “Teaching for
Transfer” approach to FYC.
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opportunities to practice this skill, when they are put in those future situations they will have the
metacognitive ability necessary to “transfer.” We can do this as by providing students with
metacognitive experiences through which they can develop metacognitive knowledge.
As composition researchers and educators place metacognition in a central role in the
composition classroom, they are actively engaging in a form of cognitive-behavioral therapy that
has been found to be among the most successful as an academic intervention. Stephen Molitor, et
al found that a concerted effort to address the writing abilities of students with ADHD
“[affected] academic functioning above and beyond the effect of other factors that are more
commonly targeted with [ADHD] intervention” (402). In this study they measured “academic
outcomes” objectively in terms of GPA and subjectively as measured by parental report of
student success. Molitor, et al not only found that a general focus on improving writing abilities
was the best way to improve the academic functioning of students with ADHD, they additionally
found that, “arguably the most complex writing skill – planning and organization of ideas – was
the only significant predictor for both outcomes” (400). This is an important clarification,
because it is the metacognitive nature of planning and organization of ideas that makes it
“arguably the most complex writing skill.”
One additional note from the Molitor, et al study is germane to the discussion of the ways
in which a focus on metacognition is crucial in the composition classroom. In outlining the
limitations of their study, Molitor, et al acknowledge that the lack of a control group to which
they might compare their findings with the ADHD group hampered their ability to make any
definitive claims about the relationship between writing ability and academic success among
students with ADHD. While a clear limitation for their purposes, it did, however, open the door
to an intriguing possibility: “It is possible that this is not a phenomenon unique to adolescents
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with ADHD, but rather something that significantly affects all adolescents” (401). That a focus
on writing generally, and the metacognitive aspects of writing in particular, aids the academic
functioning of all students, not just those with ADHD, is important to note, especially with
regard to the controversy of accommodations giving an unfair advantage to those who receive.
Building these metacognitive experiences into composition course curricula and pedagogies
sidesteps the controversy altogether because all students are being provided opportunities to
improve their academic success as they develop metacognitive knowledge and habitual selfreflection with regard to their cognitive processes.

5.5

Mindfulness Meditation
Enacting a pedagogy that reflects cognitive-behavioral therapy ideals and that

productively focuses on inculcating metacognitive skills raises many questions about the
practicality and feasibility of such an approach. It might seem that such a pedagogy would
require instructors to have a basic understanding of cognitive processes and their relationship to
metacognition. In other words, it might seem that they need some training in cognitive
psychology, training they are not likely to receive in the course of their graduate degrees in
English departments, no matter the focus of their degree. Given the already exploitative nature of
many writing programs in relying on contingent labor to teach their general education
composition courses, adding this additional work might seem a bridge too far. Given this fact, it
might be tempting to just say that perhaps helping students learn to work with, through, and
around their struggles born of their cognitive diversity is work best performed by mental health
professionals. But in leaving this work to the mental health professionals, we are assenting to the
accommodations status quo with all of the attendant concerns discussed previously of supporting
and reinforcing a reactive system that requires the students to take all the initiative in seeking out
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help. While a basic training for composition instructors in cognitive processes and metacognition
might be the ideal, and something that we might aspire to in the future, there is one practice that
can be implemented fairly easily by most any instructor and that does not add undue burden to an
already over-worked group of instructors: mindfulness meditation.
The concept of mindfulness meditation often brings with it images of religious practices
and feelings of transcendence, an activity aimed at achieving some ethereal “oneness” in the
company of the gutteral utterance “ohm.” This association with the religious and transcendent
exists not only in the realm of stereotype, but it is also invoked when mindfulness meditation is
discussed in composition literature. For example, Christy Wenger discusses the “long tradition of
Eastern contemplative philosophy and practice” (130) in her WPA Journal article on applying
mindfulness practices to her work as a jWPA; the first page of Pat Belanoff’s 2001 CCC article
“Silence: Reflection, Literacy, Learning, and Teaching” is deliberately designed to mimic an
illuminated manuscript and begins much the same as the New Testament Book of John; Gesa
Kirsch explicitly refers to this spiritual perspective on mindfulness in the title her 2009 CCC
article, “From Introspection to Action: Connecting Spirituality and Civic Engagement”; and in
her book Radical Presence: Teaching as Contemplative Practice, Mary Rose O’Reilley
explicitly calls for a marriage of teaching and spirituality, asserting that, “pedagogy emphasizes
technique; spirituality addresses who we are” (14). In each of these cases, with the exception of
O’Reilley, the author’s intent is not necessarily to advocate for an indivisible link between
mindfulness meditation and spirituality and transcendence, but in each case the connection of
mindfulness and spiritual transcendence is the starting point.
This approach to mindfulness meditation is altogether fitting and proper considering that
any meditative practices largely derive from religious practice. Using this as the starting point
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when introducing mindfulness meditation to a composition course can be useful for some
students, but it can also be greeted with strong skepticism by others. This skepticism is especially
prevalent in cultures and societies where such practices are relatively recent imports. As such,
while acknowledging the long heritage of religious meditative practices, I use clinical and
therapeutic definitions, justifications and practices as the base for classroom discussions about
and practices of mindfulness meditation.
Mindfulness meditation has long been an integral practice among clinical psychologists.
As such, when introducing mindfulness meditation to a composition class I choose to lay the
groundwork by providing a definition derived from the perspective of these mental health
practitioners:
Mindfulness is a type of meditative technique that emphasizes an observant and
nonreactive stance toward one’s thoughts, emotions, and body states. Mindfulness
meditation involves experiential learning via silent periods of sitting meditation or
slow walking and purposeful attention to daily activities (for example,
mindfulness of eating). Relaxation, although often induced during the training, is
not the sole goal of this practice; rather, the main activity is a cognitive and
intention-based process characterized by self-regulation of attention to the present
moment with an open and accepting orientation toward one’s experiences.
(Zylowska, et al 738).
This approach to mindfulness meditation, by focusing expressly on “a cognitive and intentionbased process characterized by self-regulation of attention to the present moment,” fits squarely
within the realm of providing opportunities for metacognitive experiences whereby individuals
can gain metacognitive knowledge. As has been discussed, increasing metacognitive knowledge
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through metacognitive experiences generally is an important step in enabling students with
ADHD to enact productive and successful composition processes and behaviors. Relying solely
on that connection, we might credibly claim mindfulness meditation as a valuable practice to
incorporate into the composition classroom. However, research has been done explicitly on the
effects of mindfulness meditation therapy on individuals with ADHD with resounding positive
results.
In 2007, Lidia Zylowska, et al studied the effects of a specific form of mindfulness
meditation on 25 18 adults and 7 adolescent participants with ADHD. Though they were quick to
express that their findings were likely ungeneralizable due to the size and demographics of their
participants, they concluded that, “results of this pilot study support the feasibility of
mindfulness meditation in a subset of ADHD adults and adolescents and encourage future
controlled studies” (744). In 2008 Sarina Grosswald, et al performed an exploratory study of the
effects of mindfulness meditation on the stress, anxiety, and ADHD symptoms of ten 11-14 year
old children with diagnoses of ADHD. As a result of their study, they came to a qualified
conclusion that mindfulness meditation “may have potential as an effective non-pharmacological
intervention for managing the stress and anxiety associated with ADHD and impaired executive
function, and may have a positive impact on behavioral symptoms associated with the disorder”
(8). In 2010, Randye Semple conducted a study of 45 adult participants investigating the effects
of mindfulness meditation on attention. He divided the participants into three groups: a control
group receiving no training, a mindfulness meditation group, and a “progressive muscle
relaxation group to control for effects of physical relaxation on attention” (121). Semple found
that “after training and 4 weeks of twice-daily practice, the mindfulness group demonstrated
significantly greater discriminability on a signal detection task than did the other groups, and
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that, “Significant improvements in sustained attention were found following mindfulness
meditation, which did not appear to be mediated by relaxation or practice effects” (121). The
findings of these three studies are representative of the findings of several other studies
(Mitchell, et al; Van der Oord, Bögels, and Peijnenburg; Van de Weijer-Bergsma, et al; Bueno,
et al; Travis, et al), all of which similarly found that mindfulness meditation was an effective
means of helping individuals with ADHD more productively manage the negative effects of their
ADHD.
In addition to the three studies previously discussed, I want to specifically mention
Viviane Freire Bueno, et al’s study which found that mindfulness meditation “improved mood
and QoL of patients and controls” (1). This study is of particular note first of all because it
specifically attended to the effect of mindfulness meditation on QoL, which has been central to
my discussion. However, it is also noteworthy because, like the Stephen Molitor, et al study
described previously, Bueno, et al noted the effect of mindfulness meditation on both individuals
with ADHD and controls. The positive effect that mindfulness meditation has on all college
students, regardless of neurology, is well-established in psychology and education literature
outside of the context of ADHD (Deckro, et al; Oman, et al; Paul, Elam, and Verhulst; Travis, et
al). That this specific manner of creating an accessible composition classroom benefits all
students regardless of neurology is perhaps the most salient argument in favor of implementing
mindfulness meditation into composition courses.
While college students with ADHD generally struggle with many areas of academic
performance, writing is a particular difficulty for students with ADHD. Many different
accommodations are offered to students to help mitigate the negative impact of ADHD on their
schoolwork, but as has been discussed, it is important that we add to those accommodations a
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pedagogy and course design that actively incorporates metacognitive practices, one of which
might be mindfulness meditation, in order to more fully help composition students access the
composition classroom and find greater success.
Composition courses that include teaching practices thus geared toward providing all
students with metacognitive knowledge born of metacognitive experiences can help them
succeed at composition tasks and in all academic endeavors. This is a fundamental starting point
in creating a cognitively accessible composition course. In the next chapter I discuss another way
that composition courses can more actively meet the needs of cognitively diverse students, by
instituting a prototyping pedagogy that invites students to consciously and constantly pay
attention to and adjust their writing practices, habits, technologies and environments in ways that
best suit their own needs.
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PROTOTYPING PEDAGOGY, PHYSICAL
SPACE, AND COMPOSITION TECHNOLOGY

“Over the years I have fumbled my way through life, walking into doors, failing to figure out
water faucets, incompetent at working the simple things of everyday life. ‘Just me,’ I would
mumble. ‘Just my mechanical ineptitude.’ But as I studied psychology and watched the behavior
of other people, I began to realize that I was not alone. My difficulties were mirrored by the
problems of others. And we all seemed to blame ourselves. Could the whole world be
mechanically incompetent? ...While we all blame ourselves, the real culprit – faulty design –
goes undetected. And millions of people feel themselves to be mechanically inept. It is time for a
change.”
- Donald Norman, The Design of Everyday Things, pp. xi-xii
6.1

Overview
I begin this chapter with a quote from the preface of Donald Norman’s classic book The

Design of Everyday Things because the attitude Norman portrays here of self-blame for his
struggles in engaging with the world around him is representative of the attitude that many
students with cognitive disabilities adopt when they struggle in composition courses. This selfblame is further reinforced by the deficit-model accommodations system described in the
preceding chapters. In the previous chapter I discussed how focusing on accessibility rather than
accommodation is a paradigmatic change that can help shift this class of negative self-blame to a
more positive approach. I argued for making metacognitive experiences and knowledge, in
particular mindfulness meditation, more central to our work in teaching composition. This focus
on metacognition is important because it enables all students, not just those with ADHD, to
better understand how to engage in cognitively difficult tasks even if/when their own cognitive
processes make doing so a challenge. Additionally, this metacognitive practice can help students
to also identify certain cognitive strengths that they might have which might otherwise go
unnoticed. While this is an important starting point in making our courses more cognitively
accessible, there is much more that we can and need to do in order to foster a more cognitively
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accessible and productive educational environment. Norman’s attention to the influence of the
design of everyday things provides a useful entry point in identifying and discussing specifics
areas and means of directing our efforts in composition courses.
In discussing ways that the design of the physical world influences cognitive ability there
is no way to affirmatively say that thus and such classroom design is most beneficial for students
with ADHD or that thus and such technology will be most beneficial at helping students with
ADHD access the strengths born of their unique neurological functions. In this chapter I will
discuss some possible implications for creating a more cognitively accessible composition
courses by better understanding the influence of external things like physical spaces and
composition technologies on individual cognitive functioning and writing processes; however,
my goal is not necessarily to analyze the particulars of how the design of these things affects
students with ADHD. Rather, I argue that students can be educated is such a way that they can be
the ones who consciously and critically analyze the impact of external factors such as specific
spaces and technologies on their own abilities to function cognitively. They can then to use that
knowledge in consciously selecting writing processes (writ large) that are most beneficial to
them. While there are many external factors to consider when discussing the writing process, I
first briefly outline some literature from cognitive and education psychologists that illustrates
how two such factors, physical environments and composition technologies, influence
individuals with ADHD. I then propose implementing a prototyping pedagogy23 into the
composition curriculum that draws on ideas central to usability research methods. This pedagogy
can empower composition students, especially the neurodiverse students, to succeed in their
composition endeavors both in and out of the classroom by engaging in iterative design of their

Samantha Blackmon is owed credit for coining the term “prototyping pedagogy,” as it emerged in conversation
with her about this project.
23
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own writing processes (including external factors like environment and technology) that are
uniquely attuned to their individual cognitive needs. Like the mindfulness meditation strategy
discussed in Chapter 5, this prototyping pedagogy teaches students to apply design thinking to
their writing processes in ways that are beneficial to all students regardless of cognitive ability.

6.2

Physical Environments and ADHD
I might conceivably discuss at length many different external influences that impact

individuals’ ability to function cognitively and that in doing so have an impact on the ability to
compose. However, I have chosen to specifically address two such external influences,
technology and physical space, as they are two aspects of the writing process that all students
encounter, even if they don’t explicitly recognize it. While specific circumstances might require
discussion of further influences such as emotional states, family/community situations and
influences, substance use/abuse, etc., I suggest providing students with opportunities to
familiarize themselves with reflecting on and interpreting these two, and then inviting students to
extend such reflection and examination on other areas of more immediate, personal concern.
As psychologists and education researchers have attempted to better understand what
factors affect ADHD (for better or worse), one popular thread of research has been investigating
physical environments. Initially, these kinds of studies focused on outwardly expressed
behaviors of ADHD and made recommendations accordingly. For example, Jennifer Veitch, in
recognizing that individuals with ADHD tend to be easily distractible, recommends that
workplaces provide individuals with ADHD enclosed offices to screen potential distractions and
that workplaces endeavor to architecturally and culturally create quiet working environments
(41). Similar to these recommendations for workplaces, many of the articles published in
education journals about creating classroom environments that are conducive to the success of
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students with ADHD take a fairly prescriptive approach, describing in some detail ways to
organize the physical space of the classroom. For example, William Bender and Mickie Mathes
proposed several strategies for creating an “inclusive classroom” for students with ADHD.
Among their strategies, they recommended: using a “physically structured classroom rather than
an ‘open’ classroom” in order to limit distractions, seating students “away from noise,” placing
desks away from each other, seating students with ADHD at the front of the room or near a
teacher’s desk, seating students near positive models, providing “free desks” that students can
move to when they are feeling the need to be active, and eliminating “desk fatigue” through
activities that require students to interact physically (229). Eric Carbone similarly prescribed an
ideal classroom environment for students with ADHD, incorporating many of the same
recommendations as Bender and Mathes. Carbone went so far as to include a map entitled
“Classroom Model of Suggested Structural Interventions for Children with ADHD” illustrating
how these kinds of physical spaces might be organized.
These kinds of recommendations for creating physical spaces where students and
employees can be successful are all expressly focused on identifying problem behaviors, like
being distracted, and changing the environment in order to mitigate and/or remove the impetus
for those behaviors. This behavior-based approach to organizing physical spaces for the benefit
of individuals with ADHD is unsurprising as it fits nicely alongside the behavior-based
accommodations offered by many schools and workplaces as required by law. The problem, as
was discussed in Chapter 2, is that a behavior-based approach ignores the cognitive foundations
of those behavior concerns. While we readily recognize that our environments can have an effect
on our behaviors, we may not necessarily take the next step in recognizing that those behaviors
are founded upon specific cognitive processes. Thus, in specifically selecting certain
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environments for their effect on enacting certain behaviors, individuals are in fact making
decisions about environmental effects on their cognitive processes. The goal then is to make that
link between space, cognitive process, and behavior more explicit. Cognitive psychologists have
been doing research that does just that, looking more specifically into the effects of physical
environments on cognitive ability rather than just behaviors.
Some of the most striking research in this area has been focused on the influence of green
spaces24 on the cognitive functioning of individuals with ADHD. A. E. van den Berg and C. G.
van den Berg studied two groups of six children who were residents at “care farms for children
with ADHD” (431). They found that, “children with ADHD functioned at a constant high level
in the woods, whereas they displayed more variable behaviours and feelings and a generally low
level of cognitive functioning in the built setting” (436). Similarly, Andrea Faber Taylor and
Frances Kuo studied the effect of repeated exposure to green spaces on the ADHD symptoms of
421 children between 5 and 18 years old. They concluded that, “time in greenspace may mitigate
children's ADHD symptoms” (300). In qualifying this claim, they also found that a
“hyperactivity diagnosis may moderate the apparent effect of greenness of play setting on
symptom severity...for hyperactive children, greenness alone may not be enough to reduce
symptoms” (297). These studies and others (Amoly, et al; Matsuoka) seem to suggest that green
spaces in particular can potentially have therapeutic effects on the negative symptoms of ADHD.
Interestingly, the Faber Taylor and Kuo study also had an additional finding pertinent to
this discussion: “Children with ADHD seek out green outdoor settings at a substantially higher
rate than has been reported in recent studies for children in the general population” (296). Green
spaces may be generally beneficial in facilitating the cognitive functioning of individuals with

24

In this case, “green space” refers to natural spaces, not spaces that are the color green.
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ADHD (at least in some cases), but it seems that these individuals may intuit that such is the
case. Whether or not they are conscious of the effect of green spaces on their cognitive
processes, they actively seek out such spaces. This is likely true of all students and people, not
just those with ADHD. We recognize that in some spaces we are better able to complete some
tasks than in others. That knowledge may or may not be consciously held, but, by trial and error,
we all come to understand these kinds of truths about ourselves and our work habits. As teachers,
then, we can help students to makes this knowledge explicit and help them to actively seek it out
rather than just happen upon it over time.
This information about the impact of physical spaces on behaviors and of the particularly
beneficial impact of green spaces on ADHD is important to a general understanding of how to
best help individuals manage difficult ADHD symptoms. But the key point for our purposes is to
recognize that some physical spaces are more conducive to certain cognitive processes than
others. Space and environment affect cognition, whether that space is natural or human-made,
green or grey. And, importantly, that effect is not universal across all individuals. This point
bears considerable emphasis. In order to make composition courses more cognitively accessible,
we can’t just focus on creating an accessible classroom space because there is no such thing as a
universally accessible space that meets the cognitive needs of all individuals. And even if such a
space were possible, the positive effect of the space would only last as long as the students were
in the space. Most composition work is done outside of the classroom. And by outside I am
referring both to composition work completed for academic purposes and composition work
completed outside of and after students have left school. In order to succeed, students have to
learn to recognize for themselves how the physical spaces wherein they compose impact their
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cognitive abilities and thus their ability to compose effectively. This is true both regarding
physical space and digital space.

6.3

Composition Technologies and ADHD
Various assistive technologies are actively used in efforts to “help people with ADHD

achieve greater control and influence in social and occupational activities” (Lindstedt and UmbCarlsson 403). However, the study of these assistive technologies more often deals with their
impact on everyday behaviors like remembering appointments and general impulse control.
Helena Lindstedt and Õie Umb-Carlsson studied the effects of 74 different cognitive assistive
technologies (CAT) on 13 participants with ADHD and found that of the 74, “The three most
highly rated products by the participants were weekly schedules (paper, metal plates with
magnetic tags, plastic laminated paper and/or regular calendars), watches/alarm clocks and
weighted blankets” (404). In addition to identifying the most helpful CATs, they also identified
the areas of life in which these technologies were most helpful, and they found that the four most
frequently identified areas were in, “carrying out daily routines …, economic self-sufficiency …,
undertaking a single task …, and looking after one’s health” (404). Studies like Lindstedt and
Umb-Carlsson’s help us better understand how CATs can aid individuals with ADHD to
function healthily in all areas of life, occupational and social, and implementing that knowledge
will naturally have an impact on an individual’s ability to compose effectively and engage in
optimal writing processes. However, these kinds of studies are perhaps not as helpful when it
comes to the specific project of understanding what kinds of technologies specifically enhance
one’s ability to compose effectively.
Disability resource centers often have a commonly recommended list of assistive
technologies that they make available to those individuals who seek them out. Many such
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centers, like the Assistive Technology Center (ATC) at Purdue University, promote open access
to such technologies regardless of disability status. While there is no comprehensive list of the
assistive technologies made available by all schools, some offerings might include: screen
readers, screen enlargement tools, voice input (speech-to-text), text-to-speech, audio textbooks,
braille translators, alternate keyboards, alternate pointing devices, adjustable furniture, assistive
listening systems, and training on how to use these various software and hardware. Additionally,
when thinking about assistive composition technologies we often think of the latest in electronic
technologies, but it is wise to also consider the use of older and/or analogue technologies that
might value different kinds of cognitive functioning, technologies such as: pen/pencil and paper,
chalk/whiteboards, word processors, and many others. While these kinds of assistive
technologies have been demonstrated in many cases to be beneficial, they are not and should not
be considered easy fixes to the concerns of cognitively diverse individuals.
Whenever new and improved composition technologies emerge, there is often an almost
immediate discussion of ways in which they might improve accessibility for disabled
populations. In fact, in many cases new and improved technologies, such as many of those listed
above, are developed expressly for the purposes of meeting the needs and challenges of
individuals who were unable to access previous technologies. However, new technologies are not
the cure-all that they have sometimes been made out to be. In the 1980s there was much hope
that student writing would generally improve as students were taught and encouraged to
compose with computers. As Thomas Brownwell argued in 1984, “Word processors do make it
possible to write more in less time, and do make us better writers” (3). However, while there was
initial excitement and hope for the positive effects of computers on writing, results turned out to
be much more mixed. In 2003 Charles Moran analyzed the first 20 years of articles published in
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Computers and Writing, and found that, “This particular hope – that computers would somehow
make a difference in student writing – has been one that ‘springs eternal.’” Unfortunately, Moran
went on to explain, “it became clear that computers did not improve writing quality generally”
(349). Despite the fact that new technologies do not, perhaps, universally improve student
writing, specific technologies in specific circumstances can make a marked difference.
In a 1987 article in Computers and Writing, Ann Marie Malachowski wrote about the
case of a young woman with head trauma who experienced considerable difficulty with writing.
The young woman experienced difficulty with motor skills as a result of her head trauma, and, as
Malachowski described, “Because she had to pay so much attention to the physical act of
writing, she was unable to think much about what she wanted to say” (54). However, as
Malachowski introduced this young woman to composing using a word processor on a computer,
and with practice, the young woman improved to the point where she began receiving positive
comments on her work, some going so far as to praise her for her “almost professional writing
ability” (55). When asked how the computer helped her, the young woman explained, “Once you
got it on the computer, it’s gonna be there. You don’t have to keep remembering it” (56). She
went on to explain that when you write on a computer, “You can revise it so you can put it down
in sentences, and then if it doesn’t say what it means. You can change it” (57). Based on these
comments, we might surmise that one of the cognitive difficulties that this young woman faced
was deficits in working memory, one of the executive functions discussed in Chapter 2. Despite
this cognitive challenge, with the aid of a computer this young woman was able to offload that
cognitive task onto the computer which enhanced her cognitive fluency and enabled her to
compose more easily. This in turn led her to view writing as, “far more enjoyable” (57). This
case is one example of the promise that technology can hold for individuals who struggle with
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various cognitive issues. However, as Moran, noted, computers and technology more broadly
construed, “[do] not improve writing quality generally” (349). The goal then is to help students
understand the technology options that are open to them, and to provide them enough experience
with those technologies that they are able to consciously select those that will be of most benefit
for meeting their cognitive function and ability.
Again, I want to emphasize that this discussion is not intended as a declaration of
universal impacts on all students. While certain kinds of environments and certain technologies
have been demonstrated to be more or less beneficial to individuals and students with ADHD,
such benefits are not experienced by all individuals with ADHD, let alone all other individuals as
well. Because the focus of this chapter is on pedagogical implications, making sweeping
decisions based on the findings of these kinds of studies is perhaps not wise. Rather, I discuss
this research to demonstrate generally the kinds of effects spaces and technologies can have. To
this end, ADHD and other cognitive disabilities serve as useful metaphors for cognitive ability
generally. Researchers have studied specifically the ways in which cognitively diverse
individuals are affected by spaces and technologies, as a means of specifically seeking to
improve the situations of those individuals. But similar studies might and perhaps should be done
on an individual level by all students. In this way, these kinds of studies might be used to
introduce students to the idea of the subtle influence that spaces and technologies can have on
cognitive functioning, before then inviting them to consider for themselves the ways in which
specific spaces and specific technologies affect them.

6.4

Space, Technology, and Cognitively Accessible Composition
As we have seen, physical spaces affect cognitive abilities, but they don’t all have the

same effect on every person. Composition technologies affect cognitive abilities, but, again, the
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effect varies person-to-person. Given the numerous permutations of individual-space-technology
that might be generated for 20 students, the prospect of crafting a composition course that is
universally cognitively accessible can be daunting. And this is only taking into consideration two
of the many external factors that influence our cognitive abilities when we go about composing.
We might similarly myriad other external factors that impact cognitive functioning and that
make the task even more daunting. While difficult, a study published in 2007 by Noel Gregg, et
al can help us to begin understanding how to begin addressing this difficulty. This study focused
expressly on the beneficial effects of assistive technologies, but the general discussion of best
practices also helps us to address the difficulty of space as well.
In this study, Gregg, et al examined the influence of medium of a composition
(handwritten vs typed vs typed/edited) on the standardized testing scores of students with
learning disabilities, as well as the influence of spelling, handwriting, fluency, and vocabulary
complexity on those same scores. While writing done for standardized tests is not necessarily the
most valid assessment of writing ability (Perelman), the direct findings of this study are less
important for my purposes than is the discussion of best practices for incorporating assistive
technologies into the classroom. These researchers were specifically interested in comparing the
scores of students with dyslexia and those without in each of these areas. The researchers found
that, “Writers with dyslexia face cumulative challenges when required to write expository essays
in a timed situation” (313). This isn’t an altogether shocking finding, but they went on to explain:
Many writers with learning disabilities have good ideas; they simply need more
opportunities to practice written expression using assistive technologies and
writing strategies – as a means, not the end to writing instruction. Whether one
“writes” with a pencil, word processor, or voice-to-text technology is not the
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critical point. The key to developing writing productivity is writing practice. (316,
emphasis original)
The initial claim that Gregg, et al make here, that “Many writers with learning disabilities have
good ideas,” is an important note. As has been discussed throughout this dissertation, the fact of
being diagnosed with ADHD often carries with it an assumption of deficit or less capability. But
this isn’t necessarily always the case. As demonstrated here, the problem isn’t that neurologically
diverse students are incapable of inventing quality content for their writing; the problem seems to
be the act of writing itself. And part of that concern, as we’ve been discussing, is the technology
itself. For example, in Chapter 2 it was shown that individuals with ADHD are often more likely
to be spatial and kinetic learners. Asking students for whom this is true to sit at a computer and
quietly peck away at a keyboard may be to ask them to work in a way that is fundamentally at
odds with the nature of how their brain functions best, regardless of the ideas they may have. So,
in order to allow these students full access to their genius, we need to find ways to help them
compose using technologies that facilitate their own unique cognitive abilities. And, as Gregg, et
al explain, providing students with more opportunities to practice using assistive technologies
and alternative writing strategies is an important step in integrating those technologies and
strategies into the composition classroom in such a way that they can actually be perceived by
students as a viable option. To this end, Gregg, et al’s assertion that assistive technologies can
and should be used as a “means, not the end to writing instruction” is an important shift that
needs to be made. Much the same way that WAC programs often promote the idea of both
learning to write and writing to learn, we can and need to teach students various assistive
technologies as well allow (and maybe require) them opportunities to use various assistive
technologies as a means of learning other concepts.
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This call for greater presence and prevalence of assistive technologies assumes that as
students have increased practice with these technologies, the technologies will automatically
have a beneficial impact on students’ abilities to use these technologies in new and shifting
contexts. (This assumption is perhaps driven by the implied claim that writing productivity is the
prime concern of writing ability.) While it may be the case that repeated use will engender
beneficial habits, to assume that mere facility with these technologies will be of natural benefit to
students is to fall victim yet again to the eternal-yet-unrealized hope that Moran noted that
technology is universally beneficial to writing. However, if students are given the opportunity to
repeatedly practice using assistive technologies while simultaneously being given the opportunity
to repeatedly reflect on if/how/why these technologies are helping them to compose, then they
will be better able to actually utilize the full benefit of the technologies outside of the context of
the classroom. Similarly, as students are given opportunities to repeatedly interact with different
kinds of physical space and to repeatedly reflect on the impact of those spaces on their abilities
to engage in various executive functions, they will be enabled to consciously decide to compose
in those spaces most beneficial to them.
It is important for students to be given opportunities to gain familiarity and experience
with specific technologies and in specific spaces in order for them to learn what kinds of
technologies and spaces best facilitate their success; however, just as importantly is the fact that
as these “assistive” technologies and “alternative” spaces are integrated into the fabric of the
composition classroom, these technologies will no longer be relegated as “other,” as choices that
you may need to make if and only if you have some disorder that makes normal composition
difficult for you. Removing the othering influence of such composition alternatives is a vital step
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towards helping students to not view their intrinsic strengths as mere disabilities that need to be
overcome.
Reflection and mindfulness meditation, as discussed in Chapter 5, are useful tools in
helping students to analyze the effects of technology and space on cognitive ability, but in the
rest of this chapter I propose implementing prototyping pedagogy into composition courses as a
heuristic for helping students to more concretely analyze the impacts of these factors on their
composition practices and abilities and redesign their own approaches to composition
accordingly.

6.5

Usability Research and User-centered Design
To better understand what I mean by “prototyping pedagogy,” I need to first briefly

discuss usability research and user-centered design as it is built on these ideas. There is
considerable overlap between system-centered versus user-centered design and accommodations
versus accessibility. As such, a brief history of user-centered design will help illustrate why
usability research is a suitable groundwork for a prototyping pedagogy that helps encourage a
cognitively accessible composition course.
Usability research methods have traditionally been primarily the concern of individuals
designing computer hardware and software and other technological systems intended for use by
human agents. Their intent is to facilitate user-centered design of these products. The usercentered design movement came in response to the fact that, as Robert Johnson explains,
“modern technology is for the most part system- or artifact-centered” (25). Johnson continues,
explaining that:
The metaphor of system...intends to model life as a naturally ordered, systematic
phenomenon so we can, in turn, model our day-to-day activities in this “natural
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way.” In representations of human life and our attendant technologies through the
system-centered view, however, users are inevitably ancillary, or, in some cases,
they are nonexistent because the system is powerfully hegemonic: the system is
the source and ultimately the determiner of all. …There is no need for the user to
be involved with system or artifact development, this perspective suggests,
because the system is too complex and therefore should be designed and
developed by experts who know what is most appropriate in the system design.
(26, emphasis original)
I quote Johnson at length here, because his discussion of a system-centered approach to
technology design might easily have been a discussion of the development and distribution of
accommodations. On college campuses student learning is largely framed as a naturally ordered
systematic phenomenon. Individual disciplines likely frame the “natural order of student
learning” differently, owing to distinct disciplinary exigencies. But regardless of the specific
definitions of the natural order of education, education is enacted via pedagogies that are focused
more on system concerns (e.g. disciplinary histories, research methodologies, traditional modes
of instruction, etc.) than on the needs of the students. So when individual students are unable to
fit into the natural order of the system, the system prescribes accommodations to better enable
the anomalous student to assimilate.
Ultimately, accommodations are intended to be used by individual users, and the
selection of specific accommodations to be granted to individuals is determined on a case-bycase basis. So, on some level, users are taken into consideration in developing the
accommodations offered by colleges and universities. However, while users are considered, they
are not at the center of the accommodations design. As Johnson explained, the system of
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accommodations is deemed too complex and so needs to be developed by experts who know
what is most appropriate.
In response to this system-centered approach, then, is user-centered design. Stephen
Schneider explains, “User-center design is the idea that the best product-design principles are
those that support user needs and expectations ... moving toward a more responsive
understanding of the role of technology in people’s lives” (449). This notion of shifting the
impetus of design decisions from the affordances/constraints/needs of the system to those of the
user is a natural fit for a discussion of improving the accessibility of composition courses for
students who are neurologically diverse. Rather than generalizing and developing pedagogies
and accommodations based on assumptions, traditions, and even expert knowledge, we would do
well to craft student learning based on the needs and user-capacities of the users themselves, our
students.
One way that these ideas about usability research and user-centered design might
contribute to building a cognitively accessible composition course is in providing a framework
that WPAs and instructors might apply to gain valuable insight of user needs as they attempt to
(re)design various aspects of composition courses (classrooms spaces, pedagogies, projects, etc.)
in ways that are more cognitively accessible. Patricia Sullivan defines usability research in such
a way as to actively invite educators to employ usability research as they develop their
pedagogies: “Usability research, broadly construed, includes the work of people who design
systems, test them, develop educational materials, and study users” (256). While Sullivan’s
mention of educational materials here is not in reference to the work of classroom instructors, but
rather the work of technical communicators who “focus on the educational materials that
surround a system and on how users employ those aids to help them learn a system” (258), her
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assertion that usability research can be used to ensure that users are able to engage in educational
materials invites us to consider implications of usability research in the composition classroom.
On a pedagogical level, this might indicate that instructors approach each new day as an
opportunity to 1) collect user data from their students about the “usability” of their teaching
methods and 2) revise lesson plans and class activities/assignments according to that data. As
instructors and WPAs actively take into account the needs and expectations of their students,
they are taking a fruitful step towards making composition more cognitively accessible.
While it is important that composition instructors approach their own teaching in this
way, ultimately, if students are to be given the skills to succeed in composition tasks outside of
our courses, they need to be the ones to take charge of understanding what works and does not
work for them. Namely, students need to be taught how they can actively understand for
themselves the kinds of writing processes, environments, technologies, etc. impact their
cognitive functioning in such a way as to allow them to rely on their strengths and not be overly
burdened by their struggles.
There are many ways that WPAs and composition instructors might go about
encouraging students to do this. For WPAs, this might mean that more resources (from the
bottomless well of resources to which all WPAs have access) might be dedicated to providing
access to a greater variety of technologies. Additionally, more training might be required to help
instructors think more broadly about the spaces in which they instruct and the spaces in which
they encourage their students to compose. While resource allocation might be a helpful step,
ultimately, as mentioned previously, creating a course that meets all the usability needs of all
students is likely not possible.
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Perhaps the most valuable and cost-effective approach to creating a cognitively
accessible composition course is to implement a “prototyping pedagogy” that teaches students to
take the lead in actively “designing” for themselves writing processes that are most beneficial for
their own cognitive processes and abilities. Included in such design decisions are decisions that
take into account traditional writing processes taught in FYC textbooks (i.e. prewriting, drafting,
revising, polishing, etc.), as well as considering the environments in which they complete those
processes, environments dictated both by composition technologies used and the physical spaces
in which the composing takes place. As students go about this design work, they further need to
be taught to take into account their own usability needs. Framing writing in this way can help
students to identify in more concrete ways the technologies, spaces, and other writing/life habits
that might facilitate their own success.
The key in usability research, as we have discussed, is in studying and understanding
users and their needs. But in addition to gaining understanding about our users, or in this case
helping users better understand themselves and their own needs, Sullivan argues that we need to
define at the outset “how to measure using, what to consider successful, or where in the
development cycle to conduct the test” (256, emphasis original). In teaching students to be
usability researchers studying their own composition habits and contexts, we need to help them
understand how they use technologies, spaces, and processes; what successful composition looks
like; and how and when to conduct the test.
6.5.1 What Is Successful?
I first discuss what it means to use a writing process, including physical space and
composition technologies, successfully, because understanding success dictates how the other
concerns are answered. On first impulse the answer might be that “success” is completing a
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composition assignment/project. Because grades are the markers of success in education, and it
is the completed project that is graded, completion makes initial sense as the marker of success.
However merely completing a project can be done in ways that are not geared toward cognitive
fluency. When completion is the goal, it often is translated as completion-at-any-cost, which can
often mean working in a way that is counter to one’s unique cognitive abilities. As a
psychologist once told my father when he was diagnosed with ADHD after 30+ years of being a
high school English teacher (and the attendant executive functioning challenges presented by
having 200+ students’ papers to grade every time an assignment was turned in), “You must have
a will of iron.” Hoping that students find ways of completing composition tasks through sheer
grit and in spite of themselves is not a model of success.
Success, rather, seems to me to indicate that the individual is engaged in a consciously
designed writing process that not only mitigates the struggles attendant to their cognitive
functions, but that also draws upon the strengths of the same. Such success requires that students
be consciously aware of their cognitive processes and actively choose to enact a writing process
suited to their optimal functioning.
6.5.2 How and When to Measure Using
I discuss both the how and when of performing usability research on cognitively attuned
writing processes because the how often dictates the when, and vice versa. Measuring the “use”
of a writing process is perhaps more difficult than measuring the use of a technology or technical
document because of the goal is to move beyond paying attention to outward behavioral
expressions of cognitive functions and instead become more cognizant of those functions
themselves. Additionally, in this specific model of usability research, the roles of user and
designer are conflated. A user evaluates her own user needs, designs a process that she thinks
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will facilitate her cognitive abilities best, and then proceeds to engage in that process. This
makes certain usability testing methods difficult to engage as they often require an outside,
objective, and dispassionate evaluator. However, while this model of usability test makes
selecting usability research methods a bit more difficult, in other ways it also makes the usability
research as a whole easier because the designer has the most accurate user data possible. As such
the results of the usability tests themselves, once the methods are established, will be more
accurate in their reflections of the qualitative experience of the test than is usually possible.
While certain methods are more or less useful for performing usability research on a
cognitively attuned writing process, most any kind of usability test can be employed. Patricia
Sullivan’s delineation of some of the many different kinds of usability provides a nice
framework for discussing how this might be done. The methods Sullivan outlines are:
•

•

•

Direct questioning
o Surveys
o Interviews
o Comprehension tests
Observation
o Informal observation
o Laboratory observation
o User protocols
o Reading protocols
o Keystroke records
More traditional evaluation methods
o Computer text analysis
o Editorial review
o Technical review (259)

With regard to the direct questioning usability tests, these might be most easily performed while
students are enrolled in composition courses and thus can be organized into groups with other
peers. Though the students are taking on both the role of designer and user here, other students
can help their peers to more deeply reflect on the usability of their own processes. While there
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are many moments along the way in which these direct questioning usability tests might be
engaged, I discuss two: 1) peer review, and 2) post-mortem.
Usually peer review is seen as an opportunity for peers to review the product-in-process,
with specific reference to expressly textual concerns. However, peer reviews might be reframed
as usability tests of process. Students might question each other about the kinds of technologies
used, the spaces inhabited while composing the current draft, and then ask a series of probing
questions about the experience of the writer in completing this draft. As students then go about
revising their drafts, they can also redesign their processes by taking this usability data into
account. A similarly vigorous peer conversation might take place once the project is completed
and turned in, i.e. post-mortem. Again, employing an iterative design process, students can make
plans for improving upon their writing processes for subsequent assignments and composition
opportunities.
Observation usability tests might seem to be antithetical to the project because outward
behaviors are often that which is observed in observation-based usability tests, and the goal is to
move beyond a strict consideration of outwardly expressed behavior. It might seem fruitless, for
example, to have one student observe another student while she composes because there is no
way of “observing” the cognitive functioning of a peer. However, students can learn to become
observers, in a manner of speaking, of themselves. This is the goal of mindfulness meditation. As
students practice mindfulness meditation they develop an ability to be more consciously aware of
their cognitive processes and the extent to which those processes are being engaged optimally.
Students observe themselves in this way, they can conduct usability tests continuously all
throughout the writing process. In so doing, the design of the process (the environment in which
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the process is taking place, the technology being used) can be redesigned in response to this
ongoing observation.
6.5.3 Prototyping or Reflection
The end goal of a prototyping pedagogy is to encourage students to view their writing
processes as individualized prototypes that they are honing rather than rigidly prescribed
processes that they receive from the writing guru and that they must learn to master. As teachers
engage in this kind of pedagogy, every composition assignment – from informal in-class free
writes, to formal research reports, to audio-visual compositions – provides students more data on
their writing process prototypes and new opportunities to redesign their writing processes.
Students can become more consciously aware of their own cognitive strengths and weaknesses,
and well as what factors affect their cognitive abilities, as they establish the habit of performing
informal usability tests that analyze the ways in which their writing process choices, including
physical environments and technologies, influence their ability to succeed in composition tasks.
Teaching students to engage in this prototyping of their own writing processes, especially
with reference to the spaces and technologies they use to compose, might seem an unnecessarily
complicated framework for enacting a cognitively accessible pedagogy. This might especially be
argued considering we already have decades of research telling us that reflection is an integral
part of the composition process, and prototyping might be considered just a reframing of that
issue. I argue, however, that a prototyping pedagogy, with its use of usability research methods,
is more than just reflection in that it provides a more formal structure for how students go about
the work of understanding how the choices they make as they go about their writing processes
affect their cognitive functions and their ability to compose.
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Writing is hard for everyone, regardless of specific form of cognitive ability or disability
diagnosis. But the whole enterprise can be made more transparent as we enhance our
understanding of what makes it hard, of any external influences that exacerbate/ameliorate the
difficulty, and of any interventions that can help.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS

7.1

Looking Back
The goal of this dissertation has been twofold: 1) to better understand how and why our

rhetorical practices institute and reinforce marginalized identities and opportunities upon
disadvantaged communities and 2) to advocate for substantial revision of those practices. From
this discussion I have drawn three general conclusions that can help drive the work moving
forward to better fostering spaces wherein neurodiverse students can find success.
7.1.1 Conclusion 1: Institutional language surrounding neurodiversity needs change.
As has been demonstrated in Chapter 3, medical discourse has largely won the day with
regard to how ADHD gets discussed generally, but more specifically within institutions of higher
education. This is an improvement upon previous approaches such as moralistic and religious
discourse, both with regard to intellectual and scholarly rigor as well as the efficacy and
humanity of how individuals with ADHD are treated. However, as was discussed in Chapter 4,
this medical discourse imposes a negative, deficit-centric identity on cognitively diverse students
while at the same time making it difficult for non-experts to critique or revise this approach.
Just as the changing values and increased scientific knowledge of the 18th and 19th
centuries shifted the discourse about ADHD and other a-typical cognitive-behavioral expressions
from religious to medical, it is important that this kind of discursive shift continues into the 21st
century as newer and better models for understanding the brain and its many expressions emerge.
This change from the primacy of religious discourse to medical discourse in discussing ADHD
occurred as the medical and scientific communities actively asserted themselves and their work.
The exclusive and at times exclusionary nature of medical discourse makes this work of evolving
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and shifting the discourse difficult. However, the pattern of the previous shift from religious to
medical discourse is one that neurodiversity scholars and advocates need to continue to follow.
Those who do their work from within the medical paradigm usually hold patient care and wellbeing as central to their work. This shared value should provide an entry point for neurodiversity
advocates, both in medical and academic contexts.
7.1.2 Conclusion 2: More effort can/should be placed on the academic success of neurodiverse
students.
The ADA, which is the legal justification and motivation for the current approach to
accommodations, is explicitly concerned with access, not success. The individuals who enact the
legal requirements of the ADA in providing accommodations are concerned more broadly with
student success, and they do all they can to advocate for and enable students to find success in
their academic endeavors. However, as has been discussed, these efforts alone are insufficient to
meet the needs of the students themselves. This insufficiency is due, at least in part, to the fact
that the ideal of access, not success, is the justification upon which the efforts are formulated.
This is not to argue that the accommodations themselves are damaging or unhelpful. Rather that
in order for students to succeed, teachers and instructors – professionals whose work is
foundationally driven by the ideal of success – need to be more actively involved and invested in
ensuring that the accommodations that students receive go beyond access and actually serve to
enhance the success of these students.
In addition to teacher involvement and investment on behalf of neurodiverse students,
these teachers need to be provided the training and skills that will enable them to do go about this
work in ways that are founded on neurodiversity and cognitive best practices. Given the evershifting nature of any knowledge about or related to the brain and its myriad processes, it is
important to recognize that these best practices will shift and change as more and better models
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of understanding human cognition emerge. As such, this training in best practices will have to be
ongoing and the training itself will likewise have to evolve in order to match and adapt to the
best knowledge and research available.
There are many ways of ensuring that this neurodiversity training might be carried out,
and specific decisions in this area need to be made at the local level. However, one generalizable
key in crafting this training is to collaborate closely with individuals in disability resource
centers and/or counseling/psychological services on campus. As we work more effectively with
these individuals from other administrative offices and disciplinary traditions we can better
ensure that our pedagogies are founded on principles specifically geared toward student success.
7.1.3 Conclusion 3: What works for ADHD students helps most students.
Working to improve the cognitive accessibility of composition courses is beneficial for
most if not all students regardless of diagnostic status. One of the major difficulties of this
dissertation has been working around the fuzzy definitional boundaries of ADHD. It is difficult
to make any concrete assertions about what kinds of pedagogies work for “students with ADHD”
when every student with ADHD presents a unique and at times contradictory expression of
ADHD from every other student with ADHD. However, this difficult task of finding ways to
address ADHD makes the pedagogies that work that much more impactful for all of the other
students in class as well.
All students think, learn, write, and communicate differently. This has been one of the
most difficult challenges that composition teachers have faced since time immemorial. As such,
addressing the problem of ADHD provides a fresh avenue to approach developing composition
teaching methods that can conceivably reach all students, despite their differences.
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7.2

Future Research
Any attempt to define, discuss, and otherwise proclaim knowledge about neurological

and cognitive functions will be, at best, a mere selection of reality. There are important issues
and concerns that have been left unmentioned and unexplored in this dissertation. As such, there
is much work that can and needs to be done in better understanding where we might go from
here. In writing this dissertation I have found that some of the most insightful research that I
could draw from was that done by researchers outside of rhetorical and composition studies, and
even outside of the humanities. This is at least partly due to the nature of ADHD discourse being
dominated by medical and scientific discourses. In order to more effectively meet the needs of
our neurodiverse students, it is important that we do a better job of drawing on the collected
knowledge of individuals in other disciplines. In many cases, especially in psychology and
education contexts, they are doing work that runs parallel to the work we attempt to do in
composition. We can gain much from these kinds of interdisciplinary collaborations, but we can
also contribute much, especially as it pertains to the project of shifting the discourse from
exclusively medical and pathological, to one of neurodiversity.
One fruitful area of interdisciplinary research is in better understanding the individual
experiences of students with ADHD in composition courses. As we come to better understand
their experiences we can more concretely devise new pedagogical approaches. Similarly, more
interdisciplinary work might be done researching more closely the specific pedagogical
approaches outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, namely placing greater emphasis on metacognition and
on teaching students to view their writing processes as prototypes that they are continually
redesigning to better meet their needs. Additionally, there is a need for continuing research into
the effects of introducing specific assistive technologies into composition courses on the writing
habits and processes of all students, neurodiverse and neuro-typical.
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7.3

Conclusion
Composition is one of the few disciplines in any institution of higher education that can

potentially impact all students on campus. As such, we are in a unique position to help students
with ADHD and other expressions of neurodiversity to better understand how to succeed in
college by both mitigating the struggles of and drawing on the strengths that result from their
specific cognitive expressions. Granted, WPAs and composition instructors are not cognitive
psychologists. Our depth of understanding of these issues may not make us the best equipped at
helping students to understand and work through the specific difficulties they face due to
cognitive challenges and obstacles. As such, as I have discussed, we ought to collaborate more
explicitly with scholars more intimately acquainted with the nuances of this concern. However,
as we are engaging in these interdisciplinary conversations, we can begin implementing some of
the recommendations in this dissertation to begin taking the first steps toward more cognitively
accessible composition courses. Doing so will benefit all students, regardless of cognitive
(dis)ability.
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